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Abstract 
The existence of contrarian profits is a well-documented finding across various equity 
markets around the world. A key question, which is the focus of this research, is - why 
do such profits exist? Potential answers are examined in a large number of research 
papers, and fall into two categories: rational (i.e. there is a difference in risks 
characteristics of glamour and value stocks) and behavioural (i.e. the market regularly 
overshoots, leading to a mis-valuation of glamour and value stocks followed by a 
correction). However, a consensus has not been achieved so far.  
This research contributes to this discussion, based on the S&P 500 constituents through 
1990-2013 with the use of strategies based on past returns, fundamental ratios and 
valuation models. I assess the following issues: whether the use of contrarian strategies 
can be considered as justified by the rational behaviour of a portfolio manager, whose 
clients may have a cheaper option to invest in a passive strategy, like an index fund or 
exchange traded fund (chapter 3); whether contrarian profits are mainly the product of 
(i) fair value revisions in response to new information or (ii) corrections to prior mis-
pricing (chapter 4); whether contrarian profits are mainly the product of expected returns 
as imputed from the Fama and French three factor model (chapter 5). 
On the first point I find that an equally weighted portfolio of all constituents of S&P 500 
over a particular testing period was superior to any of the tested contrarian strategies 
from risk/return perspective (Chapter 3). 
On the second point, I find that fair value revisions to new information is less important 
in explaining contrarian profits than corrections to prior mis-pricing when the market 
rebounded in 2009 (the only year where these two influences explained a significant 
part of the contrarian profits for most of the contrarian strategies under review) from the 
2008 financial crisis (Chapter 4). 
On the third point, I find that rational pricing factors (both the Fama-French three factor 
model, and fair value revisions to new information) are more important in explaining 
contrarian profits than corrections to prior mis-pricing, which is mainly due to the 
significance of the Fama-French three factor model (Chapter 5).   
Abstract 
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Introduction 
The market success of a contrarian strategy in various markets and across 
various testing periods is now well documented in the literature. The crucial question 
which has been in the focus of researches is – why this strategy is profitable? The 
reason of such attention to this question is that profitability of contrarian strategies 
contradicts with efficient market hypothesis as a contrarian strategy allows to get a profit 
from the current information. 
There are two types of answers to the question above. First, the type which 
relates existence of contrarian profits to various behavioural factors. For example, one 
of the key papers in this group (DeBondt and Thaler (1985)) concludes that systematic 
overreaction of the market with subsequent mispricing correction is the reason for 
contrarian profits. Another key paper in this group (Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1994)) suggests that the reason behind the existence of contrarian profits is the naïve 
extrapolation of past performance of companies’ fundamentals by the market 
participants. Second, the type which relates the existence of contrarian profits to rational 
factors such as the difference in risk characteristics between glamour and value stocks, 
transaction costs, impact of taxes, liquidity risk etc. Despite the variety of factors which 
have been analysed the key one is difference in risks with the key paper being Fama 
and French (1996) where the authors introduced and extension of CAMP with another 
two factors.   
Another question, which is covered in the literature, is the comparison of various 
approaches to the contrarian strategies: past returns, ratios and valuation models. 
Despite this being a valuable insight for practical implementation of contrarian strategies 
by portfolio managers I think that this topic can be considered as the secondary one. 
There is be little point in comparing various contrarian strategies if they are not 
attractive trading plans to investors due to their inferiority to a passive strategy, or in the 
event that the key reason behind contrarian profits is difference in risks or other rational 
factors. 
Firstly, in order to contribute to the analysis of the questions regarding the 
reasons behind existence of contrarian profits I will first examine whether contrarian 
strategies based on various fundamental ratios, past returns of valuation model are able 
to perform better than a passive strategy. The research question is the following: are 
Introduction 
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contrarian returns not arbitraged away due to them being unattractive for investors 
relative to a passive investment strategy? This will be the focus of Chapter 3.  
A contrarian strategy is an active strategy, which needs to be better than a 
passive strategy in order to attract investors’ attention. This comparison is missing in 
previous studies of contrarian strategies, while it could be a significant factor for 
understanding of why contrarian profits are not arbitraged away.  A simple and 
compelling requirement for the attraction of any trading strategy is that it beats a 
cheaper one that requires much less time/effort. In the case that a particular contrarian 
strategy can generate statistically significant positive returns, but is not that good as a 
passive one it would be hard for investor to decide to apply it despite the visible 
profitability. 
I will examine the key characteristics of the passive strategy and compare simple 
(past returns or ratios based) and sophisticated (valuation model based) strategies from 
a risk/return perspective, using a Calmar ratio as an evaluative tool. Initially the data for 
a one year testing period will be presented with the subsequent tests of the robustness 
of alternative results using six and three-month formation/test periods. The initial 
analysis will be done on the basis of the periods where contrarian profits are statistically 
significant wit the consecutive double checking of the results with the use of the whole 
sample of the periods.  
Secondly, I will aim to distinguish between two competing explanations of 
contrarian profits existence behavioural and rational, where behavioural factors will be 
correction of mispricing in value and glamour stock portfolios, while the rational factor 
will be difference in dynamics of fair prices over the testing period for value and glamour 
stock portfolios. In this part of the analysis I will be interested in the following research 
question: are contrarian returns mainly explained by the behavioural factor (the 
correction of prior mispricing) rather than by rational reasons (the dynamics of stocks’ 
fair values)?  This will be the focus of the Chapter 4.  
The model, which will be used for the analysis, is based on the assumption of 
periodic corrections of stock prices to some fair level, when dynamics of the fair price 
set the long-term trend in a particular stock’s price. This is what some researchers 
observe. Shiller (1981) showed that prices fluctuate around fundamental fair value 
based on the discounted dividend stream.  
Introduction 
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Thirdly, I will incorporate the analysis risk factors controls into the evaluation of 
different strategies. The research question in this part of the analysis will be the 
following: are contrarian returns mainly explained by the Fama French three-factor risk 
model rather than by the behavioural factor (the correction of prior mispricing)? This 
implies that over a particular period of time the rational change in price is not only driven 
by the change in fair price, but also by change expected in accord with the change of 
underlying risk factors. Fama and French three-factor model (Fama and French (1996)) 
is one of the key risk factor tools which has been used in the literature in order to 
consider the risk difference explanation as a driver for reported for reported contrarian 
profits. Consequently, incorporation of this model into the direct test of importance of 
various factors is a crucial step in order to distinguish between a rational and 
behavioural explanation of contrarian profits.  This will be the focus of the Chapter 5.  
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Chapter 1. Literature review and research objectives 
1.1. Introduction 
Selling past winners and using the proceeds to fund a portfolio of past losing 
stocks is for many the hallmark trade of the behavioural investor. Penman (2009) 
summarises the contrarian strategy as follows (Penman 2009: 80):  
“stocks with low multiples [of price] are sometimes called contrarian stocks for 
they have been ignored by the herd. Contrarian investors run against the herd 
they buy unglamorous low multiple stocks and sell glamorous [high multiple] 
stocks.” 
The market success of such a strategy in various markets and across various 
testing periods is now well documented in the literature. The crucial question which has 
been in the focus of researches is – why this strategy is profitable? The reason of such 
attention to this question is that profitability of contrarian strategies contradicts with 
efficient market hypothesis as a contrarian strategy allows to get a profit from the 
current information. 
There are two types of answers to the question above. First, the type which 
relates existence of contrarian profits to various behavioural factors. For example, one 
of the key papers in this group (DeBondt and Thaler (1985)) concludes that systematic 
overreaction of the market with subsequent mispricing correction is the reason for 
contrarian profits. Another key paper in this group (Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1994)) suggests that the reason behind the existence of contrarian profits is the naïve 
extrapolation of past performance of companies’ fundamentals by the market 
participants. Second, the type which relates the existence of contrarian profits to rational 
factors such as the difference in risk characteristics between glamour and value stocks, 
transaction costs, impact of taxes, liquidity risk etc. Despite the variety of factors which 
have been analysed the key one is difference in risks with the key paper being Fama 
and French (1996) where the authors introduced and extension of CAMP with another 
two factors.   
Another question, which is covered in the literature is the comparison of various 
approaches to the contrarian strategies: past returns, ratios and valuation models.  
Chapter 1. Literature review and research objectives 
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This chapter is organised in the following way. First, I will discuss the key papers, 
which analyse the reasons behind the existence of contrarian profits from behavioural 
and rational viewpoints. Then I will review the key papers, which are dealing with the 
comparison of various approaches to the contrarian strategies in an effort to understand 
which approach is better. 
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1.2. Behavioural reasons for the existence of contrarian profits 
1.2.1. Market overreaction 
DeBondt and Thaler (1985) is a land mark paper where the authors argue that 
the simple strategy of buying stocks with prior poor returns and selling stocks with prior 
strong return generate positive profit and that this is due to the market regularly 
overreaction on various news rather than due to difference in risks.  
The authors analysed the US equity market examining common stocks traded on 
the New York Stock Exchange market, which are in the database of the Centre for 
Research in Security Prices of the University of Chicago. The period under investigation 
is between January 1933 and December 1980. 
The criteria for the division between “losers” and “winners” stocks were the 
cumulative excess returns of the stocks during 36 months to the portfolio formation date 
(the “portfolio formation period”). Excess return is equal to the return of the stock minus 
market return (average return of all the stocks in the sample). The top 35 (50 or top 
10%) of the stocks ranked in descending order with the use of this coefficient consider 
to form “winners” portfolio. The bottom 35 (50 or 10%) – “losers” portfolio. Then the 
average excess returns of these two portfolios were calculated over the subsequent 36 
months (the “test period”). Formation dates are set at the end of December starting from 
December 1932 and ending on December 1977, with a step of three years to have non-
overlapping periods. Then the authors analyse the difference between “losers” and 
“winners” portfolios, calculating t-statistics for significance where inputs were returns of 
these two portfolios in each of the 16 non-overlapping three year periods. 
As a result, they have found that “losers” portfolio tend to produce better results 
than “winners” one over the 36 months testing period with the difference in excess 
returns of 24.6% and t-statistics being 2.2, which implies that the difference is 
statistically significant. In addition, they have found that greatest part of the excess 
return came over three January months in the testing period, with the average 
difference in excess returns of 8.1% and a t-statistic of 3.21 in the first January, 5.6% 
(3.07) and 4.0% (2.76) in the second and third January months respectively. 
Additionally, they analyse alternatives length of formation periods (five years, two 
years, one year). For five years, the profitability of contrarian strategy remains with even 
higher t-statistics for various months of testing period. For two and one year periods 
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results became weak with no significant difference being found over one or two year of 
the testing period, suggesting separation based on past performance.  
Risk according to CAPM was not identified as an explanation of the contrarian 
strategy profitability. The market betas of “losers” portfolios over the formation period 
were lower than betas of “winners” portfolios. 
Hence the existence of a statistically significant profit of contrarian strategies 
based on past returns was assumed to be a support for the overreaction hypothesis. 
This hypothesis implies overshooting of stocks from time to time due to excessive 
pessimism or optimism of investors with subsequent normalisation of prices. 
On the other hand, the January effect (most of the profit for the contrarian 
strategies appeared in Januaries) was not analysed. 
In their next paper in 1987 the authors extended their research in order to 
examine in details the January effect, investigate further the difference in risk of 
“winners” and “losers”, examine the impact of size effect on contrarian profits and 
assess some fundamental characteristics of winners and losers. However, this 
additional analysis has not changed their prior results that overreaction is the key 
reason for the existence of contrarian profit even from a rather simple strategy. 
Additional analysis of the reversal of earnings dynamics for “losers” and “winners” 
showed that there are signs of excessive pessimism/optimism for these two stocks 
related to the earnings dynamics. 
Again, they were dealing with the US equity market and used almost the same 
method and sub-sample of the market. 
The January effect in asset pricing seems to be attributed to tax issues given that 
they have found a negative dependence between excess returns in January and 
December. The idea of tax loss selling is that investors want to fix a loss in the end of a 
year in order to have a tax waver. However, the authors admit that their research is not 
enough to make a strong conclusion on this issue. Johnston and Cox (1996) investigate 
tax loss selling effect as a factor in generating clusters of high contrarian profits in the 
successive Januarys observed by DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1997) on the US market 
and found out that after controlling for size and tax effect contrarian profit disappear in 
January.  
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In contrast to the previous paper DeBondt and Thaler look at the risk of the 
portfolios during the testing period rather than during formation period given that there 
was a critique from Vermaelen and Verstringe (1986) that risk could vary in line with the 
market value of the companies. They have found that during testing period beta of a 
loser portfolio is higher than for winner portfolio. However, in their view the difference of 
only 0.22 could not be a sufficient explanation of an average annual return of contrarian 
portfolio of 9.2%. Hence they conclude that the observed difference in risk is not 
sufficient to explain the excess return from the contrarian strategy based on past 
returns.  
To examine the size effect the authors compared average and median market 
value for losers and winner portfolios. There were no substantial differences and it was 
hard for them to attribute the contrarian profits earned to the size effect.  
 In addition, the authors examined whether reversal in relative prices dynamics 
coincide with reversal in earnings, which would be a factor to support the overreaction 
hypothesis. They have found that there is a strong reversal in earnings for the “losers” 
portfolio from a decline into a growth phase and vice versa for “winners” portfolio. This 
in the authors view could be a sign of the errors in investors’ estimates of future 
companies’ business results, which lead to excessive pessimism or optimism and 
affects relative performance of stock prices.  
Dissanaike (1997) investigated the contrarian strategies using past returns within 
the UK market, which was a significant step towards expansion of the contrarian 
strategies analysis given that most of the prior studies focused on the US equity market. 
He took into consideration only large capitalization stock and a relatively small number 
of them which make the analysis closer to the task which portfolio managers solve in 
practice and at the same time make the results relatively robust to the size effect and 
bid-ask spread factors, which were considered by some of the researches as important 
reasons for contrarian profits existence (Zarowin (1990), Conrad and Kaul (1993)). The 
results support the overreaction hypothesis on the UK market in line with the results on 
the US market done by DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987).  
Differentiation between “losers” and “winners” portfolio was undertaken on the 
base of 48-month past returns. Dissanaike focuses only on the members of FT 500. 
Each year on 1 January from 1979 to 1988 he took the members of FT 500 on that date 
and estimated returns for winners and losers over the next 48 months.  
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A January effect was also identified on the UK market. However, the tax 
explanation investigated by Johnston and Cox (1996) on the US market should not work 
the same way in the UK given that tax year ends in April in this country.  
Besides buy and hold method, Dissanaike used returns constructed with monthly 
rebalancing and found even stronger evidence of contrarian profits being positive. 
However, he acknowledged that this method involves incurring a substantial transaction 
costs and could be affected by thin-trading problems.  
He then investigates whether contrarian profits are a result of differences in risk. 
Other explanations like bid-ask spread bias, infrequent trading and less knowledge 
about some small firms he could rule out for a study of FT 500, which are supposed to 
be well known and liquid. Dissanaike follows Chan (1988), Ball and Kothari (1989) 
methods to estimate relative risk of losers and winners and found out that positive 
profits remain even after controlling for risk. 
Antoniou et al (2006) argue that short term contrarian profits on the UK market 
exist due to market overreaction to company news rather than due to risk as captured 
by the Fama and French three factor model (see section 1.3.1.). The result is in line with 
the outcome of the research conducted by Dissanaike (1997) who also focused on the 
UK market, but with the much longer formation and testing periods. 
In contrast to Dissanake (1997) who focused on FT 500 constituents the authors 
used the data for all stocks listed on the LSE between 1984 and 2000. The contrarian 
strategy examined is based on past returns (past week is taken into consideration) with 
weekly rebalancing. They have found out that such strategy is profitable even after the 
adjustments to the FF three factors model, market frictions and seasonality. 
The authors discuss the impact of transaction costs and came to the conclusion 
that even if they are taken into consideration the strategy remains profitable. 
Wu et al (2012) also focused on the UK market and argued that overreaction is 
the key reason behind long term contrarian profits formed on the basis of a past return 
strategy. However, this holds only for what they call “middle-priced” stocks.  
 The authors used the contrarian strategy, based on the past five year period’ 
stock price performance using as a sample the constituents of the FTSE All-share index 
and FTSE All-Small Index for the years1970-2009. The testing period is also a five year 
window (60 months).To separate the stocks by price size groups the authors rank the 
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stocks by their price size each month and then assign top 30% to “high-priced” group, 
middle 40% to “middle-sized” group and the remaining 30% to “low-priced” group.  
The authors found that contrarian profits are positive on the whole sample as well 
as in each price size group. However, when returns are adjusted by Fama and French 
three factor model, by market risk and liquidity risk factors only contrarian strategies for 
“middle-priced” group of stocks continues to be profitable. 
1.2.2. Mistakes in the future growth assessment 
Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) made a significant step towards analysis 
of excessive pessimism/optimism regarding “losers” and “winners” or “value” and 
“glamour” stocks. The authors found out that the difference between cash flow growth 
for “glamour” and “value” was substantially smaller than the difference in the implied 
growth rates of various fundamental ratios or by the past dynamics. For earning growth 
rates the picture was even clearer, here there was no large difference in earning growth 
rates displayed at all. At the same time they have not found any material evidence that 
there is a difference in risk between “value” and “glamour” portfolios. The authors 
considered this as a strong support of the behavioural nature of contrarian profits.  
The authors analyse stocks traded on NYSE and AMEX. At the end of each April 
for the years from 1968 to 1989 they rank stocks according to a particular ratio and then 
group them into ten (decile) groups. The first group (glamour) are stocks with the lowest 
value of the ratio, while the tenth group are those with the highest value of a ratio (CF/P, 
E/P, growth in sales, B/P). Then they monitor performance for the next one to five 
years.   
They also applied a double-sorting by ratios approach. First stocks are sorted 
into three groups on the basis of one ratio and then once more into groups ranked into 
three groups on the basis of the second ratio resulting in nine portfolios. This approach 
gave results which are mostly in line with the one ratio, single sort, approach. 
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Table 1.2.2.1. Returns of the contrarian strategy based on B/P ratio 
 Low B/P High B/P Difference 
 
Portfolio 1 out of 
10 
Portfolio 10 out of 
10 
10-1 
R1 (average return over 1968-89, in the first 
year after portfolio formation) 
0.110 0.173 0.063 
R2 (average return over 1968-89, in the second 
year after portfolio formation) 
0.079 0.188 0.109 
R3 (average return over 1968-89, in the third 
year after portfolio formation) 
0.107 0.204 0.097 
R4 (average return over 1968-89, in the fourth 
year after portfolio formation) 
0.081 0.207 0.126 
R5 (average return over 1968-89, in the fifth 
year after portfolio formation) 
0.088 0.215 0.127 
Source: Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) 
Note: The chosen formation date is the end of April each year over 1968-1989. “Value” stocks are the 
ones from the top decile according to B/P ratio and “glamour” stocks are the ones from the bottom decile 
according to the same ratio. 
The key aim of the study was to investigate whether glamour stocks are driven 
by the optimistic expectations of investors, which extrapolate positive dynamics in the 
company business without taking into consideration potential reversion. They looked at 
the past performance of glamour vs. value stocks and found that normally glamour 
stocks outperform substantially value stocks when they are ranked on past earnings 
growth rates, cash flow growth rates, sales growth rates and stocks returns. At the 
same time, glamour stocks had a lower CF/P and E/P ratios. The authors asked a 
question, whether the differences are justifiable from a future growth rates perspective. 
When they compared implied growth expectations for cash flow and the real growth 
over the next five years they found out that the difference between cash flow growth for 
glamour and value was substantially smaller than the difference in projections of cash 
flow growth rates. For earning growth rates the picture was even clearer, given that 
there was no large difference in earning growth rates displayed at all.  
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In addition, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) examined the risk control 
issue utilising various measures. They analysed persistency of “value” portfolios 
superior performance over “glamour” portfolios. The authors calculated standard 
deviation and betas. The result was that superior performance is persistent. Value 
stocks consistently outperform glamour stocks. For example, for a one year investment 
period the CF/P ratio results in value stocks outperforming glamour in 17 out of 22 years 
and 17 out of 22 year for B/P. With a longer holding period the consistency of 
outperformance increases. “Value” portfolios tend to have higher beta than “glamour” 
(but authors consider this as a result of higher “upper” beta, which means more 
sensitivity to the growth trend on the market). Standard deviations of returns also 
exhibited higher for “value” portfolios (but they found that it is not related with higher 
downside risk – in the worst months on average “value” portfolios outperform “glamour” 
portfolios). 
La Porta (1996) was inspired by the work of LSV (1994) and also tested whether 
superior returns of value strategies are a result of some error in analysts’ expectations. 
The author did not focus on risk as an explanation given that in his view a failure to test 
one risk model does not mean that there will be a failure to test another one. Hence, he 
focused on analysing errors in analysts’ forecasts. The result was that there is evidence 
that analysts overestimate future earnings growth rates of glamour stocks and 
underestimate the ones for value stocks. 
La Porta made calculations on the basis of NYSE and AMEX stocks. He formed 
ten portfolios on the basis of low and high analysts’ expectations regarding future 
earnings growth for each year from 1982 to 1990 with the portfolio formation date being 
end of June each year. As a result, there is a clear trend for returns to increase from the 
high expected growth rates to lower expected growth rates. This is not that clear over 
shorter test windows of a year. However, in each year returns of the top decile (low 
earnings expectations) are higher that returns of bottom decile. 
The author then compared expected earnings growth of value and glamour 
groups with the actual earnings growth rates.  The earning of glamour companies 
demonstrated almost no growth after the formation date, while earnings of value 
companies grow at 7.5% on average per annum during five post formation years.  
In addition, La Porta, tested whether the reason for the existence of such 
contrarian profits is in the extrapolation of future earnings trends from current ones by 
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investment anlysts. He separated stocks into three groups according to past sales 
growth (in line with LSV 1994) and according to earnings growth expectations. True 
value stocks are those that have low earnings growth expectations and low past sales 
growth. “Temporary winners” are those that have high past sales growth but low earning 
growth expectations. In the same way, glamour stocks are those that have high 
expected returns and high rate of sales growth in the past. “Temporary losers” are those 
that have low past sales growth but high expected earnings growth.  
The results are mixed. Returns for “temporary losers” are statistically higher than 
returns for glamour stocks, which is consistent with overreaction hypothesis. On the 
other hand, returns for value stocks are smaller than returns for temporary winners and 
statistically are not different from them.  
Despite rejecting the effectiveness of risk comparisons due to them not being 
able to analyse all possible risk models La Porta compared betas, standard deviation 
and investment performance in up and down markets of various stocks groups. Stocks 
with high earning expectations have higher standard deviation and betas, which is 
contrary to the risk explanation of the difference in returns with low earning growth 
expectation portfolios. The same result exists when comparison is done on the basis of 
earnings expectations and past sales growth rates. In addition, low expected earnings 
growth stocks perform better than the high earnings growth stocks during bear markets.  
Cai (1997) applied the approaches by LSV (1994) to the Japanese market. The 
author has found contrarian profits for B/P, CF/P and past sales approaches, while 
there was no significant difference in return for P/E ratio. The test of extrapolation 
accords with LSV (1994) results in concluding that investors are over optimistic for 
glamour portfolios and over pessimistic for value ones.  
Fluck et al (1997) also followed steps of LSV, but on a relatively small sample of 
the 1000 largest companies in the US stocks market. A small sample may in their view 
help to test contrarian strategies from a real investor point of view, who normally does 
not deal with tens of thousands of stocks, but rather focuses on a substantially smaller 
investable universe. In addition, they took into account transaction costs. They also tried 
to designed out the survivorship bias by taking 1000 largest stocks trading at the start of 
their testing period in 1979. I should note that this looks a bit unusual as this approach 
would be effected by survivorship bias since the sample will become smaller and 
smaller with some of the companies being delisted through the period of observations. It 
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would be more efficient to take a new sample of 1000 stocks with a particular frequency. 
The authors agreed with this, but mentioned that they were unable to do this due to lack 
of data.  
Finally, they tested the LSV hypothesis that the reason for contrarian profits is 
naïve extrapolation of investors’ past performance of companies (like sales or earnings 
growth). However, the test was rather different from what LSV’s as they used analysts’ 
forecasts instead of growth rates implied by a particular ratio (i.e. P/E). This makes their 
research more look like the research method of Dechow and Sloan (1997). However, 
they acknowledge this fact stating that the comparability of their results with LSV (1994) 
largely depends on whether analysts’ forecasts are a good proxy of market 
expectations. It should be also mentioned that in contrast to LSV they use quarterly 
rebalancing of their portfolios.  
At first, they tested a P/E contrarian strategy and found that contrarian profit is 
positive even after adjusting for transaction costs and found that it could not be 
explained by a large difference in betas. They run a market model which results in a 
positive alpha for low P/E portfolios. Then they test the contrarian profit on the basis of 
analysts’ forecasts in the same way and found that the contrarian profit resulting is 
smaller than in P/E case and the alpha from a market model is close to zero. On the 
basis of this the authors concluded that contrarian profits generated by a P/E trading 
strategy could not be explained by error in market expectations. Furthermore, the same 
analysis was done for P/B ratio with the same results as with the P/E strategy.  
In contrast to LSV (1994) Dechow and Sloan (1997) found no evidence of 
contrarian profits being the result of extrapolation of past trend in earning or sales. 
However, they argue that taking into consideration naïve pricing of analysts’ forecast 
could explain a substantial part of the contrarian profits.  
Firstly, they tested a naïve extrapolation of past dynamics of a company 
performance as a motivation for contrarian strategies profitability. In line with LSV the 
authors used the US stock market data and applied contrarian strategies on the basis of 
B/P, E/P and CF/P ratios. Dechow and Sloan compared past and future growth rates for 
sales and earnings for different stock groups based on the ratio under revision. For a 
B/P contrarian strategy they have not found mean reversion in past sales. However, 
there was one in earning growth rates. For E/P and CF/P they have not found mean 
reversion in sales or earnings growth rates. 
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In addition, they run the same analysis for contrarian strategies based on past 
sales, past earnings growth and the past sales growth, but on a per share basis. In this 
case the mean reversion is observed rather clearly. On the other hand, contrarian 
profits between groups of stocks with the highest and lowest past growth rates is 
relatively small across strategies. 
To test more formally whether investors anticipate mean reversion Dechow and 
Sloan used a Mishkin (1983) model of the form: 
(𝑟𝑡 − ?̅?𝑡|𝜙𝑡−1) =  𝛽(𝑋𝑡 − 𝑋𝑡
𝑒) + 𝜀𝑡   ,   (1.1) 
where 
𝑟𝑡 = return to holding a security during period t, 
?̅?𝑡 = market’s subjective expectation of the required return for period t, 
𝜙𝑡−1 = set of information available to the market at the end of period t – 1, 
𝑋𝑡 = variable relevant to the pricing of the security in period t, 
𝑋𝑡
𝑒 = rational forecast of Xt at the end of period t – 1 [𝑖. 𝑒. , 𝑋𝑡
𝑒 = 𝐸(𝑋𝑡|𝜙𝑡−1)], 
β = X’s valuation multiplier, and 
𝜀𝑡 = disturbance with the property that 𝐸(𝑋𝑡|𝜙𝑡−1) = 0. 
To forecast Xt they applied a linear model, which results in a system of 
equations, which were used in the test. 
𝑋𝑡 =  𝛾0 +  𝛾1𝑍𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝑡 ,   (1.2) 
𝑟𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1(𝑋𝑡 −  𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑍𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝑡   (1.3) 
This approach allowed comparing the mean reversion implied in the actual sales 
or earnings data and mean reversion implied by the market. This is done through 
comparison of the similar coefficients in both equations. As a result, Dechow and Sloan 
have not found statistically significant evidence that investors make substantial errors 
comparing to the actual mean reversion implied by the historical data of earning or 
sales.  
Secondly, the authors investigate whether some part of the contrarian profit could 
be attributed to the naive pricing of analysts’ forecasts of long term earnings growth 
rates. They directly run a regression of future one or five-year stock return on a 
particular ratio and analysts’ forecasts (separately and together). Then they calculated 
the contribution of forecasts to explanatory power by dividing R2 for a regression where 
only forecasts are used by the R2 for a regression where a particular ratio and forecasts 
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are used. As a result, in all the tests this contribution was significantly larger than 50% 
and for five year returns for B/P ratio reached 97%.  
Hence they came to the conclusion that naïve pricing of analysts’ forecasts is the 
factor which could explain contrarian profits rather than naïve extrapolation of the past 
dynamics of actual earnings or sales outcomes.  
Levis and Liodakis (2001) analyse the sources of contrarian strategies 
profitability on the UK market. They examined B/P, CF/P, E/P and past EPS growth 
contrarian strategies. As an important part of their analysis I should mention monthly 
rebalancing, which make it less valuable given that they did not control for transaction 
costs.  
For a B/P trading strategy the profit is statistically significant for one year holding 
period after the formation date. At the same time the same analysis did not provide 
statistically significant returns for CF/P, E/P and past ESP growth strategies.  
To test whether the results could be explained by a naïve extrapolation of past 
dynamics of the companies fundamentals Levis and Liodakis applied two factor 
contrarian strategies with B/P, E/P or CF/P and past EPS growth. The assumption is 
that naïve extrapolation should imply outperformance of the stocks with low B/P (E/P or 
CF/P) and poor past EPS growth over the stocks with low B/P (E/P or CF/P) and strong 
past ESP growth. The analysis showed that this is not the case given that there is no 
statistically significant difference between returns of these two groups in either of the 
ratios used. 
Bali et al (2010) provided further evidence in favour of misevaluation by reason of 
the existence of contrarian profits. Their assumption is that the company decision to  
repurchase its own stock is a sign of the company’s stocks being under/overvalued.  
Bali et al used the data for US market for the period from 1972 to 2002 with the 
formation date for contrarian strategies being at the end of April. The strategies tested 
were B/P, CF/P and E/P. As an indicator of net stocks repurchase/issuance the authors 
use NISA indicator. Bali et al estimated contrarian profits for the one to four years post 
formation periods. 
As a result they have found out that for all examined strategies the difference in 
returns for value stocks of companies which purchase stocks from the market and 
glamour stocks which companies issue new stocks is statistically significant (the 
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difference varies between 8 and 10% per annum over the 12 months post formation 
period with the t-statistics being above 3 implying strong significance). On the other 
hand, the difference between the returns of stocks of value companies, which issue new 
stocks and glamour companies, which repurchase stocks, from the market is statistically 
insignificant and small or even negative across all of the strategies (negative for 12 
months post formation period).  
The authors also tested whether there is a significant difference between value 
and glamour stocks for those companies repurchasing/issuing shares in terms of risk 
measures (beta, standard deviation) and found no significant difference.  
Finally, they monitor contrarian profits in various states of the world assuming 
that in the worst states the strategies should produce negative return in case there is 
indeed difference in risks between value and glamour stocks. Again, the authors found 
absence of evidence supporting risk explanation of the contrarian profits.  
Piotroski and So (2012) also provided evidence in favour of the errors in judging 
a company’s fundamentals being the key source for contrarian profits. They used a B/P 
contrarian strategy with annual rebalancing over the period from 1972 to 2010. In line 
with Fama and French (1996) they considered the top 30% of stocks, ranked by B/P, to 
be value stocks and bottom 30% to be glamour stocks.  
Piotroski and So assumed that the sign of errors in the market assessment of 
stocks is that one observes a significant difference in returns between value stocks, 
which are considered to have strong fundamentals, and glamour stocks, which have 
weak fundamentals, while the difference in returns between value and glamour stocks 
which have weak/strong fundamentals should be insignificant. This is in line with Bali et 
al’s (2010) logic, with a the different assumption being made regarding the relevant sign 
of the companies fudamentals being wrongly priced in by the market. 
Strength of the companies’ fundamentals was assessed with the use of 
FSCORE, which was introduced by Piotroski (2000). This is an aggregate score based 
on nine characteristics of a particular company. These characteristics are based on the 
data from the financial report with no relation to this company stocks prices. 
As a result they have found out that the difference between value and glamour 
stocks when value is measured relative to fundamentals over a one year post portfolio 
formation is 22.6% per annum, while the difference in returns between value and 
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glamour stocks where fundamentals are  weak and strong respectively was close to 
zero. 
Zou and Chen (2017) argue that there is different reaction to earnings 
announcements for value and glamour stocks and it is this that drives contrarian 
strategies profitability. Expectations for glamour stocks are considered to be optimistic 
while for value they are considered to be pessimistic. As a result it is likely that for value 
stocks earnings announcement leads to a stronger positive surprise than for glamour 
stocks and vice versa for negative surprises. Consequently, the authors conclude that 
errors in expectations lead to the profitability of contrarian strategies.  
The authors used the 1985-2013 period for the US stock market with the annual 
rebalancing as at the end of April each year. Fundamental ratios B/M, CF/P, E/P and 
past sales growth are used. The authors split stocks into deciles and also form the 
filtration by two factors following Lakonishok et al (1994). Contrarian profits are 
analysed for the period from one to five years.   
In order to analyse the effect of change in the investors sentiment Zou and Chen 
used the investment sentiment index developed by Baker and Wurgler (2006). Using a 
result of regression analysis Zou and Chen found that negative earnings surprises affect 
value stocks significantly less than glamour stocks. On the other hand in one case (E/P 
strategy) exposure to the positive earnings surprises is stronger for value stocks (E/P).  
In my view it would be better for the authors to provide a direct test of the thesis 
they mention in the conclusion that “the announcement of the actual earnings may 
create a positive surprise for value firms and a negative surprise for glamour firms” 
rather than proxying such “surprises” using a sentiment index. To test this they could 
compare glamour and value stocks in terms of number of positive and negative 
surprises in the post formation period.  
 
1.2.3. Conclusion 
Among behavioural explanations the most important ones are: 1) regular market 
overreaction to news and 2) errors in the investors/analysts’ expectations regarding 
future fundamentals of the companies.  
In my view the evidence in favour of the overreaction explanation is weak due to 
the weakness of the method for testing overreaction to news which has been used in 
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the literature (test whether past return contrarian strategy is profitable and then 
eliminate risk explanation). This method does not take into consideration fair prices 
adjustment to new information. It can be the case that the prior poor performance of 
“losers” and the strong performance of “winners” with a consecutive reversal is the 
result of fair prices fluctuations rather than due to overreaction and consecutive 
correction of this overreaction. 
The evidences of errors in investors/analysts’ expectations are more convincing, 
but still require improvements. On one hand, researches directly show that there are 
optimistic expectations for “glamour” stocks and pessimistic for “value” stocks. 
Consequently, there should be some mispricing for these two groups of stocks given 
that fair values normally are based on the expected future dynamics of a company 
fundamentals. However, in the same way as for the overreaction explanation, the move 
of companies’ fair values over the testing period can be strong enough to explain a 
substantial part of the contrarian profit while the adjustment due to correction in errors 
can be less important (i.e. due to existence of systematic errors on the equity market). 
Consequently, the crucial part which is missing from the prior research of the 
behavioural explanation of contrarian profits is the direct test of the mispricing correction 
as the sources of contrarian profit, where mispricing is estimated in relation to a 
particular fair price estimation method implied by a particular contrarian strategy. This 
analysis should be a valuable addition to the discussion given that an assumption of 
periodic correction of stock prices to some fair level is at the core of behavioural 
explanations for contrarian profits. And this is what some of researchers observe. For 
example, Shiller (1981) showed that prices fluctuate around fundamental fair value 
based on the discounted dividend stream. 
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1.3. Rational reasons for the existence of contrarian profits 
1.3.1. Fama and French model 
The most important paper which presents an argument in favour of the risk 
explanation of contrarian profits is Fama and French (1996). The authors argue that 
their three-factor model (excess return for the market over risk free rate, difference in 
returns between large and small companies and difference in returns between 
companies with high B/P and low B/P) can explain the existence of contrarian profits: 
E(𝑅𝑖) −  𝑅𝑓 =  𝑏𝑖[E(𝑅𝑀) −  𝑅𝑓] +  𝑠𝑖E(SMB) +  ℎ𝑖E(HML)   (1.4) 
Firstly, they replicate the calculations done by LSV (1994) with the use of simple 
ratio approach (B/P, CF/P, E/P and past sales growth rank) and then applied their three 
factor model risk-adjustment to the results of all the ten groups of portfolios.  
They confirmed the results of LSV (1994) that value stocks produce better 
returns than glamour ones for all four methods.  
Also, they have found that in all the cases for all ten groups of portfolios the three 
factor models gave a R2 of more than 90% or close to this figure. The authors reported 
coefficients on the market premium, SMB and HML, or β, s and h only for CF/P and 
sales growth cases, but not for B/P and E/P. Their commentary on these linear 
coefficients is rather weak in my view. If these three factors are supposed to be risk 
factors, then it is crucial to look at the relative risks of the value and glamour portfolios. 
They do not comment at all on the relative market risk. In the CF/P regression, for 
example, results that for all ten groups of portfolios linear coefficient b (market risk) is 
almost the same for all the groups – it varies from 0.98 to 1.14 without a clear trend. 
They concluded that there is a clear trend for the size factor, SMB, coefficient s, which 
is not exactly what is observed. The linear coefficient (size risk) on SMB varies from 
0.45 to 0.57 with no distinct trend for nine portfolios and only for the value one it goes to 
0.92. The only risk factor which shows a distinct trend for different groups is the 
coefficient on HML h, (B/P risk factor) as it changes from -0.39 to 0.79. Almost the same 
picture exists for portfolios based on past sales growth. For the market risk factor, there 
is a slightly declining trend over the ten portfolio groups from glamour to value, which 
means that value stocks have less risk deriving from. For s linear coefficient the picture 
looks even worse than for CF/P case as glamour and value groups have the highest 
coefficient within the ten portfolios. Again, only B/P risk factor presents a more or less 
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clear tendency of value stocks having higher exposure to this factor than glamour 
stocks.  
Table 1.3.1.1. Results of application of Three factor model to a contrarian strategies 
based on B/P, E/P, CF/P and past sales growth 
Deciles 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
B/P Low         High 
A 0.08 -0.02 -0.09 -0.11 -0.08 -0.03 0.01 -0.04 0.03 -0.00 
t(a) 1.19 -0.26 -1.25 -1.39 -1.16 -0.40 0.15 -0.61 0.43 -0.02 
R2 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.89 
E/P Low         High 
A -0.00 -0.07 -0.07 -0.04 -0.03 0.02 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.00 
t(a) -0.07 -1.07 -0.94 -0.52 -0.43 0.24 1.01 1.46 1.49 0.05 
R2 0.91 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.92 0.92 
CF/P Low         High 
A 0.02 -0.08 -0.07 -0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.01 
B 1.04 1.06 1.08 1.06 1.05 1.04 0.99 1.00 0.98 1.14 
S 0.45 0.50 0.54 0.51 0.55 0.50 0.53 0.48 0.57 0.92 
H -0.39 -0.18 0.07 0.11 0.23 0.31 0.36 0.50 0.67 0.79 
t(a) 0.22 -1.14 -1.00 -0.04 -0.51 0.00 0.06 0.72 0.92 0.14 
t(b) 51.45 61.16 62.49 64.15 59.04 61.28 60.02 63.36 58.92 46.49 
t(s) 15.56 20.32 22.11 21.57 21.49 20.72 22.19 21.17 24.13 26.18 
t(h) -12.03 -6.52 2.56 4.28 7.85 11.40 13.52 19.46 24.88 19.72 
R2 0.93 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.92 
5-Yr SR High         Low 
A -0.21 -0.06 -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 0.00 0.04 0.07 
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B 1.16 1.10 1.09 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.02 
s 0.72 0.56 0.52 0.49 0.52 0.51 0.50 0.57 0.67 0.95 
h -0.09 0.09 0.21 0.20 0.24 0.33 0.33 0.36 0.47 0.50 
t(a) -2.60 -0.97 -0.49 -0.20 -0.61 -0.25 -0.66 0.07 0.47 0.60 
t(b) 59.01 70.59 67.65 65.34 56.68 68.89 52.49 54.12 50.08 34.54 
t(s) 25.69 25.11 22.59 21.65 20.15 23.64 21.89 21.65 23.65 22.34 
t(h) -2.88 3.55 8.05 7.98 8.07 13.63 12.80 12.13 14.78 10.32 
R2 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.93 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.92 0.87 
Source: Fama and French (1996). 
Testing with the use of two ratio approach gave almost the same results as with 
simple ratio approach. Only the B/P factor shows a clear tendency of higher exposure to 
risks for more value laden portfolios.  
In 1998 Fama and French extended their research to 12 other large stock 
markets (Japan, the UK, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Switzerland, Sweden, Australia, Hong Kong and Singapore). They applied their three-
factor model to contrarian strategies based on B/P, E/P and CF/P and found out that it 
could explain the profitability of contrarian strategies, which were profitable in 12 out of 
the 13 markets they studied (12 mentioned above and the US).  
Later on, in 2000 Fama and French with James Davis extended the research of 
the US market to the period from 1929 to 1997 and again found out that the three-factor 
model works relatively well in explaining the premium paid to a contrarian strategy.  
Gregory et al (2001) repeated the analysis done by LSV (1994) on the UK 
market. The formation date was the beginning of July, while the testing period was one 
year for the period from July 1980 to December 1998. In line with the LSV finding they 
concluded that contrarian profits exist for E/P, B/P, CF/P and past sales growth 
approaches as well as the two factor strategies when a ratio is combined with a past 
sales growth factor. The three-factor model of FF (1996) was not able to efficiently 
explain the existence of the contrarian strategies profits for two-factor contrarian 
strategies. However, it was rather successful in explaining one factor approaches.  
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Brouwer, Van Der Put and Veld (1997) extended the analysis of contrarian 
strategies to large European markets (France, Germany, Netherlands and the UK). 
They have also concluded that the profitability of contrarian profits on these markets is 
due to a behavioural factor rather than a difference in risk.  
They used cash flow to price, book value to price, dividend yield and the earnings 
to rice ratio and the analysed period was from 1982 to 1993. They eliminated country or 
industry bias by adjusting the raw ratio with the relative country and industry.  
Table 1.2.6.1. Returns for quintiles portfolio based on ranking according to various 
ratios  
Portfolio 
Value Ratio Low 2 3 4 High High-Low 
E/P 
0.168 
(0.403) 
0.172 
(0.339) 
0.171 
(0.332) 
0.157 
(0.346) 
0.218 
(0.449) 
5.0 
CF/P 
0.086 
(0.341) 
0.143 
(0.341) 
0.170 
(0.338) 
0.197 
(0.335) 
0.294 
(0.482) 
20.8 
B/P 
0.139 
(0.348) 
0.161 
(0.357) 
0.150 
(0.319) 
0.199 
(0.378) 
0.239 
(0.463) 
10.0 
Dividend 
yield 
0.165 
(0.427) 
0.154 
(0.344) 
0.177 
(0.356) 
0.174 
(0.339) 
0.217 
(0.412) 
5.2 
Source: Brouwer, Van Der Put and Veld (1997). 
Note: () – cross-sectional standard deviation, portfolios formation date is end of June each year during 
1982-1993. 
Brouwer, Van Der Put and Veld (1997) also consider the risk control issue and 
conclude that differences in performance of portfolios does not relate to risk. In two 
years: 1987 and 1990, when there was a substantial decline of the equity market, value 
portfolios performed better than glamour portfolios. The authors provide calculations of 
standard deviation of glamour and value portfolios. The result is that for all ratios except 
dividend yield the risk of glamour portfolios was less than the risk of value portfolios. 
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This means that the risk explanation is not that compelling as an explanation of the 
contrarian profits reported.  
Badrinath and Kini (2001) analysed the contrarian strategy based on  the E/P 
ratio and argue that the positive contrarian profits continue to exist even if the time-
varying risk are taken into consideration. They also compared betas for value and 
glamour portfolios and came to the conclusion that there is no significant difference 
between them across various periods used for beta calculations. 
They analyse the US market on the dataset from 1956 to 1996.  The authors 
form the portfolios as at the end of March and then also conducted additional research 
with end of June formation date. The authors form 20 groups in order to compare betas 
between them. For contrarian return calculations they split the sample stocks into 10 
groups.  
Griffin and Lemmon (2002) analysed contrarian strategy on the base of B/P ratio 
and argue that existence of this profit is due to mispricing rather than due to the Fama 
and French three factors model (see section 1.3.1.) or difference in the companies’ 
fundamentals.  
The authors used the US market data (all non-financial stocks on NYSE, AMEX 
and NASDAQ) for the period from 1965 to 1996. The formation date is the end of June. 
And split between value and glamour is done on the basis of the top 30% by B/P 
ranking being considered to be value stocks and bottom 30% - glamour stocks. 
In response to the critique of Novy-Marx (2013) and others about the three factor 
model incompleteness Fama and French (2015) extended their three factor model into 
the five factor one. The five factor model incorporates the profitability and investment 
activity: 
E(𝑅𝑖) − 𝑅𝑓 =  𝑏𝑖[E(𝑅𝑀) −  𝑅𝑓] +  𝑠𝑖E(SMB) +  ℎ𝑖E(HML) +  𝑟𝑖E(𝑅𝑀𝑊) + 𝑐𝑖E(𝐶𝑀𝐴)  (1.5) 
RMW is the factor which represents the difference in returns between portfolios 
of stocks of companies with high and low profitability, while CMA factor shows the 
difference in returns between stocks of companies with low and high investments 
volumes.  
However, the authors do not apply this model to the analysis of profitability of 
contrarian strategies as they have with the three factor one.  
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1.3.2. Other factors 
In a further effort to understand the reasons for contrarian profits Gregory et al 
(2003) analysed macroeconomic factors as reasons for contrarian profits existence. 
They assumed that these factors could be proxies for various types of risks.  
They have analysed E/P, B/P, CF/P and sales growth ratios and aimed to find 
out whether there is a relationship between contrarian profits based on these ratios and 
such macro characteristics as GDP growth, consumption growth and investment 
growth. The authors have not found a relationship between contrarian strategies results 
and consumption or investment growth in most cases (except for E/P). GDP growth 
alone has some positive relationship with B/P strategy returns and E/P returns. 
However, once the Fama and French factors are taken into consideration this 
correlation became insignificant. Moreover, for CF/P the relationship is initially negative, 
which looks counterintuitive to the assumption that GDP growth is a risk proxy.  
Black and McMillan (2005) extended the research by Gregory et al (2003) 
regarding whether the macro factors are able to explain contrarian profits. The authors 
used the following macro data as a proxy for macro risk factors: one-month Treasury 
bill, dynamics of industrial production and the annual money supply in terms and default 
yield. They have also added Fama and French factors to the analysis. 
They focused on the efficiency of a B/P strategy on the US market. The main 
limitation is that they applied a one month investment period, which implies significant 
transaction costs, which was not addressed in the paper. The authors found that a 
substantial part of the contrarian profit can be explained by the dynamics of the 
analysed macro factors. However, they concluded that part of the return is left 
unexplained, which is the sign that behavioural explanation can also be an important 
element in a more comprehensive evaluation of contrarian profits. 
Doukas et al (2004) analysed whether the level of disagreement between 
analysts regarding future earnings potential could help to explain part of the contrarian 
profits on the US market. In order to be included in their sample a stock should be 
covered by at least two analysts, which could be potentially a weak point of the research 
given that they use the analysts forecast dispersion as a disagreement risk proxy. 
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Preliminary analysis of data showed that for small companies with high B/P 
(value) the disagreement between analysts is much higher than in any other groups and 
the opposite is true large companies with low B/P ratio.   
 
Table 1.3.2.1. Dispersion of Analyst Forecasts for Portfolio of Companies and BV/MV, 
1983-2001 data (median in brackets) 
Size Quintile 
BV/MV Quintile Q1 (small) Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 (big) 
Q1 (low) 
0.125 
[0.0042] 
0.0059 
[0.0026] 
0.0049 
[0.0019] 
0.0037 
[0.0017] 
0.0024 
[0.0012] 
Q2 
0.0115 
[0.0048] 
0.0073 
[0.0034] 
0.0059 
[0.0031] 
0.0054 
[0.0026] 
0.0044 
[0.0026] 
Q3 
0.0137 
[0.0051] 
0.0100 
[0.0044] 
0.0071 
[0.0038] 
0.0072 
[0.0036] 
0.0060 
[0.0040] 
Q4 
0.0180 
[0.0065] 
0.0101 
[0.0048] 
0.0076 
[0.0043] 
0.0081 
[0.0045] 
0.0077 
[0.0046] 
Q5 (high) 
0.326 
[0.0097] 
0.0212 
[0.0087] 
0.0184 
[0.0081] 
0.0150 
[0.0071] 
0.0092 
[0.0052] 
Source: Doukas et al (2004). 
Furthermore, they tested a five-factor model (the FF three-factor model plus the 
momentum factor of Carhart (1997), plus the analysts’ forecast dispersion factor as one 
that could explain stock returns and contrarian profits. In this model the linear coefficient 
for analysts’ forecasts dispersion appeared to be statistically significant and R2 for 
various types of stocks was close to 0.9 or above it.  
Lo and Coggins (2006) tested short-term contrarian strategies on the Australian 
market and in contrast to Antoniou et al (2006) they adjust their reported trading profits 
to account for trading costs. This adjustment eliminated the statistically significant profits 
of a contrarian strategy. 
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Wongchoti and Pyun (2005) argue that trading volume could be one of the 
factors, which affects the profitability of contrarian strategies given that they analysis 
showed that only in high trading volume group contrarian profits exist even after 
adjustments to various risks and are statistically significant.  
The authors analysed all stocks outside the S&P 500 index, which is a rather 
unusual focus given that normally researches are either focus on all stocks listed or 
stocks included in a particular index. The reasons of such focus was due to large 
coverage of S&P 500 stocks by analysts and investors, which implies that the dynamics 
of trading volumes are less informative for these stocks then for a smaller ones (Karpoff 
(1986)). Also they assumed that S&P 500 consituents have a high systematic return 
volatility, which limits the potential for contrarian strategy returns (Tkac (1999), Nam et 
al (2001)). Finally, the authors assumed that trading volumes of S&P 500 stocks could 
be significantly affected by index funds flows. 
The period under review is 1979 and 1998. The “value” and “glamour” portfolios 
are identified on an annual basis for each of the three groups according to their traded 
volume (high, normal, low) on the basis of three years past returns. The testing period is 
three years as well.  
The authors reported that contrarian profits for both high and low trading volumes 
groups are better than for a normal one. However, when the statistical significance of 
returns are taken into consideration only the group with high trading volume has  
positive contrarian return. These profits continue to exist even after adjustments to time 
varying risk or leverage-induced risk.  
Maheshwari and Dhankar (2017) analysed the relationship between trading 
volumes and contrarian profits on the Indian equity market and found a similar 
dependence to the one found by Wongchoti and Pyun (2005) – contrarian profit for a 
high trading volume group was higher than for a low trading volume one. 
The authors use the period 1997-2013. There is a bit of survivorship bias as they 
used only those stocks which have the data for the whole sample. The profitability of 
contrarian strategies on historic data  was analysed with the same approach towards 
formation on the winner/loser portfolios as DeBondt and Thaler (1985) when last 36 
months return are taken into consideration.  
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1.3.3. Conclusion 
Among rational reasons for contrarian profits the most important one is the potential 
difference in risks between glamour and value stocks, according to the Fama and 
French three factors model. According to Fama and French (1996, 1998) this model 
was able to explain contrarian profits in various countries and different contrarian 
strategies. Consequently, I think that it is important to incorporate this factor into the 
analysis and test whether this is more or less important than the mispricing correction 
(the factor discussed in the conclusion to the behavioural part of the literature review).  
There is weak evidence that macro factors can be considered as important ones in 
explanation of contrarian profits. Gregory et al (2003) have found that after incorporation 
of Fama and French three factor model the importance of macro factors disappear. 
Balck and McMillan (2005) found some ability of macro factors to explain contrarian 
profits, but they also concluded that part of the return is still left unexplained. 
Consequently, I will not use these factors in my analysis. 
Disagreement between analysts regarding future fundamentals of a particular stock will 
not be included in my analysis as well given rather weak evidence that this factor 
matters for contrarian strategies. The main weak point of the analysis undertaken by 
Doukas et al (2004) is that in order to be included in their sample a stock should be 
covered by at least two analysts, which in my view is not enough to consider the 
analysts forecast dispersion as a disagreement risk proxy. 
Also among rational reasons, given in the literature, which prevent portfolio managers 
from using contrarian strategies in the first place are transaction costs, which are 
considered to be an important obstacle for short term contrarian profits. I think that the 
more important obstacle could be failure of contrarian strategies to perform better than a 
passive strategy which based on forming a portfolio from all stocks available in the 
sample without distinguishing between them according to any fundamental criteria. In 
the present world investors always have a cheaper option to use index funds or ETFs 
instead of actively managed portfolios. Consequently, in order to start using a particular 
contrarian strategy a portfolio manager should prove that it can compete well with this 
more passive alternative. 
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1.4. Comparison of various contrarian strategies 
1.4.1. Various versions of Ohlson model 
Dechow, Hutton and Sloan (1999) compare various types of Ohlson valuation 
model (Ohlson (1995)), including those that ignore “other information” parameter and 
those that take this parameter into consideration. They analyse the US equity market 
and use top/bottom deciles to distinguish between “value” and glamour” stocks.  
As a result, statistically significant contrarian profit was observed only in three 
versions of the model where “other information” is ignored.  
Table 1.4.1.1. Predictive ability of ratios of implied model values to observed market 
values with respect to stock returns over the following year 
Panel A: Implied values ignoring ‘other information’, computed as 
𝑃𝑡 = 𝑏𝑡 +
𝜔
1 + 𝑟 − 𝜔
𝑥𝑡
𝑎    (1.5) 
Portfolio 𝜔 = 0 𝜔 = 1 𝜔 = 𝜔𝑢 𝜔 = 𝜔𝑐 
1 (Lowest) 0.143 0.159 0.140 0.136 
2 0.171 0.143 0.174 0.159 
3 0.153 0.161 0.152 0.165 
4 0.169 0.158 0.162 0.159 
5 0.181 0.160 0.170 0.173 
6 0.170 0.166 0.181 0.175 
7 0.191 0.182 0.180 0.187 
8 0.196 0.202 0.197 0.194 
9 0.206 0.222 0.203 0.212 
10 (Highest) 0.215 0.235 0.234 0.235 
Hedge (t-statistic) 0.072 0.076 0.094 0.099 
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Panel B: Implied values incorporating ‘other information’, computed as 
𝑃𝑡 = 𝑏𝑡 +
𝜔
1 + 𝑟 − 𝜔
𝑥𝑡
𝑎 +
1 + 𝑟
(1 + 𝑟 − 𝜔)(1 + 𝑟 − 𝛾)
𝜐𝑡   (1.6) 
Portfolio (𝜔 = 0, 𝛾 = 0) 
(𝜔 = 1, 𝛾 = 0) 
and 
(𝜔 = 0, 𝛾 = 1) 
(𝜔 = 𝜔𝑢 , 𝛾 = 0) 
and 
(𝜔 = 0, 𝛾 = 𝛾𝜔) 
𝜔 = 𝜔𝑢 , 𝛾 = 𝛾𝜔 
1 (Lowest) 0.149 0.157 0.154 0.162 
2 0.176 0.145 0.165 0.159 
3 0.147 0.154 0.154 0.154 
4 0.162 0.177 0.161 0.158 
5 0.178 0.179 0.174 0.171 
6 0.175 0.173 0.175 0.175 
7 0.178 0.181 0.173 0.185 
8 0.211 0.210 0.213 0.203 
9 0.201 0.208 0.206 0.204 
10 (Highest) 0.220 0.210 0.224 0.224 
Hedge (t-statistic) 
0.071 
(1.77) 
0.054 
(1.44) 
0.070 
(1.71) 
0.062 
(1.34) 
Source: Dechow, Hutton and Sloan (1999). 
1.4.2. Fundamental ratios, past returns and valuation models 
Frankel and Lee (1998) compared contrarian strategies based on the book-to-
market “value” ratio and one based on intrinsic value calculated with the use of residual 
income valuation model.  
They dealt with the US equity market, namely stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX 
and NASDAQ and used quantiles to disaggregate glamour and value portfolios. They 
compared average returns produced by these strategies for one-, two- and three-year 
holding periods. It appeared that the book-to-market value ratio based strategy is better 
than intrinsic value to price ratio strategy on the base of RIM if one year returns are 
Chapter 1. Literature review and research objectives 
1.4. Comparison of various contrarian strategies 38 
taken into consideration. At the same time, it is significantly worse in the case when 
holding period is extended to a three-year period (see table 1.4.2.1).  
Table 1.4.2.1. Relative results of contrarian strategy based on V/P and B/P ratios 
B/P ratio Q1 (glamour) Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 (value) Q5-Q1 
R12 0.137 0.148 0.156 0.166 0.186 0.049 
R24 0.251 0.300 0.332 0.338 0.333 0.082 
R36 0.407 0.450 0.513 0.535 0.558 0.151 
       
V/P ratio       
R12 0.138 0.154 0.159 0.172 0.169 0.031 
R24 0.217 0.298 0.317 0.351 0.369 0.152 
R36 0.331 0.450 0.491 0.549 0.637 0.306 
Source: Frankel and Lee (1998). 
Notes: B/P – book to price ratio, V/P – value to price ratio, where value is the intrinsic value calculated by 
RIV model; R12, R24, R36 – indicate periods for average return calculation: R12 – 12 months, R24 – 24 
months, R36 – 36 months; Q1-5 – indicate equally sized portfolios: Q1 – a portfolio of stocks with lowest 
ratio B/P and lowest ratio V/P, Q5 – a portfolio with highest ratio B/P and highest ratio V/P. Figures 
represent average returns for the appropriate portfolio constructed by the appropriate period. 
Dissanaike and Lim (2010) studied the UK FTSE 100 sample in the years 1987 
to 2001. Dissanaike and Lim study takes the form of a “truth race” to see which a variety 
of variables can best generate contrarian profits.An  obvious candidate are simple 
univariate strategies based on sorting stocks by past returns (De Bondt and Thaler 
(1985)), earnings to price, cash to price, or book to market (Lakonishok et al (1994)) 
ratios. So, stocks within the highest to price to earnings / cash / book value per share 
decile are judged most overvalued and hence sold and the proceeds used to buy stocks 
in the lowest price to earnings/cash/book value decile of the market. Variants of the 
same strategy DL do not explore, but others have, require sorting successively and 
independently on two valuation attributes to form a double-sorted contrarian portfolio 
(Lakonishok et al (1994)). Such simple trading strategies then compete with the three 
more formal models of value very much in vogue with capital market researchers in 
accounting.  
These more formal valuation models are the residual income valuation model, 
that values the firm as the sum of book value plus a weighted average of earnings in 
excess of a capital charge (abnormal earnings as they are termed), and an extension to 
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it by Jim Ohlson of New York’s Stern Business School. Ohlson (1995) rather than using 
the usual terminal value in the RIM to capture earnings beyond the forecast horizon 
devises a set of dynamic conditions to impose restrictions on abnormal earnings.  
DL add value to prior work on three primary criteria. Firstly, by asking do simple 
strategies based on past returns, price to earnings, etc., underperform more 
theoretically justifiable valuation models such as the RIM or Ohlson’s (1995) reworking 
of the RIM to include a specified dynamic path for earnings over and above some 
benchmark (which he terms the Linear Information Dynamics ,or LID).  
A clear danger of a simplistic ratio-based strategy is allowing price to enter your 
valuation decision by the back door. A PE ratio of 20 that was extraordinary in 1996 
may in the time of a bubble, for example in late 1999, look average or even low. Only by 
constructing value metrics without reference back to price can one hope to trade 
securely (Penman (2013)). The theory here seems sound, yet DL ask does observed 
investment practice bear theory out? 
Secondly, these authors ask within the formal valuation models does Ohlson’s 
(1995) addition of the LIM to the standard RIM model allow incremental profits to be 
earned on contrarian strategies.  
A final contribution by DL (2008) is to ask if data snooping bias can explain 
reported contrarian profits? Since De Bondt and Thaler’s (1985) study many hours of 
computing power have been now been thrown at the main US data sources of 
COMPUSTAT and CRSP to confirm the presence of contrarian profits. Some new 
evidence reached on a sample independent of the earliest US market results is needed. 
DL (2008) provide this evidence and confirm that previous US results are not specific to 
the United States market. Many other national studies also exist, for Spain (Forner and 
Marhuenda (2003)), Greece (Antoniou et al (2005)), New Zealand (Chin et al (2002)) 
and Japan (Cai (1997)). 
Despite the fact that theory predicts considerable variability in the size of 
contrarian profits derived from a fundamental based trading strategy most reported 
evidence for contrarian such strategies profitability report average profits over extended 
periods. DL using the UK FTSE 100 sample between 1987 and 2001 reports the 
average profits from a trading strategy based on a portfolio formation period of three 
years. Forming portfolios from 1987 onwards DL report average profits for 11 
overlapping one year holding periods. DL find some version of the AEG model are 
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profitable, but also support surprising strength in cash-flow based strategies a result like 
that previously reported by Desai et al (2004) for the US. Interestingly, DL attribute the 
greater profitability of models that suppress “other information”, typically the difference 
between forecast earnings next year and their realisation, to the fact “reported and 
current earnings are more accurate, reliable and not subject to estimation error and 
noise as with one-period ahead forecasts of earnings”. This instability in the profits 
derived from fundamentals based contrarian strategy leads DL to focus on the 
profitability of one year test periods, following three-year portfolio formation periods. 
Nevertheless, DL still average reported contrarian profits over the 11 years of their 
sample portfolios temporarily ignoring the recognised instability in such profits. 
Giamouridis and Montagu (2011) make another step towards analysis of the 
relative efficiency of various contrarian strategies. They broaden the universe compared 
to Dissanaike and Lim (2010), instead of focusing on the UK market they use a 
constituents of MSCI Europe index. As a result they have found that RIM and ROM 
(Hwang and Sohn (2010)) approaches produce better results than the contrarian 
strategies based on ratios (P/E, where E is expected earnings per share, B/P, fair P/E, 
CF/P). The authors do not include the Ohlson model in the analysis based on the 
Dissanaike and Lim (2010) finding that various versions of this model have not 
produced a superior results to the RIM contrarian strategy.  
The authors used a monthly rebalancing of portfolio and each time determine 
“value” and “glamour” stocks on the basis of an allocation the stocks into five groups. 
The period under review is from 1990 to 2010. They have found out that only three 
strategies produce statistically significant results RIM, ROM and CF/P. In addition they 
took into consideration the FF three factor model and Carhart (1997) momentum risk 
factor and came to the conclusion that positive returns for RIM and ROM continue to 
exist, while for CF/P it became insignificant. 
The authors acknowledge that monthly rebalancing should involve a substantial 
transaction costs and consequently they should be taken into consideration in order to 
have a more realistic picture. They used 50 bps as an assumed proxy for transaction 
costs. Even after adjusting to this factor the positive returns for RIM, ROM and CF/P 
stand. In addition the difference between the results of these three strategies became 
marginal.  
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1.4.4. Conclusion 
The main conclusion based on the papers related to the comparison of various 
contrarian strategies is that ratios based strategies (especially CF/P) can be as good as 
the ones based on various valuation models. For example, Frankel and Lee (1998) 
have found that B/P is a better strategy than the one based on RIM in case one year 
testing period is used, while Dissanaike and Lim (2010) have found that CF/P contrarian 
strategy results are close to the ones of strategies based on sophisticated valuation 
models.  
This conclusion is counterintuitive in my view. I think that valuation models 
should be more useful for practical application of contrarian strategy than ratios. 
Valuation models aim to directly estimate mispricing of stocks which goes to the core of 
contrarian strategy effectiveness. While high/low past returns or high/low ratios serves 
only as indirect indications of mispricing. The point is that the ratio strategy assumes 
that there are normal values for the ratios, and any deviation is an indication of 
mispricing. This assumption does not look like a strong one given that it does not take 
into consideration different growth expectations across the companies and different cost 
of equity, while valuation models take into consideration these factors. 
Despite the comparison of efficiency of various contrarian profits being a valuable 
insight for practical implementation of contrarian strategies by portfolio managers I think 
that this topic can be considered as the secondary one. There is be little point in 
comparing various contrarian strategies if, in the event that they are not attractive to 
investors due to their inferiority to a passive strategy, or in the event that the key reason 
behind contrarian profits is difference in risks/other rational factors. 
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1.5. Summary of the literature review  
The existence of contrarian profits is a well-documented finding across various equity 
markets around the world. A key question, which is in the focus of this research, is - why 
do they exist? Potential answers are examined in a large number of research papers, 
and fall into two categories: rational (i.e. there is a difference in risks of glamour and 
value stocks) and behavioural (i.e. the market regularly overshoots true/fundamental 
value, which leads to a mis-valuation of glamour/value stocks). However, a consensus 
has not been achieved so far. Please refer to Table 1.5.1. for more details. 
Among behavioural explanations the most important ones are market overreaction, 
naïve extrapolation of past dynamics of the companies’ fundamentals and errors in the 
analysts’ expectation, which are naively priced by the market. However, what is missing 
from the prior research of the behavioural explanation of contrarian profits is the direct 
test of the mispricing correction as a sources of contrarian profits, where mispricing is 
estimated in relation to a particular fair price estimation method implied by a particular 
contrarian strategy. This analysis is undertaken here, and should be a valuable addition 
to the discussion given that an assumption of periodical correction of stock prices to 
some fair levels is the core assumption for behavioural explanation of contrarian profits. 
And this is what some of the researchers observe. For example, Shiller (1981) showed 
that prices fluctuate around fundamental fair value based on discounted dividend 
stream. 
Among rational reasons for contrarian profits the most important one is the potential 
difference in risks between glamour and value stocks, according to Fama and French 
three factors model. Consequently, I think that it is important to incorporate this factor in 
the analysis and test whether this is more or less important than the mispricing 
correction.  
Also among rational reasons, given in the literature, which prevent portfolio managers 
from using contrarian strategies in the first place are transaction costs, which are 
considered to be an important obstacle for short term contrarian profits. I think that the 
more important obstacle preventing investors from using contrarian strategies could be 
their failure to outperform a passive strategy which based on forming a portfolio from all 
stocks available in the sample without distinguishing between them according to any 
fundamental criteria. In the present world investors always have a cheaper option to use 
index funds or ETFs instead of actively managed portfolios. Consequently, in order to 
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start using a particular contrarian strategy a portfolio manager should prove that it can 
compete well with reasonable  alternatives. 
Another question, which has been researched, is – which contrarian strategy is the best 
one? The key finding here is that CF/P approach is in many cases better than most of 
the other strategies or at list on par of some of them based on more sophisticated 
approach which incorporates valuation models. Despite this being a valuable insight for 
practical implementation of contrarian strategies by portfolio managers I think that this 
topic can be considered as the secondary one. There is be little point in comparing 
various contrarian strategies if they are not attractive trading plans to investors due to 
their inferiority to a passive strategy, or in the event that the key reason behind 
contrarian profits is difference in risks or other rational factors. 
Table 1.5.1. Various explanations of contrarian profits existence 
Paper 
Market 
under 
review 
Contrarian 
strategies 
used 
Reason for contrarian profits 
existence 
DeBondt and 
Thaler (1985) 
US Past return 
Behavioral: regular market 
overreaction to companies news 
DeBondt and 
Thaler (1987) 
US Past returns 
Behavioral: error in estimates of 
future business results 
Lo and MacKinlay 
(1990) 
US Past returns 
Mixed: less than 50% due to 
overreaction, while the majority due 
to cross effect between securities 
Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993) 
US Past returns 
Behavioral: market incorrect 
reaction to company news. 
Lakonishok, 
Shleifer and 
Vishny (1994) 
US 
CF/P, E/P, 
growth of 
sales, B/P, 
double-sorting 
with the use 
of two ratios 
Behavioral: market extrapolate past 
dynamics of companies 
fundamentals 
La Porta (1996) US 
Expected 
earnings 
growth 
Behavioral: errors in expectations 
regarding future earnings growth 
Fama and French US 
B/P, CF/P, 
E/P and past 
Rational: difference in risk between 
glamour and value stocks 
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(1996) sales growth according to three factor model 
Johnston and Cox 
(1996) 
US Past returns 
Rational: tax loss selling and size 
effects 
Dissanaike (1997) UK Past returns 
Behavioral: regular market 
overreaction to companies news 
Brouwer, Van Der 
Put and Veld 
(1997) 
France, 
Germany, 
Netherlands 
and the UK 
CF/P, B/P, 
Divided yield, 
E/P 
Behavioral: market extrapolate past 
dynamics of companies 
fundamentals 
Cai (1997) Japan 
B/P, CF/P, 
sales growth, 
E/P 
Behavioral: market extrapolate past 
dynamics of companies 
fundamentals 
Dechow and Sloan 
(1997) 
US 
B/P, E/P, 
CF/P 
Behavioral: naive pricing of 
analysts’ forecasts 
Fluck et al (1997) US E/P, B/P Not clear 
Fama and French 
(1998) 
Japan, the 
UK, France, 
Germany, 
Italy, the 
Netherlands, 
Belgium, 
Switzerland, 
Sweden, 
Australia, 
Hong Kong 
and 
Singapore 
B/P, E/P and 
CF/P 
Rational: difference in risk between 
glamour and value stocks 
according to three factor model 
Mun et al (1999) 
France, 
Germany 
Past returns 
Behavioral: regular market 
overreaction to companies news 
Badrinath and Kini 
(2001) 
US E/P 
Not clear, but not due to time 
variation in systematic risk or 
difference in systematic risk 
Levis and Liodakis 
(2001) 
UK 
B/P,CF/P,E/P, 
past earnings 
per share 
growth 
Not clear, but not due to naïve 
extrapolation of past dynamics of 
the companies fundamentals 
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Gregory et al 
(2001, 2003) 
UK 
E/P, B/P, 
CF/P and 
past sales 
growth; 
double-sorting 
with the use 
of two ratios 
Mixed: three factor FF model was 
able to explain contrarian profits for 
one ratio approach. However, the 
model failed to explain contrarian 
profits for double-sorting approach 
Chin et al (2002) New Zeland 
CF/P, e/P, 
B/P and past 
growth of 
sales 
Behavioral: expectation errors 
regarding future companies 
fundamentals 
Griffin and 
Lemmon (2002) 
US B/P 
Behavioral: mispricing, but not 
difference in risk according to Fama 
and French three factors model 
Assoe and Sy 
(2003) 
Canada Past returns 
Rational: transaction costs make 
short term contrarian strategy not 
useful 
Forner and 
Marhuenda (2003) 
Spain Past returns 
Behavioral: regular market 
overreaction to companies news 
(extremely long testing period of 
five years was used) 
Doukas et al 
(2004) 
US B/P 
Rational: dispersion of analysts 
forecasts 
Antoniou et al 
(2006) 
UK Past returns 
Behavioral: regular market 
overreaction to companies news 
Black and 
McMillan (2005) 
US B/P 
Mixed: substantial part of the 
contrarian profit can be explained 
by the dynamics of the macro 
factors (one-month Treasury bill, 
dynamics of industrial production 
and money supply in annual terms 
and default yield). However, they 
concluded that part of the return is 
left unexplained, which is the sign 
that behavioural explanation can 
also be an important one. 
Lo and Coggins 
(2006) 
Australia Past returns Rational: transaction costs make 
short term contrarian strategy not 
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useful 
Bildik and Gulay 
(2007) 
Turkey Past returns Rational: higher risk of value stocks 
Bali et al (2010) US 
B/P, CF/P 
and E/P 
Behavioral: used 
repurchase/issuance of new stocks 
as an indicator of the stocks being 
under/overvalued; found that this 
factor is significant for contrarian 
profits; test of the difference in risk 
between value and glamour failed 
Wu et al (2012) UK Past returns 
Not clear: contrarian profits 
continue to exist only for “middle-
sized” group of stocks after 
controlling for various types of risk  
Piotroski and So 
(2012) 
US B/P 
Behavioral: used the strength of a 
company fundamentals indicator 
FSCORE (introduced by Piotroski 
in 2000) as an indicator of the 
stocks being under/overvalued; 
found that this factor is significant 
for contrarian profits 
Fama and French 
(2015). 
US - 
Not clear: the authors have not 
used the five factor model to test 
whether it can explain profitability of 
contrarian strategies; however they 
show that the five factors model is 
better than three factors one in 
explaning stocks return 
Zou and Chen 
(2017). 
US 
B/M, CF/P, 
E/P and past 
sales growth 
Behavioral: positive/negative 
earnings surprises have a material 
impact on the value/glamour stocks 
returns.  
Maheshwari and 
Dhankar (2017) 
India Past returns 
Mixed: trading volume effects the 
profitability of contrarian profits 
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1.6. Research objectives  
The overall aim of my research is to contribute to the analysis of the reasons for 
profitability of contrarian strategies on the US market. Specifically, I will focus on the 
following research questions. 
Are contrarian returns not arbitraged away due to them being unattractive for investors 
relative to a passive investment strategy? To my knowledge this question has not been 
reviewed yet in the literature. At  the same time in case of less efficiency of the 
contrarian strategies vs a passive one it could be extremely complicated for any 
portfolio manager to start using them in practice given that this will not be accepted by 
his/her investors who always have a cheaper option of a passive investing.  
Are contrarian returns mainly explained by the behavioural factor (the correction of prior 
mispricing) rather than by rational reasons (the dynamics of stocks’ fair values)? So far 
in the literature behavioural factors were analysed indirectly either with the use of the 
implied errors of the future companies fundamentals investor make (i.e. Lakonishok, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1994), La Porta (1996), Dechow and Sloan (1997)) or by rejecting 
the risk explanation of contrarian profits (i.e. DeBondt and Thaler (1985,1987), 
Dissanaike (1997), Brouwer, Van Der Put and Veld (1997)). At the same time there 
have been no direct tests of importance of stocks mispricing correction for contrarian 
profits. I assume that mispricing fluctuations should be anchored to a fair price of a 
particular stock. Consequently, incorporation of the stock’s fair value in the test should 
help to distinguish between the mispricing correction effect (behavioural factor) and 
effect from the fair prices change themselves (rational factor). 
Are contrarian returns mainly explained by the Fama French three factor risk model 
rather than by the behavioural factor (the correction of prior mispricing)? Fama and 
French three factor model (Fama and French (1996)) is one of the key risk factor tools 
which has been used in the literature in order to consider the risk difference explanation 
for existence of contrarian profits. Consequently, incorporation of this model into the 
direct test of importance of various factors is a crucial step in order to distinguish 
between rational and behavioural explanations of contrarian profits.   
I do not focus on the comparison of various contrarian profits as this topic can be 
considered as the secondary one. There is no point in comparing various contrarian 
strategies in the event that they are not attractive to investors due to their inferiority to a 
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passive strategy, or in the event that the key reason behind contrarian profits is 
difference in risks or other rational factors. 
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Chapter 2. Data used and specification of models  
2.1. Introduction 
I my view, there are three key things which need to be defined in order to start 
the analysis of the research questions: dataset, type of contrarian strategies and various 
technical aspects like method of strategies efficiency comparison. The aim of this 
chapter is to describe and justify these tools which should help me in my research. 
I will focus on the US market. The US market can be considered as one of the 
most efficient markets and certainly one of the heavily traded markets, given the high 
level of liquidity, transparency and large number of investors. Consequently, in case the 
analysis will provide some insight regarding the research questions it will be likely that 
the same results will be achieved on less efficient markets. However, this will require 
further research in order to be proven.   
The relatively small dataset will be used – constituents of S&P 500. The S&P 500 
index includes only stocks of large companies, which eliminates the necessity to adjust 
the result for the size effect, which is in line with the Dissanaike method applied to the 
UK market (Dissanaike (1997)) or Davis method, which was applied to the US market 
(Davis (1994)). Moreover, the stocks in the index have a relatively high level of liquidity, 
implying that it is possible to implement the contrarian strategy while incurring only 
relatively low transaction costs in terms of bid/ask (Dissanaike (1997), Davis (1994)). 
Finally, it is more appropriate to operate with a smaller size of a portfolio when testing 
contrarian strategies in order to have something close to what normally is used in 
practice. 
As for the types of contrarian strategies – I will focus on simple ones: past 
returns, various ratios (B/P, CF/P, E/P, FCFE/P) and on the sophisticated ones, which 
are based on various valuation models. Besides the standard valuation models (RIM, 
AEG, Ohlson-Feltham model) which have been used in the literature before I will also 
add to the analysis DCF model, which is widely used in the investment sphere and 
consecuently can add a valuable insight to the analysis. 
As for the method of assessment of contrarian strategies efficiency I will use 
Calmar ratio, which use “maximum drawdown” as a measure of risk. A contrarian 
strategy is supposed to have positive returns in any market condition. This is usually the 
aim of a hedge fund (Heidorn et al (2009)). Hence I can apply the same tools to back-
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test potential losses to a contrarian strategy. One such measure is “maximum 
drawdown”, the maximum potential loss suffered from following the given trading 
strategy from the moment of portfolio formation. Maximum drawdown is a popular 
measure to assess possible losses to a hedge fund. According to EDHEC Risk and 
Asset Management Research Centre (Heidorn et al (2009)) 74% of investors recognize 
maximum drawdown as an important piece of information for a hedge fund and would 
like to see this figure in its fund’s report. 
I will also take into consideration the returns of contrarian strategies only for 
those years where these returns are statistically significant. The normal practice is to 
take the difference between the average return of value and glamour portfolios each 
year and then aggregate them over the sample years and then to test whether the mean 
of this sample is different from zero. This is a test of the hypothesis that these annual 
observations are drawn from a distribution with zero mean. This seems to 
underestimate the variability of chance. The test certainly ignores the information in the 
underlying distributions of value and glamour portfolios. The test could be influenced by 
a few years with large positive values of the difference in value and glamour average 
that are due to chance so that during these years, there is no significant difference 
between the sample from which average return for value is taken and the sample from 
which average return for glamour is taken. In order to avoid this problem, I will test each 
year for the difference between value and glamour portfolios and include in the 
calculations only those where there is a statistically significant difference. So I will test 
the hypothesis that the contrarian strategy works in each year, not just on average 
during the test period, which is a much stricter and I believe more intuitive test. 
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2.2. Stocks under review 
 
2.2.1. Rational for the US equity market selection 
Contrarian strategies have been tested in various markets over diverse periods 
and proved to be profitable in most cases. Focus on the US would be useful given that 
this market is one of the most liquid, which implies that it is possible to run a substantial 
contrarian portfolio incurring a relatively small transaction costs in terms of the bid/ask 
spread faced . For example, New York Stock Exchange has the highest liquidity in the 
world among stock exchanges, with a trading volume about twice as large as the 
second largest exchange. Further much high quality data on large US stocks is easily 
available. 
The US securities market is considered to be one of the most transparent, with 
companies obliged to disclose a wide range of information, which should help investors 
in assessing their valuations (Doukas et al (2004)). This makes the profitability of the 
contrarian strategies on this market even more puzzling given the wealth of information 
an investor has to estimate a company’s fair/fundamental value.  
Moreover, there is a relatively high number of institutional investors in the market, 
which means that more professional investors estimate fair stock prices than in other 
markets. Thus the market should be one of the most efficient in the world. 
here is a relatively high number of mutual funds on the US market compared to other 
countries, with more than half of them being equity funds. See the graph 2.2.1.1 for 
more details on the number of mutual funds in various countries. 
The US pension funds’ assets are the largest in the world. For example, their share in 
the pension funds’ assets of the OECD countries is consistently over 50%. The UK 
takes second place in the world ranking, but the size is much smaller – with a country 
share of only around 10%. The US also has the highest share of pension funds’ assets 
invested in the stock market. It is close to 50%, while in the UK it is only 24%, according 
to the OECD data. 
The US insurance companies take the lion share in the global insurance market. For 
example, this share was 40% in 2009 according to OECD data. The second place was 
occupied by Japan, but again this country’s share is far smaller – 12%.   
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Graph 2.2.1.1. Number of mutual funds in different countries 
 
 
2.2.2. Rationale for a small sample selection 
Some research on the contrarian strategies for the US equity market examines a 
very large sample, which normally consists of all stocks traded on NASDAQ, NYSE and 
AMEX. Consequently, there is a close to thousand or more stocks in glamour and value 
portfolio even if the sample is split in deciles. For example, Fama and French (1998) 
sample for the US market in 1995 consists of 6258 stocks, which means that a decile 
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This size of these portfolios is not normal for a mutual fund. For example, a more 
than USD 40 bn fund, AMCAP Fund, had 140 stocks as of 31 December 2014, a more 
than USD 12 bn fund, JPMorgan US Equity Fund, had 187 stocks as of 28 February 
2015, Vanguard US Value fund had a holding of 218 stocks as of 31 December 2014. 
On average the number of stocks in the typical US equity mutual fund is less than 100 
(Alexeev and Tapon (2013)). Hence it is more appropriate to operate with a smaller size 
of a portfolio when testing contrarian strategies in order to have something close to what 
is normally is used in practice.  
The S&P 500 index includes only stocks of large companies, which eliminates 
the necessity to adjust the result for the size effect, which is in line with the Dissanaike 
method applied to the UK market (Dissanaike (1997)) or Davis’s method, which was 
applied to the US market (Davis (1994)). For example, the market capitalisation of the 
S&P 500 index constituents should be equal, or greater than, USD 4 bn with a median 
market capitalisation of close to USD 19 bn as of 31 March 2015.  
Moreover, the stocks in the index have a relatively high level of liquidity, implying 
that it is possible to implement the contrarian strategy while incurring only relatively low 
transaction costs in terms of bid/ask (Dissanaike (1997), Davis (1994)). The index 
constituents should have a free float of at least 50% and “the ratio of annual dollar value 
traded to float adjusted market capitalisation should be 1 or greater” (S&P 
methodology).  
In addition, there is a very low impact of the infrequently trading factor 
(Dissanaike (1997), Davis (1994)) due the liquidity filter applied before a stock can enter 
the S&P 500. 
I employ S&P 500 constituent lists for the end of March in  each sample year. 
This helps to avoid survivorship bias and to keep the sample liquid and retain mainly 
large capitalisation stocks. 
 
2.2.3. Data sources 
I require all necessary data for the various valuation methods used to be 
available for a stock to enter my sample. All data, including price data, is taken from 
Datastream and COMPUSTAT apart from the consensus analysts’ forecasts data which 
is taken the I/B/E/S Consensus database. Data limitations mean my sample companies 
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vary from nearly 500 for the “simple” cash-flow to price and past return strategies to 128 
sample companies for the DCF valuation model based strategies. This is a result of 
absence of some data for each stock for a particular method, which I used. In the case 
when even one necessary input is missing I exclude this stock from the analysis for that 
particular method. This is why for more sophisticated models there is a lower number of 
stocks in the sample compared to simpler ones, such as ratios and past returns 
approaches, these more complicated valuation methods are more demanding of my 
data sources.  
I calculate returns measured from end of March year t to end of March year t+1 
to allow time for the release and assimilation of December year-end accounting 
disclosures (same method was used by Badrinath and Kini (2001)). Returns are 
calculated on the basis of COMPUSTAT data.  
 
2.2.4. Characteristics (size, turnover, stability of sample)  
Overall there were 1038 stocks included in the S&P 500 in at least one of the 
ends of March over the period 1990-2012. Only 164 existed in the index throughout all 
the period, while 619 existed in less than half of the end of March days. You can find 
more details regarding S&P 500 constituents distribution in the graph 2.2.4.1. 
Graph 2.2.4.1. Distribution of stocks which were in S&P 500 index during 1990-2012 
according to a number of years they exist in the index 
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low, with 99% being the maximum and 89% being the minimum. Please find more 
details in the graph below. 
Graph 2.2.4.2. Overlap of S&P 500 constituents of two consecutive years 
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2.3. Raw or excess returns? 
There are two main methods applied when testing contrarian strategies on the 
basis of past returns: excess return (for example, DeBondt and Thaler (1985), Johnston 
and Cox (1996), Dissanaike (1997)) and raw returns (for example, Jegadeesh and 
Titaman (1993), Mun, Vasconcellos and Kish (1999)). Please find details for other 
papers in the Table 2.3.1. 
Table 2.3.1. Methods of past return calculation used to identify value and glamour 
stocks 
Paper Use of raw returns 
Use of excess 
returns 
DeBondt and Thaler (1985)  Yes 
Kryzanowski and Zhang (1992)  Yes 
Jegadeesh and Titaman (1993) Yes  
Chang, McLeavey and Rhee (1995) Yes  
La Porta (1996) Yes  
Johnston and Cox (1996)  Yes 
Dissanaike (1997)  Yes 
Asness (1997) Yes  
Conrad, Gultekin and Kaul (1997) Yes  
Mun, Vasconcellos and Kish (1999) Yes  
Assoe and Sy (2003) Yes  
Forner and Marhuenda (2003)  Yes 
Dissanaike and Lim (2010) Yes  
When testing contrarian strategies on the basis of excess return authors normally 
used average returns for the whole sample of stocks in their analysis as a proxy for the 
market return (DeBondt and Thaler (1985)), Johnston and Cox (1996)), while some 
used the return of market indices (Dissanaike (1997)). There is a slight deviation in the 
excess return approaches of various authors as some of them sum up the excess 
monthly returns while the others multiply them. 
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For simplicity I will use raw return approach given that there is no consensus in 
the literature regarding which method is better. I will leave contribution to identification 
of the best option for further research. 
Normally, stock with the highest prior returns are considered to be glamourous 
stocks and the ones with the lowest prior returns consider to be value laden ones. This 
is what is used in the current research as well. 
The formation periods vary, but most of the research uses three-year periods, 
following the earliest study of the DeBondt and Thaler (1985). In my research the three-
year formation period will be used as well.  
The three-year formation period for a contrarian strategy looks also justifiable 
given that the maximum testing period for a contrarian strategy employed in my 
research is one year. Normally researchers avoid having a formation period shorter than 
a testing one. This could be due to the assumption that normally correction of an 
over/under reaction trend should be shorter duration than the trend itself. In addition, I 
will assume that the longer the trend of over/under reaction the stronger and more likely 
a correction to fundamental/fair value will occur.  
For the stock to enter the universe for this type of contrarian strategies I will 
require it to have a past three years return data. As discussed above liquidity is one of 
the filters a stock needs to pass through to enter the S&P 500 index. Hence it is not a 
surprise that on average 481 stocks over the 23 formation dates in the research fulfil the 
criterion of having past three-year return. Minimum number is 460 and maximum 
number of stocks is entering my contrarian strategy tests is 492. Please see the graph 
below for more details.  
Graph 2.3.2. The number of stocks in the S&P 500 which have all the data needed to 
test a contrarian strategy on the basis of past returns 
  
0
100
200
300
400
500
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
Chapter 2. Data used and specification of models 
2.4. The selection of ratios 58 
2.4. The selection of ratios 
Much of the early reported evidence of contrarian profits such as Lakonishok et al 
(1994) or Fama and French (1996) used simple company sorts based on earnings to 
price, price to cash flow, book value to price or sales growth rankings. Value stocks with 
low multiples (of price to fundamental value) were bought using the proceeds of sales 
derived from the sale of glamour stocks, which had correspondingly high multiples of 
their chosen value characteristics. Table 2.4.1 below gives the main fundamental ratios 
used by various researchers.  
Table 2.4.1. Ratios used for testing of contrarian strategies in various papers 
Paper B/P CF/P 
E/P (past 
or 
expected) 
Sales or 
eps growth 
Dividend 
yield 
Analysts 
expected 
growth in 
earnings 
Chan, Hamao and Lakonishok 
(1991) 
+ + + (past)    
Davis (1994) + + + (past) + (sales)   
Lakonishock, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1994) 
+ + + (past) + (sales)   
Brouwer, van der Put and Veld 
(1997) 
+ + + (past)  +  
Fama and French (1996) + + + (past) + (sales)   
La Porta (1996)      + 
Asness (1997) + +   +  
Cai (1997) + + + (past) + (sales)   
Dechow and Sloan (1997) + + + (past)    
Fluck et al (1997) +  + (past)    
Gregory et al (2001) + + + (past) + (sales)   
Levis and Liodakis (2001) + + + (past) + (EPS)   
Doukas et al (2004) +      
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Paper B/P CF/P 
E/P (past 
or 
expected) 
Sales or 
eps growth 
Dividend 
yield 
Analysts 
expected 
growth in 
earnings 
Black and McMillan (2005) +      
Dissanaike and Lim (2010) + + + (past)    
Giamouridis and Montagu 
(2011) 
+ + 
+ 
(expected) 
   
Notes: B/P – book value per share/price, CF/P – cash flow per share/price, E/P – earnings per share 
(EPS)/price (two versions – with past year EPS and expected EPS for the next year, the so called 
“forward PE ratio”). 
Some of the research examines a twin ratio double-sort strategy (for example, 
Lakonishok et al (1994) tested ratios coupled with sales growth). This approach will be 
not taken into consideration in my PhD given that this can be considered as further 
extension/elaboration of the current research which focused on simple strategies alone. 
In my PhD I will focus on book value per share/price (B/P), cash flow per 
share/price (CF/P), earnings per share (EPS)/price (E/P) (in two versions with the past 
years EPS and market consensus expectations of EPS for the next year, sometimes 
called the “forward PE ratio”) and free cash flow to equity/price (FCFE/P). 
 
2.4.1. Book value per share/price, B/P 
B/P is the ratio which divides book value per share by the share price. For the 
purpose of this PhD I will take the last year’s book per share figure to calculate this 
indicator. Book value per share is the company equity, according to the company 
accounts, divided by the number of common stocks outstanding (see, for example, 
Graham and Dodd (2009)).  
This indicator puts a stock investor in a position of a person or entity who wants 
to buy a portion of a company’s business (Graham and Dodd (2009)). In this case, it is 
important to understand the value which was initially paid to start the business with all 
subsequent investments and profits accumulated from the base point of that initial 
(usually the) Founder’s capital injection. Then investor could decide whether or not it 
looks justifiable to pay a premium or discount to this sum taking into consideration other 
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factors. It is rather widely used indicator by the market participants and it has attracted 
their attention long ago. In the beginning of the 20th century this was especially popular 
given that most of the companies traded had a lot of tangible assets (like, railroads, 
manufacturing companies etc.) (Graham and Dodd (2009)). 
However, it could not be considered efficient for any company. For example, it is 
hard to use it for a technology company, which has a lot of intangible assets, not 
recognized in the company accounts and increasingly it may be outdated for most 
companies (Baruch Lev and Feng Gu (2016)). In addition to this argument LSV point to 
the growth prospects which could also affect the B/P ratio.  
For a stock to enter the universe of sample stocks used to test the efficacy of 
contrarian strategies I will require it to have a past year BPS and a valid current price. 
Current price is not an issue for S&P 500 constituents, given the discussed earlier high 
level of liquidity needed for a stock to enter the index. Hence it is not a surprise that on 
average 481 stocks over the 23 formation dates in the research fulfil the criteria. The 
minimum number is 460 and maximum number of stocks is 492. Please see the graph 
2.4.1.1 below for more details.  
Graph 2.4.1.1. The number of stocks in the S&P 500 which have all the data needed to 
test contrarian strategy on the basis of B/P ratio 
 
 
2.4.2. Cash flow per share/price, CF/P 
Normally, researchers use a sum of earnings and depreciation/amortization with 
the subtraction of provisions as an indication of cash flow (LSV (1994), Dissanaike and 
Lim (2010)), which is close to the cash flow from operations (EY, Statement of cash 
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flows (2014)). Sometimes research uses the earning adjusted for a depreciation change 
only (Dechow and Sloan (1997)). 
Cash flow could be seen as a more objective indicator of the company’s business 
success given that it could not be affected with the use of provisions by the company 
management like earnings (Graham and Dodd (2009)).  
However, it is still possible to manipulate with the cash flow indicator. For 
example, Enron in late 1990s managed to inflate its cash flow with the money it got from 
banks as loans (Dreman (2012)). WorldCom in 2002 announced that it inflated its cash 
flow by USD 3.8 bn during five quarters (Romero and Berenson (2002)). 
Again, as with the B/P indicator for the stock to enter the universe for this type of 
contrarian strategies I will require it to have its cash flow per share from the previous 
years and a valid current price. As a result, there are on average 464 stocks over the 23 
formation dates in the research which fulfill the criteria. The minimum number is 424 
and maximum number of stocks is 491. Please see the graph 2.4.2.1 below for more 
details. 
Graph 2.4.2.1. The number of stocks in the S&P 500 which have all the data needed to 
test a contrarian strategy based on the CF/P ratio 
 
 
2.4.3. Earnings per share/price, E/P (past and expected) 
E/P or earnings ratio is net earnings per share divided by a stock price (see for 
example, Dechow and Sloan (1997). This indicator has been widely used already in 
studying trading strategies for the US equity market in the beginning of the 20th century. 
Graham and Dodd (2009) wrote at that time the commonly used valuation formula used 
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for by investors was most recently reported earnings per share multiplied by some 
figure, which could be a qualitative indication of the company’s ability to pay dividends, 
or the stock’s so called “earnings power”, some rank of the company (like size of 
potential for future development), within its industry (some industries are assumed to 
have higher fundamental multiples than others) or the market conditions (be that a bull 
or bear market). 
The key problem with this indicator is that earnings could be a misrepresentation 
of the company’s business results due to manipulations by a company’s management. 
There is a lot of evidence that earnings management is widely used (Healy and Wahlen 
(1999), Cohen and Zarowin (2010), Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), Dechow et al 
(2010)).  
For the stock to enter the universe of value based contrarian strategies I will 
require it to have the prior year’s  earnings per share and a valid current price. For the 
strategy which is based on the E/P ratio where E is the consensus expectation of the 
analysts following the stock for the next year’s earnings per share I require this data to 
be available for a stocks to be included in the sample for testing of a (future) earnings-
based contrarian strategy. As a result, for the ratio based on past year’s reported EPS 
there is on average 473 stocks over the 23 formation dates in the research which fulfill 
the data capture criteria. The minimum number is 430 and maximum number of stocks 
is 496. For the version which is based on a one year future EPS the figures are largely 
the same. Please see the graph below for more details. 
Graph 2.4.3.1. The number of stocks in the S&P 500 which have all the data needed to 
test a contrarian strategy based upon the E/P ratio (orange columns: expected EPS, 
blue – past EPS) 
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2.4.4. Free cash flow to equity/price, FCFE/P 
Free cash flow to equity is the cash flow which a firm can return to its 
shareholders (Damodaran (2001)). According to the Damodaran (2001) the full formula 
would be the following: 
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐸 = 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 − (𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 − 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)
− (𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙)
+ (𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑙𝑦 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑑 − 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠)   (2.1) 
This could be simplified on the assumption that a company uses a fixed 
proportion of the debt and equity to finance changes in working capital and capital 
expenditure. In this case the formula could be adjusted to (Damodaran (2004)): 
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐸 = 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 − (1 − 𝑑)(𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 − 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)
− (1 − 𝑑)(𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙)   ,   (2.2) 
 
where d is debt to equity capital ratio. 
This formula calculated on a per share basis will be used in my research and it 
will be also used as a part of DCF model, which will be discussed later on. 
Free cash flow to equity is not the indicator which is widely used in the contrarian 
strategy papers, while it could be considered as a better indicator than an ordinary cash 
flow since it takes into consideration more factors than just depreciation. Capital 
expenditure is probably one of the most important ones, given that many companies 
need investments in order to maintain their assets at a proper level and capital 
maintenance CAPEX is taken into consideration by the investment firms (Graham and 
Dodd (2009)).  
For the stock to enter the sample for this type of a contrarian strategy I require it 
to have free cash flow to equity (FCFE) from the prior year and an existing  current 
price. As a result, for the ratio based on prior FCFE there are on average 374 stocks 
included in my FCFE based contrarian strategy tests over the 23 formation dates that 
fulfill the criteria. The minimum number of stocks included in the FCFE tests is 348 and 
maximum number of stocks is included in 416. Please see the graph 2.4.4.1 below for 
more details. 
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Graph 2.4.4.1. The number of stocks in the S&P 500 which have all the data needed to 
test contrarian strategy on the base of FCFE/P ratio  
 
I will not use past sales growth as a base for contrarian strategy given that this 
indicator lacks a clear valuation model to underpin it – it does not have an obvious 
influence upon market price. Consequently, this approach lacks the ability to capture 
over/under reaction of stock prices given that it treats equally the companies with the 
same past sales growth, but with very different stock price movements. 
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2.5. The selection of valuation models  
Valuation models started to appear as drivers of contrarian strategies later than 
past returns or fundamental ratios. Please find below a table with the main valuation 
models used by various researchers.  
Paper 
Residual income 
valuation model 
Ohlson-Feltham model 
Frankel and Lee (1998) +  
Lee and Swaminathan (1999) +  
Dechow, Hutton and Sloan (1999)  + 
Lee, Myers and Swaminathan (1999) +  
McCrae and Nilsson (2001) + + 
Dissanaike and Lim (2010) + + 
Note: “+” – the model is used. 
Valuation models are better suited for capturing over/under reaction than 
fundamental ratios or past returns given that they are supposed to estimate directly the 
fair value of a stock. Consequently, it is not possible to say that V/P, where V is a 
stock’s implied price by a particular valuation model, is some form of a proxy for a risk 
factor, like it is sometimes assumed for various fundamental ratios (see for example, 
Fama and French (1992), where B/P is considered to be a proxy for a company 
distressed risk).  
One of the key problems with application of valuation models to contrarian 
strategies is that they require more inputs than ratios and hence allow more errors in the 
inputs which could substantially diminish the validity of the use of the models (Frankel 
and Lee (1998)).  
In my research, I will use four models: RIM, Ohlson-Feltham, AEG and DCF. The 
later one has not been used in the contrarian strategies to my knowledge, but it is rather 
widely used within the asset management industry and hence I have included it into the 
test it as well.  
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As with other strategies I will require all the inputs to exist at the formation date 
for a particular company in order its stock to enter into the sample for the identification 
of value (low V/P ratio) and glamour (high V/P) portfolios.  
 
2.5.1. Residual income valuation model, RIM  
The residual income valuation model developed by Edwards-Bell (1961), 
Peasnell (1982) and Ohlson (1995). It is derived from a discounted dividend model 
using a clean surplus accounting assumption. The latter assumption means that the 
change in book derives purely from changes in earnings and dividends: 
𝑏𝑡+1 =  𝑏𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡+1 − 𝑑𝑡+1  ,   (2.3) 
where  
b =book value,  
e = earnings, and  
d = dividends for a particular period.  
The standard discounted dividend model assumes that a company’s fair value is 
equal to the discounted dividend stream: 
𝑃𝑡 =  ∑
E𝑡[𝑑𝑡+𝜏]
(1 + 𝑟)𝜏
∞
𝜏=1
   ,   (2.4) 
where  
r = a discount rate, and  
d  = the dividend for a particular year. 
Once clean surplus accounting relationship is incorporated into the DD model the 
equation 2.4 can be reformulated into the following formula (Ohlson (1995)): 
𝑃𝑡 =  𝑏𝑡 + ∑
E𝑡[𝑥𝑡+𝜏
𝑎 ]
(1 + 𝑟)𝜏
∞
𝜏=1
   ,   (2.5) 
where  
𝑥𝑡+𝜏
𝑎   = abnormal earnings for a specified time period and defined as earnings in excess of 
required cost of equity (discount rate in the model).  
In practice, there is a need to make some assumption regarding the terminal 
value given that there is a need to eliminate an infinite series of future cash-flows to 
discount in the equation 2.5. For example, Frankel and Lee (1998), Dissanaike and Lim 
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(2010) or McCrae and Nilsson (2001) assumed that abnormal earnings for the third year 
after the formation date will exist in perpetuity. Lee and Swaminathan (1999) calculated 
terminal value on the basis of the assumption that return on equity for a company 
linearly decrease to some average level for the industry and then stays at that level in 
perpetuity: 
𝑇𝑉 =  ∑
𝐹𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡+𝑖 − 𝑟𝑒
(1 + 𝑟𝑒)𝑖
𝐵𝑡+𝑖−1 +
𝑇−1
𝑖=3
𝐹𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡+𝑇 − 𝑟𝑒
𝑟𝑒(1 + 𝑟𝑒)𝑇−1
𝐵𝑡+𝑇−1   (2.6) 
In my tests of the RIM’s effectiveness as a guide to contrarian trading, I will 
estimate implied price using the equation: 
𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑀 = 𝑏𝑡 +
𝑥𝑡+1
𝑎
(1 + 𝑟)
+
𝑥𝑡+2
𝑎
(1 + 𝑟)2
+ 𝑇𝑉   ,   (2.7) 
𝑇𝑉 =  ∑
𝑥𝑡+2
𝑎
(1 + 𝑟)𝑖
14
𝑖=3
   ,   (2.8) 
  
where  
PRIM =the implied price,  
bt = the book value of equity per share at time t, 
𝑥𝑡
𝑎  = abnormal earnings per share at time t, 
r = the cost of capital, and  
TV = the terminal value.  
I calculate the terminal-value assuming that earnings in the second year of the 
forecast horizon continues uninterrupted into the future (a zero-abnormal earnings 
growth assumption). Further I assume abnormal earnings become zero, after fifteen 
years. This is more realistic than assuming perpetuity of abnormal earnings in the third 
year given that competition is likely to eliminate any abnormal earnings in the longer 
run.  
As a result, for the contrarian strategy based on RIM there are on average 322 
stocks included in my tests over the 23 formation dates in the sample that fulfil my data 
availability criteria. The minimum number of stocks included in my contrarian strategy 
tests is 213 and the maximum number of stocks is 464. Please see the graph below for 
more details. 
Chapter 2. Data used and specification of models 
2.5. The selection of valuation models 68 
Graph 2.5.1.1. The number of stocks in the S&P 500 which have all the data needed to 
test the contrarian strategy based on VRIM/P ratio  
 
 
2.5.2. Abnormal Earnings Growth, AEG 
The Abnormal Earnings Growth model was created by Ohlson and Juettner-
Nauroth in 2005 and denoted hereafter as AEG model. Initially the authors look at the 
standard formula, which relates the current value of stock to its discounted future 
dividends stream (I use the summary done by Ohlson and Gao (2006)): 
𝑝𝑜 = ∑ 𝑅
−𝑡𝑑𝑡
∞
𝑡=1
   ,   (2.9) 
 
where  
R = 1+r,  
d = dividends per share for a year t, and  
r  = cost of equity. 
Then this equation is merged with the following one: 
0 = 𝑦0 + ∑ 𝑅
−𝑡∞
𝑡=1 (𝑦𝑡 − 𝑅𝑦𝑡−1)  ,   (2.10) 
where  
R = the same as in the previous formula, while  
𝑦𝑡 = a sequence of figures, which satisfies the condition that  
lim
𝑡→∞
𝑅−𝑡𝑦𝑡 = 0 
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Consequently, the merged formula has the following form: 
𝑝0 = 𝑦0 + ∑ 𝑅
−𝑡
∞
𝑡=1
𝑧𝑡
′  ,   (2.11) 
where 
𝑧𝑡
′ = 𝑦𝑡 + 𝑑𝑡 − 𝑅𝑦𝑡−1   (2.12) 
 
Now let us assume that  
𝑦𝑡 =
𝑥(𝑡+1)
𝑟
   ,   (2.13) 
where 
𝑥(𝑡+1) = next year’s earnings, while 
𝑟 = the cost of equity. 
In this case: 
𝑧𝑡
′ =
1
𝑟
(∆𝑥𝑡+1 − 𝑟(𝑥𝑡 − 𝑑𝑡))  (2.14) 
 
And if I assume that  
𝑧𝑡 ≡ 𝑟 ∙  𝑧𝑡
′ = ∆𝑥𝑡+1 − 𝑟(𝑥𝑡 − 𝑑𝑡)   (2.15) 
 
The formula will look like: 
𝑝0 =
1
𝑟
∙ 𝑥1 +
1
𝑟
∑ 𝑅−𝑡𝑧𝑡
∞
𝑡=1
   (2.16) 
 
This is the AEG model formula which equates the current value of a stock to next 
year’s earnings and a sequence of discounted abnormal earnings growth. Under the 
assumption of clean surplus accounting this model is equal to the RIM (Penman 
(2005)). 
Penman (2005) considers three advantages of the AEG model vs RIM one. 
Firstly, there is no need to forecast book values. Secondly, there is no need to invoke 
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clean surplus accounting as in RIM. Finally, it allows for more realistic growth rates than 
RIM, which requires high growth rates in the short term, which then slow down. 
In contrast with RIM, which has been examined rather rigorously, the AEG model 
rarely is the focus of research attention and it has not been used in past contrarian 
strategies papers according to my knowledge.  
In my research I will use the following finite version of the AEG model: 
𝑉𝑡
𝑘 =
𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑡,1
𝑘
𝑟𝑡
𝑘 +
𝑥𝑡
𝑘
1 + 𝑉𝑡
𝑘 + 𝑇𝑉𝑡
𝑘   ,   (2.17) 
where 
𝑥𝑡
𝑘 =
(𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑡,2
𝑘 + 𝑟𝑡
𝑘 ∗ 𝑑𝑝𝑠𝑡+1
𝑘 − (1 + 𝑟𝑡
𝑘) ∗ 𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑡
𝑘)
𝑟𝑡
𝑘    ,   (2.18) 
𝑇𝑉𝑡
𝑘 = ∑
𝑥𝑡
𝑘
1 + 𝑉𝑡
𝑘 ∗ (𝑗 + 1)
12
𝑗=1
   (2.19) 
In the same way, as for the other strategies I require the company to have all 
necessary inputs for the construction of the valuation equation in order for a 
company/year observation to enter the sample for analysis. Consequently there are on 
average 327 stocks over the 23 formation dates in the research. The minimum number 
is 196 and the maximum number of stocks is 438. Please see the graph below for more 
details.  
Graph 2.5.2.1. The number of stocks in the S&P 500 which have all the data needed to 
test contrarian strategy on the basis of VAEG/P ratio  
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2.5.3. Ohlson-Feltham model, OF  
A third approach to fundamental valuation I employ is the Ohlson-Feltham  model 
which extends the RIM in equation 2.19 to specify the linear dynamics for abnormal 
earnings and is estimated in the form 
          𝑃𝑂𝐹 = 𝑏 + 𝛼1𝑥𝑡
𝑎 + 𝛼2𝑣𝑡    ,   (2.19) 
                     𝛼1 =
𝜔
(1 + 𝑟 − 𝜔)
   ,   (2.20) 
𝛼2 =
(1 + 𝑟)
(1 + 𝑟 − 𝜔)(1 + 𝑟 − 𝛾)
   ,   (2.21) 
where  
𝑣𝑡 = non-earnings, but value relevant information about the stock, such as press 
releases about technological and regulatory innovations, or major boardroom 
disputes, and  
𝛼1, 𝛼2 = capture the persistence of abnormal earnings and non-earnings information about 
value respectively.  
This model is derived from a standard RIM formula on the assumption that 
abnormal earnings follow the autoregressive formulas: 
𝑥𝑡+1
𝑎 = 𝜔𝑥𝑡
𝑎 + 𝑣𝑡 + 𝜀1,𝑡+1  ,   (2.22) 
𝑣𝑡+1= 𝛾𝑣𝑡+𝜀2,𝑡+1   (2.23) 
The advantage of the OF model over the RIM is that it allows considerable 
flexibility in modelling of the persistence of residual income and does not need 
estimates of future dividends or doubtful assumptions regarding terminal value. In 
reporting the profitability of contrarian trading strategies, it is possible to control for 
persistence in residual income, via variation in the assumed value of ω. Specifically, I 
estimate the OF model for the case of ω=1, γ=0 (which is identical to ω=0, γ=1) when 
the OF price equation becomes (see the typology given in DeChow, Hutton and Sloan 
(1999: 10)).  
𝑃𝑡 =
𝐸𝑡(𝑥𝑡+1)
𝑟
   (2.24) 
Here the price becomes simply a perpetuity in the expectation or forecast of next 
year’s earnings. Here the abnormal level of profits, deriving from some competitive 
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advantage the company has, remains unchallenged by competitors. The polar opposite 
assumption of ω=0, γ=0 transforms the OF valuation equation into  
𝑃𝑡 = 𝑏𝑡 +
𝐸𝑡(𝑥𝑡+1
𝑎 )
(1 + 𝑟)
   ,   (2.25) 
which puts the focus of valuation on the current book value with any addition in 
value deriving from an expectation about next year’s abnormal earnings. So any 
competitive advantage the company enjoys is almost immediately competed away by 
rival firms. The modelling assumption, be that equation 2.24 or 2.25, which best 
captures value is an empirical question. But prior empirical work by Dechow, Hutton and 
Sloan (1999) suggests that abnormal earnings may be fairly persistent, with ω=0.66, 
giving more credibility to the equation 2.24 specification as against the equation 2.25 
specification.  
The requirement that a stock needs to have all the inputs for the OF model 
results in an average 325 and 353 stocks respectively for (0.0) and (0.1) version of the 
model over the 23 portfolio formation dates in the research. The minimum number is 
220 for both version and the maximum number of stocks is also almost the same 464 
and 465 respectively. Please see the graph below for more details.  
Graph 2.5.3.1. The number of stocks in the sample for contrarian strategy based on 
VOF/P for (0.0) and (0.1) 
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2.5.4. Discounted cash flow model, DCF  
The final model I will use is the discounted free cash flow model. I will focus on a 
version which implies the value of equity rather than value of the whole firm. The 
formula is widely used in many text books (see for example, Damodaran (2004)): 
∑
FCFEt
(1 + ke)𝑡
+
𝑃𝑛
(1 + ke)𝑛
   ,   (2.26) 
where  
FCFE  = the free cash flow to equity defined by formula (X), while  
Pn  = the terminal value at time n. 
This formula is more realistic than the simple discounted dividend formula given 
that it could lead to unjustifiable valuations of companies, which normally pay less than 
their full the company’s free cash flow to equity to their shareholders in the form of 
dividends, or engage in buybacks (Damodaran (2004)). This is rather common practice 
– for example the average share of FCFE, which was paid to shareholders was slightly 
above 50%.  
According to Damodaran (2004) there are several reasons for such a situation. 
Managers aim to make dividend stream relatively stable. In practice variation in 
dividends is less than the observed variation in earnings of free cash flow to equity for 
most companies. This is normally a result of the company management, being uncertain 
regarding whether they will be able to maintain high earnings or FCFE, do not want to 
immediately increase dividends in response to earning of FCFE sharp rise in case they 
are later pressured into an embarrassing retreat.  
There is a need to accumulate cash for future investments. Sometimes company 
management can decide to use this source of funding rather than issuing bonds or 
equities.  
There are some tax issues. High taxes on dividends compared to taxes on capital 
gains could prevent a company from paying as much as it could.  
There could be a use of dividends as signals of future performance. The 
company management sometimes can use increases or decreases in the  dividend paid 
as a signalling tool to their shareholders regarding the future dynamics of the company. 
Thus dividends can “signal” intended future stock returns, with a a higher dividend 
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committing management to return more cash to shareholders. Consequently, this could 
result in a large difference in the dynamics of FCFE/earnings and dividends. 
Management interests could matter. The management may want to use 
accumulated cash to expand the company or to create a reserve against possible hard 
times. 
On the other hand, DCF model is not popular among researchers of contrarian 
strategies despite it being rather widely used in practice by analysts. For example, 
Demirakos, Strong and Walker (2004) examined reports in three sectors: beverage, 
electronics and electrical equipment and pharmaceuticals. They have found that in 
around 40% of reports DCF model is used as compared to the close  to 2% of reports 
which incorporated RIM.  
The implementation, which I will use, assumes that free cash flow is forecast to 
grow at the same rate as earnings for the first two years of the forecast horizon, and 
then remains constant afterwards. The equation is given as follows. 
P =
FCF1
1 + r
 +   
FCF2
r(1 + r)
   ,   (2.27) 
where  
FCF1  = the current free cash flow to equity (FCF) multiplied by 1 plus the one year ahead 
forecast proportionate change in earnings per share,  
FCF2 = the current FCF multiplied by 1 plus the two year ahead forecast proportionate 
change in earnings per share, and  
P = the cost of capital.  
The same requirements as before are imposed for the stock to be included in the 
sample for analysis within the contrarian strategy, based on using the DCF model, 
resulted in a relatively lower number of stocks on average, maximum and minimum 
figures of 223, 336 and 128 respectively. This is due to more data being required than 
for the FCFE valuation method than other models due to a lot of inputs in the FCFE 
calculation. Please find details in the graph 2.5.4.1 below. 
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Graph 2.5.4.1. The number of stocks in the S&P 500 which have all the data needed to 
test contrarian strategy based on VDCF/P ratio  
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2.6. Other aspects of setting up a contrarian strategy 
 
2.6.1. Risk free rate 
It is a common practice to use the US treasury bonds yield or return as a risk-free 
rate (see for example, Dissanaike and Lim (2010), Lee and Swaminathan (1999), 
Antoniou et al (2006)). To follow this method, I will use yields on US one year treasury 
bonds published by the U.S. Department of Treasury on its website.    
 
2.6.2. Cost of capital 
A cost of equity capital is the necessary part of any valuation model given the 
need to calculate the present value of a particular sequence of future outcomes of the 
company business. When analysing contrarian strategies on the basis of a valuation 
model, the authors used the proxies for cost of equity presented in table 2.6.2.1. 
Table 2.6.2.1. Approach to the cost of equity estimation in various papers 
Paper Cost of equity calculation Additional notes 
Frankel and Lee 
(1998) 
Constant discount rate. Industry 
discount rates proposed by FF (1997) 
based on one-factor and three-factor 
risk models. 
They have found that variation in 
discount rates did not materially affect 
their results, which is in line with 
Abarbanell and Bernard (1995). 
Lee and 
Swaminathan 
(1999) 
Add to a risk-free rate, which varies 
across periods, an estimate of a risk 
premium, which is estimated on the 
base of CAPM. Also, they used the 
industry specific cost of equity following 
FF (1997). 
 
Dechow, Hutton 
and Sloan (1999) 
Assumed to be 12%, which is the 
average return for the US equities over 
a long period of observations. 
Variation of the discount rate from 9% 
to 15% did not change the outcome of 
the analysis a lot. 
Lee, Myers and 
Swaminathan 
(1999) 
The same as in Lee and Swaminathan 
(1999). 
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Paper Cost of equity calculation Additional notes 
McCrae and 
Nilsson (2001) 
CAPM is used. Risk free rate is the 
yield of a six-month Treasury bill, while 
beta is taken from Bonnier-Findata 
database, while 4% is the assumed 
market risk premium. 
 
Dissanaike and 
Lim (2010) 
Either 12% following Dechow, Hutton 
and Sloan or derived from CAPM. 
 
In my research I will use CAPM model to calculate company specific cost of 
equity with the assumption that in the case of the cost of equity appearing to be smaller 
than risk free rate I will use risk free rate as a proxy for cost of equity. Otherwise the 
cost of equity for a particular stock k at a formation date t is equal to the following: 
𝑟(𝑘, 𝑡) = 𝑟𝑓(𝑡) + (𝑎𝑟𝑚(𝑡) − 𝑟𝑓(𝑡)) ∗ 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(𝑘, 𝑡)   (2.28) 
Where 
𝑟𝑓(𝑡) = the risk free rate 
𝑎𝑟𝑚(𝑡) = average return for the market 
 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(𝑘, 𝑡)   = beta for a particular stock k 
Yield for a one year treasury bond at the relevant formation date will be the proxy 
for a risk-free rate. Average return for the last three years for a S&P 500 index will be a 
proxy for the market risk premium. Beta is calculated following the standard formula: so 
it is the covariance between a stock and the S&P 500 index divided by the variance of 
the S&P 500 index. Calculations are done on the basis of the last three years’ data for 
monthly returns of the S&P 500 index and a particular stock. 
 
2.6.3. Contrarian portfolio performance evaluation 
In order to calculate the return for a particular strategy I will follow the standard 
procedure used in classic contrarian strategy research papers. For each year of 
portfolio formation ‘t’, for a one-year holding period H, the return on the value portfolio of 
n stocks, for given H, and t is  
𝑉𝐻,𝑡 =
∑ 𝑉𝐻,𝑡,𝑖 
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
   ,   (2.29) 
where  
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𝑉𝐻,𝑡,𝑖 = the return on the ith security (i=1,…,n) in the value portfolio, and 
𝑛 = the number of securities in the value portfolio in year t.  
The return on the glamour portfolio, composed of m (i=1,…,m) stocks, for a given 
holding period H is expressed as  
𝐺𝐻,𝑡 =
∑ 𝐺𝐻,𝑡,𝑖 
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑚
   ,   (2.30) 
where  
GHti  = the return on the ith security (i=1,…n) in the glamour portfolio, and  
b  = the number of securities in the glamour portfolio. 
In addition, there is a need to tackle the issue with those stocks which have no 
total return figure for the next year, while still being eligible for inclusion in either 
glamour or value portfolios. Choosing an S&P 500 sample frame limits the impact of this 
issue significantly. In more than half of the formation dates there are no stocks, which 
could be potentially included in the glamour or value portfolio (they have a least current 
price and are in the S&P 500 index) and at the same time do not have total return figure 
for the 12-month ahead period (from March to March). For the remaining formation 
dates the share of the such stocks is really low varying from 0.2% of the total stocks, 
which could be potentially in the sample to 1%. Please find details in the graph 2.6.3.1.  
Given the very small size of the share of the stocks with the lack of data issue I 
will delete such stocks once ranking the sample for the purpose of glamour/value 
portfolios identification and will assume that a small look ahead bias will not have a 
material impact on the results. 
Graph 2.6.3.1. Share of stocks from the S&P 500 list for a particular formation date 
while being without total return for the one year ahead period 
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In order to identify the stocks which should enter the glamour or value portfolios, 
normally ranking the sample by a particular ratio is used and then a proportion of stocks 
(say 25% or 10%) of the stocks with the highest/lowest ratio are considered to be 
glamour or value stocks. The most common share which is used for glamour/value 
stocks identification is deciles (top and bottom ones are used). However other options 
are used as well: top/bottom 35 or 50 stocks (DeBondt and Thaler (1985)) and quintiles 
(Chan et al (1991) or Frankel and Lee (1998)).  
I consider the 25% best upper quartile of stocks on the basis of B/P, CF/P or 
other valuation ratio to be a value portfolio, while the lower quartile – to be a glamour 
one, which is better than deciles or quintiles due to a small initial sample for some of the 
strategies studied. For example, for the DCF model the minimum number of stocks in 
the sample for one year is 128, which results in 13 stocks in case of deciles and 26 in 
case of quintiles, while 25% (or quartiles) results in 32 stocks in glamour and value 
portfolios.  
For past returns method, the quartile of stocks with the strongest performance 
over the past three years at each of the March formation dates will be considered as 
being glamour stocks. The quartile of the stocks with the poorest performance over the 
last three years will be considered as being value stocks. 
The overall contrarian profit (𝜋𝑐,𝑡) recorded in our various tables of results is the 
net return to buying the value portfolio, while going short in the glamour portfolio, netting 
over the value and glamour portfolios to yield the trading yearly profit 𝜋𝑐,𝑡: 
 𝜋𝑐,𝑡 = 𝑉𝐻,𝑡 − 𝐺𝐻,𝑡   (2.31) 
I test the null hypothesis for a particular year t. 
Ho: 𝜋𝑐,𝑡 = 0 (there is no significant difference between the return on the 
value portfolio VH,t and the return on the glamour portfolio (GH,t) against 
the alternative), 
H1:  𝜋𝑐,𝑡 > 0 (there are contrarian profits available to the strategy).  
This is different from the normal practice used while analysing contrarian 
strategies. The normal practice is to take the difference between the average return of 
value and glamour portfolios each year aggregate them over the sample years and then 
to test whether the mean of this sample is different from zero. This is a test of the 
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hypothesis that these annual observations are drawn from a distribution with zero mean. 
This seems to underestimate the variability induced by pure chance. The test ignores 
the information in the underlying distributions of value and glamour portfolios. The test 
could be influenced by a few years with large positive values of the difference in value 
and glamour average that are due to chance alone (so that during these years, there is 
no significant difference between the sample from which the average return for value is 
taken and the sample from which average return for glamour is taken. If the test were 
undertaken over a lengthy period (i.e. 40 years), then there would be enough 
observations to dilute the effect of the unrepresentative years. But typically, in statistical 
terms the periods are much shorter than that, say 20 or 25 years.  
In order to avoid this problem, I test each year for the difference between value 
and glamour portfolios and include in the calculations only those where there is a 
statistically significant difference. So I test the hypothesis that the contrarian strategy 
works in each year, not just on average during the test period, which is a much stricter, 
and I believe more intuitive, test.  
Some of the papers examine this question as well. Table 2.6.3.2 presents some 
key findings from past studies which do comment on the annual variation of contrarian 
profits; specifically, I give the stock market studied, the portfolio formation variable, the 
percentage of years in which losses are incurred by the strategy employed and, finally, 
the largest annual loss yielded by the strategy as a percentage of the average profit. 
The percentage of loss making years shown in Table 2.6.3.2 are substantial, ranging 
from 6.6% of the contrarian portfolio’s value when the long-term growth of earnings is 
the portfolio formation attribute, to 80% in the case of book to price (for US stocks over 
the period 1976-1990, reported by Frankel and Lee (1998)). These studies suggest that 
the issue of the stability of contrarian profits is a serious one and thus worthy of further 
study.  
Consistent with my objective of evaluating the returns to a contrarian trading 
strategy I calculate buy and hold returns to holding a portfolio of value stocks, while 
shorting a portfolio of glamour stocks over one year following portfolio formation in each 
of the twenty-three years of our sample.  
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Table 2.6.3.2. Previous evidence concerning the annual variability of contrarian profits 
Study Market 
Portfolio formation 
variable 
Sample 
period 
% of loss-
making 
years 
Largest loss 
as % of 
mean gain 
Lakonishok et al 
(1994) 
USA Cash-to-Price ratio 1968-1989 22% -2.12 
Lakonishok et al 
(1994) 
USA Book-to-Market ratio 1968-1989 27% -3.28 
Fama and French 
(1996) 
USA 
Book–to-Market 
premium 
1964-1993 23% -3.76 
Cai (1997) Japan 
Book–to-Market 
premium 
1971-1992 13% -1 
Frankel and Lee 
(1998) 
USA Book-to-price ratio 1976-1990 80% 5.2 
Frankel and Lee 
(1998) 
USA 
Long-term growth of 
earning forecast 
1976-1990 6.6% -0.31 
Dimson, Nagel, 
Quigley (2003) 
UK 
Book-to-Market 
premium 
1955-2001 24% -0.82 
Chan and 
Lakonishok (2004) 
USA Book-to-Market ratio 1979-2002 54% -13.22 
Jamin (2005) Germany Price-Earnings ratio 1990-2002 46% -4 
 
I tackle the question whether glamour and value stocks are drawn from different 
distributions each year and not just from distributions with significantly different means 
once the whole period sample mean has been compiled, averaging across its 
component years. This difference matters because a bad year can be the end of a 
contrarian fund manager.  
In order to compare different strategies, I focus on the expected return for a 
strategy for the next year. For this I use only years where a particular strategy produced 
statistically significant returns (whether positive or negative). In other years, I can 
assume that a return was zero as the hypothesis that it was different from zero failed to 
pass the test for being statistical significant. 
Firstly, I calculate the probability that the return to deploying a particular 
contrarian strategy next year will be positive or negative. According to probability theory 
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this can be estimated as a share of years with statistically significant positive/negative 
returns among the 23 years examined.  
Secondly, I estimate average returns, regardless of sign, as average figures for 
those years where the strategy produced statistically significant negative/positive 
returns. 
Thirdly, I construct an expectation of a return to the chosen contrarian strategy 
for the next year: 
𝑅𝐸 = 𝑝𝑁 ∗ 𝑎𝑟𝑁 + 𝑝𝑃 ∗ 𝑎𝑟𝑃   ,   (2.32) 
where 
𝑝𝑁 = probability return will be negative, 
𝑎𝑟𝑁  = average negative return for those years where it was statistically significant over the 
examined 23 years, 
𝑝𝑃 = probability return will be positive, and 
𝑎𝑟𝑃  = average positive return for those years where it was statistically significant over the 
examined 23 years. 
 
2.6.4. Evaluation of strategies efficiency from risk/return perspective 
The T-statistics for the average return of a contrarian strategy and the average 
return itself show the reward of a particular strategy. On the other hand, this is not 
enough for assessing the efficiency of a strategy given that portfolio evaluation normally 
requires the calculation of some ratio based of both risk and reward. In some papers 
related to contrarian strategies the Sharpe ratio is used (Gregory et al (2003), Lee and 
Swaminathan (1999), Fama and French (1998), Daniel and Titman (1997)). The Sharpe 
ratio is calculated the following way: 
𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑝𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =  
(𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 − 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛)
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛
   (2.33) 
An alternative indicator for the Sharpe ratio is the Sortino ratio and the Calmar 
ratio. Under the threat of a catastrophic loss, increasingly both fund managers and 
those who evaluate their performance have become more focused on downside risk. 
One manifestation of this is the popularity of semi-variance metrics like the Sortino ratio 
(Sortino and van der Meer (1991) and Sortino and Forsey (1996)). It is the modification 
of the Sharpe ratio, with the substitution of standard deviation by the standard deviation 
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for the negative returns, which makes it better in assessing results of the skewed return 
distributions (Rollinger and Hoffman (2013)). Often equity returns are not normally 
distributed and this sets the background for many hedge fund strategies (Eling and 
Schuhmacher (2007)), which utilize long-short strategies among others. 
In my study, I apply one such measure of downside risk, the Calmar ratio, (Young 
(1991)) to evaluate the relative performance of alternative contrarian trading strategies. 
A contrarian strategy holds out the prospect of generating positive returns in any 
market condition. This is usually the aim of a hedge fund (Heidorn et al (2009)). Hence I 
can apply the same tools to back-test potential losses to a contrarian strategy. One such 
measure is “maximum drawdown”, the maximum loss suffered from following the given 
trading strategy from portfolio formation. Maximum drawdown is a popular measure to 
assess possible losses to a hedge fund. According to EDHEC Risk and Asset 
Management Research Centre (Heidorn et al (2009)) 74% of investors recognize 
maximum drawdown as an important piece of information for a hedge fund and would 
like to see this figure in its fund’s report. 
Maximum drawdown is frequently used to assess results of a portfolio manager 
together with their annualized returns. One such drawdown measure is the Calmar ratio 
(Dunis and Miao (2006)). The Calmar ratio is given by the expression  
𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑎𝑟 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
(𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 − 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛)
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑤𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛
   (2.34) 
Where the maximum drawdown is the maximum loss over the portfolio’s history 
which an investor could have suffered by investing at the highest peak and selling the 
lowest trough (Heidorn et al (2009)). 
Finally, I will compare the risk/return ratio for a particular contrarian strategy with 
the same ratio for a passive strategy, which is simply holding all stocks in the S&P 500 
sample for a year with the consecutive change of the portfolio in line with the change of 
constituents of the index. Equal weighting for a passive portfolio will be applied in line 
with the equal weighting applied within the value/glamour portfolios.  
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Chapter 3. The risk return superiority of passive investing as the 
reason for contrarian profits not being arbitraged away 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Contrarian strategy is an active strategy, which is supposed to be at least better 
than a passive strategy in order to attract investors’ attention. This comparison is 
missing in previous studies of contrarian strategies, while it could be a significant factor 
for understanding of why contrarian profits are not arbitraged away.  In the case that a 
particular contrarian strategy can generate statistically significant positive returns, but is 
not that good as a passive one it would be hard for investor to decide to apply it despite 
the visible profitability. 
In this chapter I will examine the key characteristics of the passive strategy and 
compare simple (past returns or ratios based) and sophisticated (valuation model 
based) strategies with it from a risk/return perspective using a Calmar ratio as an 
evaluative tool. Initially the data for a one year testing period will be presented with the 
subsequent tests of the robustness of earlier results using a six and three-month 
formation/test periods. The initial analysis will be done on the basis of the periods where 
contrarian profits are statistically significant with a subsequent replication of the same 
tests using  of the whole sample of the periods.  
The methodology which will be used to evaluate the results is the one discussed 
in Chapter 2 with the end of March each year being the portfolio formation period and 
testing period being the consecutive 12-month period after the formation date. For six 
and three months tests the formation dates will be end of March/end of September for 
six months and end of quarter for three-month tests.  
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3.2. Returns to a passive strategy 
A passive strategy resulted in more positive returns than negative ones across 23 
year in the analysis of Chapter 2 with most of the returns being statistically significant. 
During 20 years, it produced positive returns and only in three years the strategies 
resulted in losses for its investors. 22 returns are statistically different from zero, with 
the only exception being the return for the period from end of March 1998 to end of 
March 1999. 
Moreover, in the case of losses there was a relatively quick recovered 
afterwards. After a loss of 26.1% in 2002 the strategy returned a 54.3% profit the next 
year. After a two-year period of losses in 2007 and 2008 of 8.3% and 39.3% 
respectively the strategy returned a 78.8% profit in 2009, which brought the size of 
investments to 99.5% of the level existing at the end on March 2007. 
Finally, the variation across the sample each year is relatively large. The 
outperformance of best performing stock vs worst performing one is more than 140% in 
all the 23 periods and in the peak (2009) almost reached 1000%. The standard 
deviation of returns for a sample each year is 35% on average across the 23 periods, 
while the peak of 85% is reached in 2009 as well. 
The strategy performed relatively well around downturns in the S&P 500 market 
index. It was robust during the dot-com crash in 2000 (from March 2000 to March 2001). 
The capitalisation weighted index S&P 500 returned a loss of 21.6% during that period 
while the strategy posted a significantly positive result. Losses during 2002 and 2007-
2008 periods were almost the same for the strategy and the S&P 500 index, while 
consecutive recoveries were much stronger for the strategy. In 2003 the strategy 
reached the level, which was a 14% higher than the end of March 2002 figure, while 
S&P 500 barely managed to recover the loss. After a turmoil of 2007-2008 S&P 500 
managed to fully recover only by end March 2011, while the strategy almost did it by 
end March 2010. 
The strategy performed well from risk return perspective. It returned 21% per 
annum during positive years with statistically significant results, which totalled 19 years. 
The average loss was 25% across the three years with statistically significant losses. 
This implies a 14% expected annual return following the methodology I discussed in the 
previous section. Maximum drawdown is 52.7%, which was reached close to the end of 
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the turmoil period of 2007-2008. Consequently, the Calmar ratio (see formula (2.34)) is 
equal to 0.19. 
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Graph 3.2.1. Passive strategy annual return 
 
 Statistically significant return  
 Statistically insignificant return  
 
 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Number of stocks 464 476 479 479 481 488 489 491 494 494 494 493 496 497 497 498 494 498 499 499 498 497 497 
Maximum return 138% 179% 407% 153% 119% 198% 145% 301% 281% 552% 239% 146% 149% 678% 208% 203% 124% 104% 81% 866% 99% 74% 129% 
Minimum return -70% -66% -82% -100% -77% -79% -52% -63% -83% -89% -91% -100% -99% -75% -88% -90% -61% -93% -100% -98% -45% -84% -71% 
Standard 
deviation 
29.6% 31.5% 35.3% 27.4% 23.1% 29.8% 25.1% 40.6% 42.5% 69.4% 45.5% 33.9% 26.3% 53.9% 29.0% 30.6% 22.0% 28.7% 28.1% 85.4% 23.7% 23.1% 24.0% 
Average return 9.8% 16.3% 20.5% 5.1% 13.1% 27.8% 14.0% 42.7% 1.7% 11.7% 9.8% 10.3% -26.1% 54.3% 10.6% 18.1% 12.4% -8.3% -39.3% 78.8% 19.7% 4.7% 16.9% 
Return of S&P 
500 index 
14.3% 11.0% 15.2% 1.5% 15.5% 32.0% 19.8% 47.8% 18.4% 17.9% -21.6% 0.3% -24.7% 35.0% 6.7% 11.7% 11.8% -5.0% -38.0% 49.6% 15.6% 8.5% 13.9% 
t-statistics 7.1 11.2 12.5 4.0 12.2 20.1 12.0 22.6 0.9 3.6 4.6 6.5 -21.4 21.7 7.9 12.7 12.1 -6.2 -30.2 19.9 17.9 4.4 15.2 
Note: The returns and other figures are calculated on the base of portfolios formed as at the end of March each year from 1990 to 2012. The period from end March 
1990 to end March 1991 is considered to be 1990, from end March 1991 to end March 1992 – 1991, etc.
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3.3. Returns to ratio based strategies 
 
3.3.1. Returns based on past returns, RET 
It was more likely to get a loss from this strategy than to get a profit over a one 
year period during the 23 years in the analysis, while in most case the strategy would 
give an investor a zero return once statistical significance is taken into consideration 
(see details on graph 3.3.1.1.).   There are seven statistically significant negative results 
and only six statistically positive ones, while all other years produced statistically 
insignificant returns.  
The strategy performed better than a passive one during turmoil periods on the 
market. During the dot-com crash it returned an impressive 46.5%, far above the 9.8% 
of the passive strategy. This was a result of capturing contrarian profits when glamour 
stocks declined by 21%, while value stocks gained 25.5%. During 2002 and 2007-2008 
the losses of the strategy was smaller than for the passive one, while recovery in 2009 
was far stronger with more than 100% rise vs. 78.8% for the passive strategy. Recovery 
in 2003 was smaller, but due to a smaller loss in 2002 it brought the overall return for 
two years to a higher level.   
There are two reasons for a better performance of the strategy during tumultuous 
periods in the market followed by the consecutive recovery. 
Firstly, it performed better on a downside mainly due to a long-short nature of the 
strategy. That is, the strategy involves taking both a long and a short position on stocks. 
On a standalone basis glamour and value portfolios perform as bad as the passive 
strategy or even worse. In 2002 the losses for glamour and value were 21.5% and 
32.5% respectively, while the passive strategy made a loss of 26.6%. In 2007-2008 the 
glamour portfolio performed better than the passive one, which was better than the 
value one, this was mainly due to glamour portfolio having a zero return in 2007 
(insignificant positive return) when both of other discussed portfolios got a statistically 
significant loss. 
Secondly, it performed better on an upside due to more demand for value stocks 
once there is a recovery. In the recovery of 2003 value stocks returned 82% profit, while 
glamour and the passive strategy gained 40% and 54% respectively. In 2009 value 
portfolio jumped by 147% vs 34% for a glamour one and 79% for the passive strategy. 
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The main relative weakness of the strategy, besides having lower number of 
statistically significant results, is that it performed worse than the passive one in most of 
the other years. This includes statistically significant losses of 20% and more in 1998 
and 2011 and smaller returns in 1991 and 1994.   
However, the strategy could be better than a passive one if only statistically 
significant years are taken into consideration. It produced on average a 40.1% positive 
return during positive years and loss of 15.9% during negative ones. These figures are 
better than a return of 20% and a loss of 25% for the passive strategy.  
From a maximum drawdown point of view the strategy is better than the passive 
one with a 47.6% figure vs 52.7%.  This was reached during the turmoil of 2007-2008.  
The strategy looks worse than the passive one from a risk/return perspective with 
the Calmar ratio of 0.04 vs 0.19 for the passive strategy. The main reasons are a 
substantially lower number of statistically significant returns and a smaller ratio between 
a number of statistically significant annual gains divided by a number of statistically 
significant annual losses.  
Overall, the past return strategy seems to be a rather poor tool to capture 
contrarian profits, which could be significant enough compared to the profits of the 
passive strategy. Periods of recoveries and the dot-com crash in 2000 are the only time 
when it performed relatively well due to the embedded idea of captured value stocks 
being able to substantially outperform glamour stocks and the average market level. 
This is in line with the overall test of significance, which shows that average return is not 
statistically significantly different from zero across 23 years in the sample.  
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Graph 3.3.1.1. Annual returns of a contrarian strategy based on three years past returns 
 
 Statistically significant return of the contrarian strategy 
 Statistically insignificant return of the contrarian strategy 
 Return of the passive strategy 
 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Glamour 15.6% 13.6% 16.3% 6.3% 9.6% 34.9% 17.3% 50.5% 15.8% 13.8% -21.0% -2.0% -21.5% 40.4% 15.1% 22.7% 9.5% 2.7% -43.3% 33.6% 25.3% 13.2% 12.9% 
St Div of Glamour 31.2% 26.2% 27.9% 28.1% 22.4% 30.9% 27.2% 44.6% 55.7% 55.8% 41.5% 36.9% 26.1% 29.0% 22.8% 27.0% 26.1% 30.6% 21.5% 28.7% 24.3% 23.4% 24.4% 
T-statistics for glamour 5.4 5.6 6.3 2.4 4.7 12.3 6.9 12.3 3.1 2.7 -5.6 -0.6 -9.1 15.3 7.3 9.3 4.0 1.0 -22.2 12.9 11.5 6.3 5.9 
Value 7.3% 27.2% 26.2% 12.3% 17.7% 21.4% 11.5% 41.6% -10.1% 11.6% 25.5% 22.2% -32.5% 82.1% 4.8% 18.4% 12.9% -16.5% -47.3% 146.6% 13.3% -6.8% 18.0% 
St Div of value 36.1% 39.7% 50.5% 38.8% 28.4% 37.6% 29.2% 51.0% 37.0% 75.9% 52.4% 38.7% 32.0% 65.2% 37.7% 43.1% 21.7% 29.2% 34.5% 131.6% 24.8% 22.2% 27.9% 
T-statistics for value 2.2 7.4 5.6 3.4 6.8 6.2 4.3 8.9 -3.0 1.7 5.4 6.3 -11.2 13.9 1.4 4.7 6.5 -6.3 -15.2 12.3 5.9 -3.4 7.1 
Number of stocks in sample 460 470 470 472 472 476 473 476 483 483 482 475 482 483 490 492 487 486 487 485 489 491 490 
Number of stocks in each 
portfolio 
115 118 118 118 118 119 118 119 121 121 121 119 121 121 123 123 122 122 122 121 122 123 123 
Difference -8.3% 13.6% 9.9% 6.0% 8.0% -13.5% -5.8% -8.9% -25.8% -2.2% 46.5% 24.2% -11.0% 41.7% -10.3% -4.3% 3.3% -19.2% -4.1% 113.0% -12.1% -20.1% 5.1% 
T-statistics -1.9 3.1 1.9 1.4 2.4 -3.0 -1.6 -1.4 -4.2 -0.3 7.7 4.9 -2.9 6.4 -2.6 -0.9 1.1 -5.0 -1.1 9.2 -3.8 -6.9 1.5 
Note: The returns and other figures are calculated on the base of portfolios formed as at the end of March each year from 1990 to 2012. The period from end March 1990 to end March 1991 is 
considered to be 1990, from end March 1991 to end March 1992 – 1991, etc. 
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3.3.2. Returns based on past earnings to price, E/P 
In contrast to the past returns strategy it was more likely to get a profit from this 
strategy than to get a loss over a one year period during the 23 years in the analysis, 
while in most case the strategy would give an investor a zero return once statistical 
significance is taken into consideration (see details on graph 3.3.2.1.). There are six 
statistically significant positive results and only four statistically positive ones, while all 
other years produced statistically insignificant returns.  
In the same way as the past returns the strategy based on E/P ratio performed 
better than a passive one during turmoil periods on the market. During the dot-com 
crash in 2000 it returned an impressive 44.4% average return in the sample period 
studied, far above the 9.8% of the passive strategy. This was a result of capturing 
contrarian profits when glamour stocks declined by 25.6%, while value stocks gained 
35.2%. During 2007-2008 the losses of the strategy were smaller than for the passive 
one, while recovery in 2009 was almost the same as for the passive strategy of just 
holding the S&P 500 index during its  74.6% rise vs. 78.8% for the passive strategy of 
just holding S&P 500 index for the period. In 2002 the strategy did not have a loss at all 
(rather a insignificant positive return). However, it had an insignificant negative return in 
2003, when there was a recovery in the market.  
Again, there are the same reasons as for the past return one for a better 
performance of the strategy during periods of market turmoil followed by the 
consecutive recovery. 
Firstly, it performed better in downside markets mainly due to a long-short nature 
of the strategy. On a standalone basis glamour and value portfolios perform as bad as 
the passive strategy or even worse. In 2002 the losses for glamour and value were 
32.9% and 26.8% respectively, while the passive strategy made a loss of 26.6%. In 
2007-2008 the glamour portfolio performed better than the passive one, which was 
better than the value one, which was mainly due to the glamour portfolio having a 
relatively small negative return in 2007. 
Secondly, it performed better on the upside due to more demand for value stocks 
once there is a recovery. In 2009 the value portfolio jumped by 137% vs 63% for the 
glamour portfolio and 79% for the passive strategy. 
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In line with the past returns strategy the main relative weakness of the strategy 
based on E/P, besides having a lower number of statistically significant results, is that it 
performed worse than the passive one in most of the other years. This includes 
statistically significant losses of 35% in 1998 and 1999 and zero returns (insignificant 
returns) during most of the years when stock market growth was strong in the 1990s.   
In the same way, as the past return strategy the strategy based on E/P ratio 
could be better than a passive one if only statistically significant years are taken into 
consideration. It produced on average a 31.9% positive return during positive years and 
loss of 21.7% during negative ones. These figures are better than a return of 20% and a 
loss of 25% for the passive strategy of simply holding the S&P 500 index. 
From a maximum drawdown point of view the strategy is slightly worse than the 
passive one with a 58.2% figure vs 52.7%. In contrast to the past return strategy and 
passive strategy this drawdown was during the turmoil of 2000, while during the 2007-
2008 period the strategy required a smaller implied drawdown of 17.3%.  
The strategy looks worse than the passive one from a risk/return perspective with 
a Calmar ratio of 0.01 vs 0.19 for the passive strategy. The main reasons are the 
substantially lower number of statistically significant returns and a smaller ratio between 
a number of statistically significant annual gains divided by a number of statistically 
significant annual losses. Again, this is in line with other strategies examined before. 
Consequently, I conclude that the contrarian strategy seems to be a rather poor 
tool to capture contrarian profits, which could be significant enough compared to the 
profits of the passive strategy. Recovery periods and the dot-com crash are the only 
time when it performed relatively well due to value stocks being able to substantially 
outperform glamour stocks and the average market level. This is in line with the overall 
test of significance, which shows that average return to a contrarian strategy is not 
statistically significantly different from zero across the 23 years in the sample. 
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Graph 3.3.2.1. Annual returns of a contrarian strategy based on E/P (historical EPS) 
 
 Statistically significant return of the contrarian strategy 
 Statistically insignificant return of the contrarian strategy 
 Return of the passive strategy 
 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Glamour 9.1% 18.1% 24.8% 7.3% 12.7% 22.5% 9.4% 41.8% 20.9% 34.7% -25.6% 2.6% -32.9% 69.8% 2.0% 23.6% 4.8% -5.2% -42.3% 62.7% 22.1% -0.3% 17.1% 
St Div of Glamour 27.9% 38.3% 53.1% 32.1% 27.6% 30.8% 28.8% 52.8% 54.1% 90.5% 38.2% 35.4% 30.9% 78.4% 37.4% 37.5% 26.2% 29.2% 25.0% 75.2% 30.3% 25.1% 26.6% 
T-statistics for glamour 3.5 4.9 4.9 2.4 4.8 7.8 3.5 8.6 4.2 4.2 -7.3 0.8 -11.7 9.8 0.6 7.0 2.0 -2.0 -18.8 9.2 8.1 -0.1 7.1 
Value 11.9% 23.1% 29.0% 4.2% 13.4% 30.1% 18.0% 49.0% -13.8% 0.0% 35.2% 23.2% -26.8% 58.5% 17.7% 20.0% 15.7% -15.3% -44.2% 137.3% 14.9% 4.4% 14.5% 
St Div of value 33.4% 30.8% 28.3% 22.8% 19.5% 27.0% 28.3% 39.0% 29.4% 46.4% 52.3% 34.0% 25.5% 36.1% 29.2% 25.8% 22.3% 33.8% 33.3% 122.4% 22.2% 21.0% 28.8% 
T-statistics for value 3.8 7.8 10.7 1.9 7.2 11.9 6.9 13.6 -5.1 0.0 7.3 7.5 -11.6 17.9 6.7 8.6 7.8 -5.0 -14.8 12.3 7.4 2.4 5.6 
Number of stocks in 
sample 
464 430 435 435 440 450 467 472 476 473 473 478 482 489 489 490 490 494 494 485 491 496 496 
Number of stocks in 
each portfolio 
116 108 109 109 110 113 117 118 119 118 118 120 121 122 122 123 123 124 124 121 123 124 124 
Difference 2.9% 4.9% 4.2% -3.1% 0.7% 7.5% 8.6% 7.3% -34.7% -34.8% 60.8% 20.6% 6.2% -11.4% 15.7% -3.6% 10.9% -10.1% -1.9% 74.6% -7.2% 4.8% -2.6% 
T-statistics 0.7 1.0 0.7 -0.8 0.2 2.0 2.3 1.2 -6.2 -3.7 10.2 4.6 1.7 -1.5 3.7 -0.9 3.5 -2.5 -0.5 5.7 -2.1 1.6 -0.7 
Note: The returns and other figures are calculated on the base of portfolios formed as at the end of March each year from 1990 to 2012. The period from end March 1990 to end March 1991 is 
considered to be 1990, from end March 1991 to end March 1992 – 1991, etc. 
-60%
-40%
-20%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
Chapter 3. The risk return superiority of passive investing as the reason for contrarian profits not being 
arbitraged away 
3.3. Returns to ratio based strategies 94 
3.3.3. Returns based on expected earnings to price, EE/P  
This strategy did worse than the one with the historical earnings despite having a 
lot of similarities. This was mainly due to lower return during statistically significant 
positive years and higher loss during statistically significant negative years.  
Again, as with the other strategies it was more likely to get a profit from this 
strategy than to get a loss over a one year period during the 23 years in the analysis, 
while in most cases the strategy would give an investor a zero return, on average, once 
statistical significance is taken into consideration (see details on graph 3.3.3.1.). There 
are six statistically significant positive results prevailed and only four statistically positive 
returns, while all other years yielded statistically insignificant returns, which was exactly 
the same as for the E/P strategy based on historical data.  
In the same way, as the other strategies analysed so far, the strategy based on 
E/P (forecasted earnings) ratio performed better than a passive one during turmoil 
periods in the market. However, there were some differences. During the dot-com crash 
in 2000 it returned 56.5%, far above the 9.8% of the passive strategy of simply holding 
the S&P 500 index. This was a result of capturing contrarian profits when glamour 
stocks declined by 24.5%, while value stocks gained 32.1%. During 2007-2008 the 
losses of the strategy were smaller than for the passive one. In contrast to other 
strategies and to a passive one there was no statistically significant recovery in 2009. In 
2002 the strategy returned a statistically significant profit, which is better than any other 
strategy analysed so far. However, it had an insignificantly negative return in 2003, 
when there was a recovery in the market, which is in line with E/P based on historical 
data.  
For this strategy, there is only one reason for a better performance of the strategy 
during turmoil in the market followed by the consecutive recovery. It performed better on 
the downside of the stock market, mainly due to a long-short nature of the strategy. On 
a standalone basis glamour and value portfolios perform as badly as the passive 
strategy or even worse. In 2002 the losses for glamour and value were 33.6% and 
25.5% respectively, while a passive strategy made a loss of 26.6%. In 2007-2008 the 
glamour portfolio performed better than the passive one, which was better than the 
value one. 
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In line with the other strategies analysed so far, the main relative weakness of the 
strategy based on E/P (expected earnings) besides having lower number of statistically 
significant results, is that it performed worse than the passive one in most of the other 
years. This includes statistically significant losses of 36% and 55% in 1998 and 1999 
respectively and zero returns (insignificant returns) during most of the positive years in 
the 1990s when the stock market was strongly rising.   
In the contrast to other analysed strategies so far, the strategy is almost in line 
with the passive one if only statistically significant years are taken into consideration. It 
produced on average a 20.6% positive return during positive years and loss of 27.2% 
during negative ones. These figures are close to a return of 20% and a loss of 25% for 
the passive strategy of holding the S&P 500 index in all years as it rose/fell. 
From a maximum drawdown point of view the strategy is worse than the passive 
one with a 72% figure vs 52.7%. In the same way, as for E/P strategy based of historical 
earnings and in contrast to the past return strategy and passive strategy this drawdown 
was during the turmoil of 2000, while the 2007-2008 period yielded a substantially 
smaller drawdown of 45.3%.  
The strategy looks worse than the passive one from a risk/return perspective with 
the Calmar ratio of a minus 0.04 vs 0.19 for the passive strategy. The main reasons are 
the substantially lower number of statistically significant returns and a smaller ratio 
between the number of statistically significant annual gains divided by the number of 
statistically significant annual losses. Again, this is in line with other strategies examined 
before. In contrast with other strategies there is a substantially large maximum 
drawdown. 
Consequently, again I could conclude that the contrarian strategy seems to be a 
rather poor tool to capture contrarian profits, compared to the profits of a passive 
strategy. The Dot-com crash is the only time when it performed relatively well, due to 
the embedded idea of captured value stocks being able to substantially outperform 
glamour stocks and the average market return. In contrast to other strategies this 
strategy did not perform well during recoveries. This is in line with the overall test of 
significance, which shows that average return is not statistically significantly different 
from zero across 23 years in the sample. 
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Graph 3.3.3.1. Annual returns of a contrarian strategy based on E/P (expected EPS) 
 
 Statistically significant return of the contrarian strategy 
 Statistically insignificant return of the contrarian strategy 
 Return of the passive strategy 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Glamour 9.1% 18.3% 21.4% 6.0% 13.6% 26.3% 9.0% 38.8% 22.9% 48.7% 
-
24.5% 
1.2% 
-
33.6% 
72.1% 3.2% 20.8% 5.6% -9.4% 
-
41.2% 
93.0% 24.5% 1.9% 16.0% 
St Div of Glamour 27.9% 38.5% 52.6% 31.4% 25.6% 32.6% 27.1% 42.3% 54.3% 108.6% 37.6% 33.1% 31.0% 85.3% 35.2% 38.0% 25.9% 29.4% 25.1% 87.6% 28.9% 23.9% 27.9% 
T-statistics for 
glamour 
3.5 4.9 4.3 2.0 5.6 8.6 3.6 10.0 4.6 4.9 -7.1 0.4 -11.9 9.3 1.0 6.1 2.4 -3.5 -18.3 11.8 9.4 0.9 6.4 
Value 11.9% 22.2% 25.1% 7.2% 12.1% 26.9% 22.9% 47.5% 
-
13.4% 
-6.6% 32.1% 23.7% 
-
25.5% 
58.1% 15.5% 21.1% 15.8% 
-
14.0% 
-
48.8% 
107.8% 14.9% 3.5% 16.3% 
St Div of value 33.4% 32.2% 27.8% 24.7% 18.6% 28.1% 27.2% 35.6% 31.8% 34.2% 52.6% 33.2% 24.3% 37.8% 28.4% 27.3% 22.8% 34.2% 30.8% 119.9% 23.1% 23.5% 28.4% 
T-statistics for value 3.8 7.2 9.4 3.0 6.8 10.2 9.1 14.5 -4.6 -2.1 6.7 7.8 -11.5 17.0 6.0 8.6 7.7 -4.5 -17.6 10.0 7.2 1.7 6.4 
Number of stocks in 
sample 
464 431 435 435 441 451 468 472 476 473 475 478 484 489 488 490 491 495 495 493 495 496 496 
Number of stocks in 
each portfolio 
116 108 109 109 110 113 117 118 119 118 119 120 121 122 122 123 123 124 124 123 124 124 124 
Difference 2.9% 3.9% 3.7% 1.3% -1.5% 0.6% 13.9% 8.7% 
-
36.3% 
-55.3% 56.5% 22.4% 8.1% 
-
14.0% 
12.2% 0.2% 10.3% -4.6% -7.5% 14.8% -9.6% 1.6% 0.3% 
T-statistics 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.3 -0.5 0.2 3.9 1.7 -6.3 -5.3 9.5 5.2 2.3 -1.7 3.0 0.1 3.3 -1.1 -2.1 1.1 -2.9 0.5 0.1 
Note: The returns and other figures are calculated on the base of portfolios formed as at the end of March each year from 1990 to 2012. The period from end March 1990 to end March 1991 is 
considered to be 1990, from end March 1991 to end March 1992 – 1991, etc. 
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3.3.4. Returns based on book value to price, B/P 
In the same way, as for the two strategies based on E/P ratios one was more 
likely to get a profit from this strategy than to get a loss over a one year period during 
the 23 years in the analysis, while in most case the strategy would give an investor a 
zero return once statistical significance is taken into consideration (see details on graph 
3.3.4.1.). There are eight statistically significant positive results and only five statistically 
negative, while all other years produced statistically insignificant returns.  
In the same way, as the past return strategy, the strategy based on B/P ratio 
performed better than a passive one during periods of turmoil in the markets. During the 
dot-com crash in 2000 it returned an impressive 44.4%, far above the 9.8% of the 
passive strategy. This was a result of capturing contrarian profits when glamour stocks 
declined by 14%, while value stocks rose by 30.4%. During 2002 and 2007-2008 the 
losses of the strategy was smaller than for the passive one, while recovery in 2009 was 
slightly stronger of with a 87.7% rise vs. a 78.8% return for the passive strategy. 
Recovery in 2003 was smaller, but due to there being a smaller loss in 2002 the overall 
return for these two years was overall at a higher level than in the 2008-2009 period.   
Again, there are the same reasons for a better performance of the strategy during 
eras of turmoil in the market followed by the subsequent recovery. 
Firstly, it performed better on the downside of the market mainly due to a long-
short nature of the strategy. On a standalone basis glamour and value portfolios 
perform as badly as the passive strategy or even worse. In 2002 the losses for glamour 
and value were 20% and 28% respectively, while a passive strategy made a loss of 
26.6%. In 2007-2008 downturn the glamour portfolio performed better than the passive 
one, which was better than the value one, which was mainly due to the glamour portfolio 
having a zero return in 2007 (insignificant negative return) when both of other discussed 
portfolios produced a statistically significant loss. 
Secondly, it performed better on the upside due to more demand for value stocks 
once there was a recovery. In the recovery of 2003 value stocks returned 77% profit, 
while glamour and passive strategy gained 44% and 54% respectively. In 2009 the 
value portfolio jumped in market capitalisation by 135% vs 47% for the glamour portfolio 
and 79% for the passive strategy. 
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In line with the other strategies examined so far, the main relative weakness of 
the strategy based on B/P, besides having a lower number of statistically significant 
results, is that it performed worse than the passive strategy of simply buying the S&P 
500 index in most of the other years. This includes statistically significant losses of 33% 
in 1998 and a loss of 8.5% in 2011. However, in contrast to the past return strategy in 
statistically significant positive years the strategy performed almost as well as the 
passive one.   
In the same way, as for the previous strategies the strategy based on the B/P 
ratio could be better than a passive one if only statistically significant years are taken 
into consideration. It produced on average a 29.2% positive return during positive years 
and loss of 17.1% during negative ones. These figures are better than a return of 20% 
during rising stock market years and a loss of 25% during falling stock market years for 
the passive strategy. 
From a maximum drawdown point of view the strategy is better than the passive 
buy and hold one with a 47.9% figure vs 52.7%. In contrast to the past return strategy 
and the passive strategy this drawdown was during the turmoil of 2000, while 2007-
2008 period passed with a substantially smaller drawdown of 32.8%.  
The strategy looks worse than the passive one from a risk/return perspective with 
a Calmar ratio of 0.06 vs 0.19 for the passive strategy. The main reasons are the 
substantially lower number of statistically significant returns and a smaller ratio between 
the number of statistically significant annual gains divided by the number of statistically 
significant annual losses. This replicates the situation for the past return strategy. 
In line with the previously examined strategies I conclude that the contrarian 
strategy seems to be a rather poor tool to capture trading profits, which could be 
significant enough compared to the profits of the passive strategy. Periods of recovery 
and the dot-com crash are the only time when it performed relatively well due to the 
embedded idea of captured value stocks being able to substantially outperform glamour 
stocks and the average market return to just passively holding the S&P 500 index. This 
is in line with the overall test of significance, which shows that average return is not 
statistically significantly different from zero across the 23 years of the sample. 
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Graph 3.3.4.1. Annual returns of a contrarian strategy based on three years past returns 
 
 Statistically significant return of the contrarian strategy 
 Statistically insignificant return of the contrarian strategy 
 Return of the passive strategy 
 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Glamour 9.1% 10.8% 10.7% 0.5% 16.0% 27.0% 15.5% 50.3% 25.1% 24.6% -14.0% 6.9% -20.0% 44.2% 6.4% 16.2% 8.4% -2.6% -27.2% 47.3% 24.3% 11.3% 15.1% 
St Div of Glamour 27.9% 25.6% 27.7% 26.0% 24.5% 29.5% 27.4% 47.7% 58.1% 85.0% 44.8% 29.6% 30.0% 70.4% 27.0% 33.5% 23.1% 27.1% 26.6% 39.7% 24.9% 23.9% 23.7% 
T-statistics for 
glamour 
3.5 4.5 4.1 0.2 7.0 9.9 6.1 11.4 4.7 3.1 -3.3 2.5 -7.1 6.7 2.5 5.1 3.8 -1.0 -10.0 11.2 9.0 4.3 5.7 
Value 11.9% 27.9% 25.5% 8.5% 12.8% 30.1% 15.9% 43.9% -7.8% 11.2% 30.4% 20.9% -28.1% 77.4% 19.9% 22.7% 17.1% -20.2% -45.4% 135.0% 18.5% 2.9% 20.8% 
St Div of value 33.4% 38.9% 33.0% 31.2% 21.6% 29.6% 27.3% 42.6% 32.4% 76.3% 47.3% 36.0% 25.9% 64.9% 29.9% 31.6% 25.0% 33.1% 31.4% 127.7% 25.0% 21.0% 24.9% 
T-statistics for value 3.8 7.6 8.2 2.9 6.3 11.0 6.3 11.1 -2.6 1.6 6.9 6.2 -11.5 12.7 7.1 7.5 7.1 -6.2 -14.1 9.9 6.9 1.2 7.5 
Number of stocks in 
sample 
464 449 450 449 458 463 466 466 471 462 456 460 451 453 453 445 428 407 381 350 342 326 318 
Number of stocks in 
each portfolio 
116 112 113 112 115 116 117 117 118 116 114 115 113 113 113 111 107 102 95 88 86 82 80 
Difference 2.9% 17.1% 14.8% 8.0% -3.2% 3.1% 0.4% -6.4% -32.9% -13.4% 44.4% 13.9% -8.1% 33.1% 13.5% 6.5% 8.7% -17.6% -18.1% 87.7% -5.8% -8.5% 5.7% 
T-statistics 0.7 3.9 3.7 2.1 -1.1 0.8 0.1 -1.1 -5.4 -1.3 7.3 3.2 -2.2 3.7 3.6 1.5 2.6 -4.2 -4.3 6.2 -1.5 -2.4 1.5 
Note: The returns and other figures are calculated on the base of portfolios formed as at the end of March each year from 1990 to 2012. The period from end March 1990 to end March 1991 is 
considered to be 1990, from end March 1991 to end March 1992 – 1991, etc. 
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3.3.5. Returns based on cash flow to price, CF/P 
It was much more likely to get a profit from this strategy than to get a loss over a 
one year holding period during the 23 years in the analysis if compared to other simple 
strategies (see details on graph 3.3.5.1.). In contrast to other strategies in most cases 
the strategy would give an investor a positive return. There are twelve statistically 
significant positive results and only three statistically negative ones (the same as for a 
passive strategy).  
In the same way, as for most of the other analysed strategies the CF/P one 
performs better than a passive strategy during turmoil periods. The difference is that it 
performed much better. During the dot-com crash in 2000 it returned 59.1%; far above 
the 9.8% of the passive strategy. This was a result of capturing contrarian profits when 
glamour stocks declined by 23.2%, while value stocks gained 35.9%. During 2007-2008 
the losses of the strategy were not statistically significant, while recovery in 2009 was 
close to that of the passive strategy at close to 80%. Recovery in 2003 was smaller, but 
there was a statistically significant gain in 2002 which brought the overall return for two 
years to a much higher level compared to that of the passive strategy.   
Again, there are the same reasons for a better performance of the strategy during 
periods of turmoil on the market followed by the consecutive recovery as for most of the 
other strategies. 
Firstly, It performed better on the downside mainly due to a long-short nature of 
the strategy. On a standalone basis glamour and value portfolios perform as badly as 
the passive strategy or even worse. In 2002 the losses for glamour and value were 29% 
and 20% respectively, while the passive strategy made a loss of 26.6%. In 2007-2008 
the glamour portfolio performed slightly better than the passive one and a value one. 
Secondly, It performed better on the upside due to more demand for value stocks 
once there was a recovery. In the recovery of 2003 value stocks returned 69% profit, 
while glamour and passive strategy gained 44% and 54% respectively. In 2009 the 
value portfolio jumped by 132% vs 52% for a glamour one and 79% for a passive 
strategy. 
In line with the other strategies the main relative weakness of the CF/P strategy, 
besides having a lower number of statistically significant results, is that it performed 
worse than the passive one during other years. This includes statistically significant 
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losses of 16% and 29% in 1998 and 1999. However, in contrast to the other strategies it 
performed better than the passive one during most of the years, when the passive 
strategy return was positive and this profit was statistically significant for the CF/P 
strategy.   
In the same way as many other strategies the strategy based on CF/P ratio could 
be better than a passive one if only statistically significant years are taken into 
consideration. It produced on average a 27.1% positive return during positive years and 
loss of 18.4% during loss-making years. These figures are better than a return of 20% in 
profitable years and a loss of 25% in loss-making years for the passive strategy. 
From a maximum drawdown point of view the strategy is better than the passive 
one with a 43.7% figure vs 52.7%. In the same way, as for most of the other strategies 
this drawdown happened during the turmoil of 2000, while during 2007-2008 period 
there was a substantially smaller drawdown of 8.7%.  
The strategy is slightly worse than the passive one from a risk return perspective 
with the Calmar ratio of 0.18 vs 0.19 for the passive strategy. Hence it would be hard for 
an investor to decide upon using it, despite the average return across 23 years being 
statistically significantly different from zero according to the reported t-test, with t-
statistics being 2.5. 
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Graph 3.3.5.1. Annual returns of a contrarian strategy based on CF/P 
 
 Statistically significant return of the contrarian strategy 
 Statistically insignificant return of the contrarian strategy 
 Return of the passive strategy 
 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Glamour 17.0% 8.7% 8.7% -2.6% 10.5% 25.0% 11.1% 35.1% 11.5% 30.9% 
-
23.2% 
1.5% 
-
29.0% 
44.8% 0.1% 12.4% 3.1% -8.2% 
-
37.5% 
52.4% 20.3% 5.8% 13.4% 
St Div of Glamour 34.1% 28.6% 28.1% 23.8% 28.2% 29.0% 28.2% 38.2% 54.4% 92.9% 37.5% 27.8% 25.5% 53.6% 30.2% 27.1% 20.0% 28.4% 25.0% 49.7% 23.3% 25.1% 18.5% 
T-statistics for glamour 5.1 3.2 3.2 -1.2 4.0 9.2 4.2 9.8 2.3 3.6 -6.6 0.6 -12.2 9.1 0.0 5.0 1.7 -3.2 -16.4 11.6 9.6 2.5 8.0 
Value 6.3% 25.7% 39.2% 12.2% 14.3% 27.9% 16.5% 52.9% -4.0% 1.9% 35.9% 23.8% 
-
20.3% 
69.2% 22.5% 23.4% 20.2% -8.7% 
-
43.0% 
132.2% 18.6% 2.8% 18.9% 
St Div of value 30.2% 34.7% 47.0% 35.3% 19.5% 29.5% 24.3% 42.8% 34.6% 30.5% 45.4% 32.5% 26.7% 73.0% 31.5% 31.1% 22.8% 32.0% 31.6% 132.0% 24.7% 22.2% 28.3% 
T-statistics for value 2.2 7.7 8.7 3.6 7.8 10.1 7.3 13.2 -1.3 0.7 8.5 7.8 -8.1 10.3 7.8 8.2 9.7 -3.0 -14.8 11.0 8.3 1.4 7.4 
Number of stocks in 
sample 
424 433 431 438 450 451 459 454 468 461 459 456 456 472 477 480 479 484 477 484 491 491 489 
Number of stocks in each 
portfolio 
106 108 108 110 113 113 115 114 117 115 115 114 114 118 119 120 120 121 119 121 123 123 122 
Difference 
-
10.7% 
17.0% 30.4% 14.8% 3.8% 2.9% 5.5% 17.7% 
-
15.6% 
-29.0% 59.1% 22.3% 8.7% 24.4% 22.4% 11.0% 17.0% -0.5% -5.4% 79.8% -1.7% -3.0% 5.6% 
T-statistics -2.4 3.9 5.8 3.6 1.2 0.7 1.6 3.3 -2.6 -3.2 10.8 5.6 2.5 2.9 5.6 2.9 6.2 -0.1 -1.5 6.2 -0.6 -1.0 1.8 
Note: The returns and other figures are calculated on the base of portfolios formed as at the end of March each year from 1990 to 2012. The period from end March 1990 to end March 1991 is 
considered to be 1990, from end March 1991 to end March 1992 – 1991, etc. 
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3.3.6. Returns based on free cash flow to equity to price, FCFE/P 
In the same way, as for CF/P it was much more likely to get a profit from this 
strategy than to get a loss over a one year period during the 23 years in the analysis if 
compared to other simple strategies (see details on graph 3.3.6.1.). There are seven 
statistically significant positive results and only one statistically negative (smaller than 
for a passive strategy) loss.  
In the same way, as for most of the other analysed strategies CF/P performs 
better than a passive strategy during turmoil periods. During the dot-com crash in 2000 
it returned 45.7%, far above the 9.8% of the passive strategy. This was a result of 
capturing contrarian profits when glamour stocks declined by 9.1%, while value stocks 
gained 36.6%. During 2007-2008 the returns of the strategy were not statistically 
significantly different from zero. However, the same was during the recovery in 2009. 
There was no statistically significant gain in 2003, but there was a statistically significant 
gain in 2002 when there was a loss for the passive strategy, which brought the overall 
return for two years to a much higher level compared to a passive strategy.   
In the same way, as for the weakest strategy (E/P (forecasted EPS)) there was 
only one reason for a better performance of the strategy during the turmoil on the 
market followed by the subsequent recovery – It performed better on the downside, 
mainly due to a long-short nature of the strategy. This was the case for 2007-2008 
market turmoil. However, the excellent result of 2002 could be attributed to an ability to 
capture contrarian profits. 
In line with the other strategies the main relative weakness of the strategy based 
on FCFE/P besides a having lower number of statistically significant results is that it 
performed worse than the passive one during other years. This includes statistically 
significant losses of 11% in 2005 and earning zero returns during growth years on the 
market. However, in contrast to the other strategies it performed better than the passive 
one during most of the years when the return to a passive strategy was positive, while 
the FCFE/P strategy yielded a statistically significant positive return.   
In the same way as many other strategies the strategy based on CF/P is better 
than a passive strategy when only statistically significant years are taken into 
consideration. It produced on average positive return of 21.6% positive return during 
positive years and loss of 11.2% during the loss-making years. These figures are better 
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than a return of 20% in profitable years and a loss of 25% in loss-making years for the 
passive strategy. 
From a maximum drawdown point of view the strategy is better than the passive 
one with a 28.1% figure vs 52.7%. In the same way, as for most of the other strategies 
this drawdown was during the market turmoil of 2000, while 2007-2008 period was 
passed with a substantially smaller drawdown of 18.8%.  
The strategy looks worse than a passive one from a risk/return perspective with 
the Calmar ratio of 0.08 vs 0.19 for the passive strategy. In contrast to CF/P strategy it 
did not compensate a smaller number of statistically significant positive years with a 
substantially lower drawdown and so gave overall better performance during its 
profitable years. However, it does not look better than the passive strategy and hence it 
would be hard for an investor to adopt, despite the average return across 23 years 
being statistically significantly different from zero according to a t-test, with all recorded 
t-statistics averaging out at 2.13. 
It could be considered as a better tool in capturing contrarian profits than most of 
the other strategies, given that it yielded profits in seven out of the 23 years with only 
one statistically significant loss. However, its poor ability to generate returns during 
rebound times could be considered as a strong weakness, given that it could easily put 
a portfolio manager who uses this strategy out of the business by generating an 
unacceptable short-term loss.   
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Graph 3.3.6.1. Annual returns of a contrarian strategy based on FCFE/P 
 
 Statistically significant return of the contrarian strategy 
 Statistically insignificant return of the contrarian strategy 
 Return of the passive strategy 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Glamour 2.9% 16.6% 28.7% 12.0% 13.7% 14.9% 11.3% 32.6% 3.3% 28.5% -9.1% 3.8% -35.4% 69.5% 7.5% 32.7% 10.6% -6.7% -44.3% 80.1% 23.2% -0.3% 15.1% 
St Div of Glamour 34.4% 41.0% 57.7% 33.6% 27.6% 28.7% 30.0% 49.9% 49.8% 99.9% 51.1% 46.4% 31.8% 65.9% 34.7% 45.2% 28.2% 34.8% 27.2% 81.1% 28.2% 24.9% 30.7% 
T-statistics for 
glamour 
0.8 3.8 4.7 3.3 4.7 4.9 3.6 6.2 0.6 2.7 -1.7 0.8 -10.8 10.2 2.1 7.1 3.7 -1.9 -16.2 9.8 8.4 -0.1 5.0 
Value 14.1% 24.7% 25.7% 8.2% 18.4% 41.9% 19.4% 57.9% 4.0% 7.5% 36.6% 19.7% -17.4% 64.0% 14.5% 21.5% 14.8% -13.2% -43.3% 102.4% 16.2% 5.7% 16.8% 
St Div of value 28.7% 29.5% 23.0% 27.1% 20.6% 32.1% 18.6% 40.8% 43.5% 55.9% 45.3% 26.1% 22.1% 43.5% 22.4% 21.8% 20.7% 29.4% 30.2% 103.1% 19.6% 23.6% 23.9% 
T-statistics for 
value 
4.6 7.8 10.5 2.8 8.4 12.4 9.9 13.4 0.9 1.3 7.7 7.2 -7.6 14.2 6.3 9.6 7.0 -4.4 -14.3 9.9 8.4 2.4 7.1 
Number of stocks 
in sample 
348 351 352 351 357 360 359 357 361 366 366 368 375 370 379 378 379 384 396 395 416 414 409 
Number of stocks 
in each portfolio 
87 88 88 88 89 90 90 89 90 92 92 92 94 93 95 95 95 96 99 99 104 104 102 
Difference 11.3% 8.1% -3.0% -3.8% 4.7% 27.0% 8.2% 25.3% 0.8% -21.1% 45.7% 15.9% 18.0% -5.5% 7.1% -11.2% 4.2% -6.5% 1.0% 22.2% -7.0% 6.0% 1.8% 
T-statistics 2.3 1.5 -0.5 -0.8 1.3 6.0 2.2 3.7 0.1 -1.8 6.4 2.9 4.5 -0.7 1.7 -2.2 1.2 -1.4 0.2 1.7 -2.1 1.8 0.5 
Note: The returns and other figures are calculated on the base of portfolios formed as at the end of March each year from 1990 to 2012. The period from end March 1990 to end March 1991 is 
considered to be 1990, from end March 1991 to end March 1992 – 1991, etc. 
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3.4. Returns to valuation models based strategies 
 
3.4.1. Returns based on abnormal earnings growth, AEG 
The AEG model formula equates the current value of a stock to its earnings next 
year and sequences of discounted abnormal earnings growth outcomes. I will use the 
following finite version of the formula in order to calculate an estimate of a fair price at a 
particular formation date: 
𝑉𝑡
𝑘 =
𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑡,1
𝑘
𝑟𝑡
𝑘 +
𝑥𝑡
𝑘
1 + 𝑉𝑡
𝑘 + 𝑇𝑉𝑡
𝑘  ,   (3.1) 
where 
𝑥𝑡
𝑘 =
(𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑡,2
𝑘 + 𝑟𝑡
𝑘 ∗ 𝑑𝑝𝑠𝑡+1
𝑘 − (1 + 𝑟𝑡
𝑘) ∗ 𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑡
𝑘)
𝑟𝑡
𝑘    ,   (3.2) 
𝑇𝑉𝑡
𝑘 = ∑
𝑥𝑡
𝑘
1 + 𝑉𝑡
𝑘 ∗ (𝑗 + 1)
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𝑗=1
   (3.3) 
 
It was more likely to get a profit from this strategy than to get a loss over a one 
year period during the 23 years in the analysis, while in most cases the strategy would 
give an investor a zero return once statistical significance is taken into consideration 
(see details on graph 3.4.1.1.).   There are five statistically significant positive results 
and only three statistically negative ones, while all other years produced statistically 
insignificant returns. 
In the same way, as for most of the simple strategies AEG strategy performed 
better than a passive one during turmoil periods on the market. During the dot-com 
crash in 2000 it returned an impressive 41.2%, far above the 9.8% of the passive 
strategy. This was a result of capturing contrarian profits when glamour stocks declined 
by 16.1%, while value stocks gained 25.1%. During 2002 and 2007-2008 the losses of 
the strategy were either insignificant, or smaller than for a passive one, while the 
recoveries in 2003 and in 2009 were smaller, but overall the AEG strategy brought 
returns for periods of decline and recovery of higher levels than for passive strategy.   
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Again, there are the same reasons for a better performance of the strategy during 
the turmoil on the market followed by a subsequent recovery. 
Firstly, it performed better on the downside mainly due to a long-short nature of 
the strategy. On a standalone basis glamour and value portfolios perform as badly as 
the passive strategy or even worse. In 2002 the losses for glamour and value portfolios 
were 22.3% and 32% respectively, while passive strategy made a loss of 26.6%. In 
2007-2008 glamour and value portfolios performed roughly in line with the passive one. 
Secondly, It performed better on the upside due to more demand for value stocks 
once there was a recovery. In the recovery of 2003 value stocks returned a 79.1% 
profit, while the glamour and passive strategy portfolios gained 40.1% and 54% 
respectively. In 2009 the value portfolio jumped by 105.1% vs 51.8% for a glamour one 
and 79% for the passive strategy. 
In line with most of the simple strategies besides having a lower number of 
statistically significant results it also performed worse than the passive one in most of 
the other years. This includes statistically significant losses of 35.3% and 45.8% in 1998 
and 1999 respectively. 
The AEG strategy has mixed results compared to the passive one if only 
statistically significant years are taken into consideration. It produced on average a 31% 
positive return during profitable years and loss of 30.2% during loss-making ones. The 
first figure is better than a return of 20% for the passive strategy, while the second one 
is worse than a loss of 25% for the passive strategy. 
From a maximum drawdown point of view the strategy is worse than a passive 
one with a 70.1% figure vs 52.7%. In contrast to the passive strategy this drawdown 
was during the turmoil of 2000, while the 2007-2008 period passed by with a 
substantially smaller drawdown of 38.1%.  
The strategy looks worse than the passive one from a risk/return perspective with 
the Calmar ratio of -0.01 vs 0.19 for the passive strategy. The main reasons are the 
substantially lower number of statistically significant returns, a smaller ratio between a 
number of statistically significant annual gains divided by a number of statistically 
significant annual losses and a larger drawdown. 
In line with many simple strategies I conclude that the AEG contrarian strategy 
seems to be a rather poor tool to capture contrarian profits, which are significant enough 
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compared to the profits of the passive strategy. Periods of recoveries and the dot-com 
crash are the only time when it performed relatively well due to the embedded idea of 
captured value stocks being able to substantially outperform glamour stocks and the 
average market level. This is in line with the overall test of significance, which shows 
that the average return attained by the strategy is not statistically significantly different 
from zero across 23 years in the sample. 
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Graph 3.4.1.1. Annual returns of a contrarian strategy based on AEG 
 
 Statistically significant return of the contrarian strategy 
 Statistically insignificant return of the contrarian strategy 
 Return of the passive strategy 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Glamour 11.5% 18.4% 18.3% 5.6% 20.7% 26.8% 10.8% 41.7% 27.9% 50.5% -16.1% 6.3% -22.3% 40.1% 7.7% 15.4% 7.4% -8.5% -41.1% 51.8% 17.7% 5.6% 12.9% 
St Div of Glamour 25.7% 27.4% 23.5% 23.9% 23.9% 26.3% 30.2% 37.0% 59.2% 106.5% 40.9% 26.5% 24.6% 31.7% 20.4% 24.5% 22.4% 31.4% 29.1% 35.4% 19.3% 25.3% 25.3% 
T-statistics for glamour 3.1 4.8 5.7 1.7 6.7 8.0 2.8 9.0 4.1 4.2 -3.7 2.1 -8.8 12.6 3.9 6.5 3.4 -2.7 -14.5 12.0 9.6 2.3 5.2 
Value 1.7% 15.7% 22.9% 6.9% 12.7% 26.0% 17.5% 35.8% -7.3% 4.7% 25.1% 6.9% -32.0% 79.1% 9.2% 22.5% 17.5% -3.9% -43.9% 105.1% 18.4% 2.7% 24.4% 
St Div of value 35.0% 40.5% 33.5% 28.4% 23.7% 33.5% 26.5% 33.0% 29.3% 56.7% 48.5% 33.6% 23.9% 52.5% 32.6% 35.8% 21.5% 28.4% 30.6% 129.8% 27.0% 25.0% 20.9% 
T-statistics for value 0.3 2.8 5.0 1.8 4.1 6.0 5.1 8.7 -2.2 0.7 4.9 1.8 -12.9 15.0 2.9 6.5 8.4 -1.4 -14.7 6.6 7.1 1.1 12.0 
Number of stocks in 
sample 
196 202 217 221 234 244 238 255 294 312 352 328 371 394 426 425 430 412 420 267 434 438 420 
Number of stocks in each 
portfolio 
49 51 54 55 59 61 60 64 74 78 88 82 93 99 107 106 108 103 105 67 109 110 105 
Difference -9.9% -2.7% 4.6% 1.4% -8.0% -0.8% 6.7% -5.8% -35.3% -45.8% 41.2% 0.6% -9.7% 38.9% 1.5% 7.1% 10.1% 4.6% -2.8% 53.3% 0.7% -2.9% 11.5% 
T-statistics -1.6 -0.4 0.8 0.3 -1.8 -0.2 1.3 -0.9 -4.6 -3.4 6.1 0.1 -2.7 6.3 0.4 1.7 3.4 1.1 -0.7 3.2 0.2 -0.9 3.6 
Note: The returns and other figures are calculated on the base of portfolios formed as at the end of March each year from 1990 to 2012. The period from end March 1990 to end March 1991 is 
considered to be 1990, from end March 1991 to end March 1992 – 1991, etc. 
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3.4.2. Returns based on residual income model, RIM 
The Residual Income Valuation Model is derived from a discounted dividend 
model using a clean surplus accounting assumption. In my tests of the RIM’s 
effectiveness as a guide to contrarian trading, I will estimate implied price using the 
equation: 
𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑀 = 𝑏𝑡 +
𝑥𝑡+1
𝑎
(1 + 𝑟)
+
𝑥𝑡+2
𝑎
(1 + 𝑟)2
+ 𝑇𝑉   ,   (3.4) 
𝑇𝑉 = ∑
𝑥𝑡+2
𝑎
(1 + 𝑟)𝑖
14
𝑖=3
   ,   (3.5) 
where  
𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑀 = the implied price,  
𝑏𝑡   = the book value of equity per share at time t, 
𝑥𝑡
𝑎 = abnormal earnings per share at time t,  
r  = the cost of capital, and  
TV  = the terminal value.  
We calculate the terminal-value assuming that earnings in the second year of the 
forecast horizon continues (a zero-abnormal earnings growth assumption). Further I 
assume abnormal earnings converge to zero in their level, after fifteen years. 
It was more likely to get a profit from this strategy than to get a loss over a one 
year period during the 23 years in the analysis, while in most cases the strategy would 
give an investor no return once statistical significance is taken into consideration (see 
details on graph 3.4.2.1.). There are eight statistically significant positive results and 
only two statistically negative, while all other years produced statistically insignificant 
returns. 
In the same way, as for most of the simple strategies RIM strategy performed 
better than a passive one during turmoil periods on the market. During the dot-com 
crash in 2000 it returned an impressive 53.2%, far above the 9.8% of the passive 
strategy. This was a result of capturing contrarian profits when glamour stocks declined 
by 22.6%, while value stocks gained 30.6%.  During 2002 and 2007-2008 the losses of 
the strategy were insignificant, while the recovery of 2009 was slightly stronger yielding 
a 82.9% rise vs. 78.8% for the passive strategy. The recovery in 2003 was smaller, but 
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due to an insignificant loss in 2002 it brought the overall return for two years to a higher 
level.   
Again, there are the usual reasons for a better performance of the strategy during 
the turmoil on the market followed by the subsequent recovery: 
Firstly, it performed better on the downside mainly due to a long-short nature of 
the strategy. On a standalone basis glamour and value portfolios perform as badly as 
the passive strategy or even worse. In 2002 the losses for glamour and value were 
26.1% and 25.5% respectively, while the passive strategy made a loss of 26.6%. In 
2007-2008 the glamour portfolio performed better than the passive one, which was 
slightly better than the value one. 
Secondly, it performed better on the upside due to more demand for value stocks 
once there is a recovery. In the recovery of 2003 value stocks returned a 72% profit, 
while glamour and passive strategy gained 43% and 54% respectively. In 2009 the 
value portfolio jumped by 131.5% vs 48.6% for the glamour portfolio and 79% for the 
passive strategy. 
In line with the most of the simple strategies besides having a lower number of 
statistically significant results is that it performed worse than the passive one in most of 
the other years. This includes statistically significant losses of 36.7% and 58.4% in 1998 
and 1999 respectively. However, in statistically significant positive years the strategy 
performed almost as well as the passive one or even better.   
The RIM strategy has a mixed comparison with the passive one if only 
statistically significant years are taken into consideration. It produced on average 
positive return of 29.3% positive return during profitable years and loss of 47.6% during 
loss-making ones. The first figure is better than a return of 20% for the passive strategy 
in profitable years, while the second one is worse than a loss of 25% for the passive 
strategy in loss-making ones. 
From a maximum drawdown point of view the strategy is worse than the passive 
one with a 75.5% drawdown vs 52.7% for the passive strategy. In contrast to the 
passive strategy this drawdown was during the turmoil of 2000, while the 2007-2008 
period passed with a substantially smaller drawdown of 32.2%.  
The strategy looks worse than the passive one from a risk return perspective with 
the Calmar ratio of 0.03 vs 0.19 for the passive strategy. The main reasons are the 
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substantially lower number of statistically significant returns, a smaller ratio of the 
number of statistically significant annual gains divided by a number of statistically 
significant annual losses and a large drawdown.  
In line with many simple strategies I conclude that the RIM contrarian strategy 
seems to be a rather poor tool to capture contrarian profits, which could be significant 
enough compared to the profits of the passive strategy. Periods of recoveries and the 
dot-com crash are the only time when it performed relatively well due to the embedded 
idea of captured value stocks being able to substantially outperform glamour stocks and 
the average market level. This is in line with the overall test of significance, which shows 
that average return is not statistically significantly different from zero across the 23 
years in the sample. 
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Graph 3.4.2.1. Annual returns of a contrarian strategy based on RIM 
 
 Statistically significant return of the contrarian strategy 
 Statistically insignificant return of the contrarian strategy 
 Return of the passive strategy 
 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Glamour 21.4% 19.7% 11.7% 6.9% 13.8% 26.4% 6.9% 41.1% 30.4% 60.2% -22.6% 6.3% -26.1% 43.3% 2.7% 17.8% 5.1% -9.2% -39.1% 48.6% 24.2% 3.6% 11.5% 
St Div of Glamour 35.6% 30.6% 26.8% 24.1% 25.1% 31.3% 28.6% 46.1% 59.6% 114.1% 37.4% 29.2% 25.8% 40.9% 30.8% 27.9% 26.3% 29.9% 24.1% 37.6% 25.5% 23.9% 32.0% 
T-statistics for glamour 4.4 4.7 3.2 2.1 4.3 6.6 1.9 7.2 4.4 4.7 -5.6 2.1 -9.9 10.5 0.9 6.5 2.0 -3.0 -15.1 11.6 8.4 1.3 3.1 
Value 6.4% 14.7% 25.3% 4.4% 13.2% 28.4% 20.2% 34.8% -6.4% 1.2% 30.6% 21.6% -25.5% 72.4% 19.2% 19.1% 15.9% -10.6% -45.3% 131.5% 16.8% 3.9% 20.2% 
St Div of value 26.8% 30.2% 31.8% 21.7% 17.9% 38.5% 31.0% 30.5% 29.1% 50.6% 43.9% 32.3% 25.5% 48.6% 28.8% 23.3% 18.0% 33.1% 32.2% 134.0% 23.8% 20.7% 19.7% 
T-statistics for value 1.8 3.5 5.9 1.5 5.7 5.8 5.1 9.3 -1.9 0.2 6.5 6.4 -9.8 14.8 6.8 8.3 8.8 -3.1 -13.1 8.8 6.3 1.7 8.9 
Number of stocks in 
sample 
215 213 217 225 240 249 248 264 298 318 346 363 384 397 417 414 399 372 342 318 316 304 298 
Number of stocks in 
each portfolio 
54 53 54 56 60 62 62 66 75 80 87 91 96 99 104 104 100 93 86 80 79 76 75 
Difference -15.0% -5.0% 13.6% -2.5% -0.6% 2.0% 13.3% -6.3% -36.7% -59.0% 53.2% 15.3% 0.6% 29.0% 16.5% 1.3% 10.8% -1.4% -6.1% 82.9% -7.4% 0.3% 8.7% 
T-statistics -2.5 -0.9 2.4 -0.6 -0.2 0.3 2.5 -0.9 -4.8 -4.2 8.6 3.3 0.2 4.5 4.0 0.4 3.4 -0.3 -1.4 5.3 -1.9 0.1 2.0 
Note: The returns and other figures are calculated on the base of portfolios formed as at the end of March each year from 1990 to 2012. The period from end March 1990 to end March 1991 is 
considered to be 1990, from end March 1991 to end March 1992 – 1991, etc. 
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3.4.3. Returns based on Ohlson (γ=0, ω=0) model, O00 
I will use the following formula in order to estimate a fair price at a particular 
formation date:  
𝑃𝑡 = 𝑏𝑡 +
𝐸𝑡(𝑥𝑡+1
𝑎 )
(1 + 𝑟)
      ,   (3.6) 
which puts the focus of valuation on the current book value with any addition in value 
deriving from an expectation about next year’s abnormal earnings. So any competitive 
advantage the company enjoys is almost immediately competed away by rival firms in 
one period. 
It was more likely to get a profit from this strategy than to get a loss over a one 
year period during the 23 years in the analysis, while in most case the strategy would 
give an investor no return once statistical significance is taken into consideration (see 
details on graph 3.4.3.1.). There are nine statistically significant positive results and only 
four statistically negative ones, while all other years produced statistically insignificant 
returns. 
In the same way, as for most of the simple strategies, the RIM strategy 
performed better than a passive one during turmoil periods on the market. During the 
dot-com crash in 2000 it returned an impressive 50.2%, far above the 9.8% of the 
passive strategy. This was a result of capturing contrarian profits when glamour stocks 
declined by 23%, while value stocks gained 27.3%. During 2002 and 2007-2008 the 
losses of the strategy were insignificant or smaller than for a passive one, while 
recovery in 2009 was slightly better at yielding a 84.9% rise vs. 78.8% for the passive 
strategy. The recovery in 2003 was smaller, but due to an insignificant loss in 2002 
bringing the overall return for the two years to a higher level.   
Again, there are the same reasons for a better performance of the strategy during 
the turmoil on the market followed by the subsequent recovery. 
Firstly, it performed better on the downside mainly due to a long-short nature of 
the strategy. On a standalone basis glamour and value portfolios perform as badly as 
the passive strategy or even worse. In 2002 the losses for glamour and value portfolios 
were 22.3% and 28.4% respectively, while the passive strategy made a loss of 26.6%. 
In 2007-2008 the glamour portfolio performed better than the passive one, which was 
slightly better than the value one. 
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Secondly, it performed better on an upside due to more demand for value stocks 
once there is a recovery. In the recovery of 2003 value stocks returned 76% profit, while 
glamour and passive strategy gained 37.6% and 54% respectively. In 2009 the value 
portfolio jumped by 131.9% vs 47% for a glamour portfolio and 79% for the passive 
strategy. 
In line with most of the simple strategies besides having a lower number of 
statistically significant results is that it performed worse than the passive one in most of 
the other years. This includes statistically significant losses of 40.9% and 10% in 1998 
and 2011 respectively. 
The Ohlson (0,0) strategy is better than the passive one if only statistically 
significant years are taken into consideration. It produced on average a 27.6% positive 
return during profitable years and loss of 21% during loss-making ones. These first 
figure is better than a return of 20% for the passive strategy, while the second one is 
worse than a loss of 25% for the passive strategy. 
From a maximum drawdown point of view the strategy is close to the passive one 
with a 56.4% figure vs 52.7%. In contrast to the passive strategy this drawdown was 
during the market turmoil of 2000, while the 2007-2008 period passed with a 
substantially smaller drawdown of 31.5%.  
The strategy looks worse than the passive one from a risk/return perspective with 
the Calmar ratio of 0.06 vs 0.19 for the passive strategy. The main reasons are the 
substantially lower number of statistically significant returns and a smaller ratio of the 
number of statistically significant annual gains to the number of statistically significant 
annual losses. 
In line with many simple strategies I could conclude that the Ohlson (0,0) 
contrarian strategy seems to be a rather poor tool to capture contrarian profits, behaving 
poorly compared to a simple passive strategy. Periods of recoveries and the dot-com 
crash are the only time when it performed relatively well, due to the embedded idea of 
captured value stocks being able to substantially outperform glamour stocks and the 
average market level. This is in line with the overall test of significance, which shows 
that average returns are not statistically significantly different from zero across the 23 
years in the sample.  
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Graph 3.4.3.1. Annual returns of a contrarian strategy based on Ohlson (0,0) 
 
 Statistically significant return of the contrarian strategy 
 Statistically insignificant return of the contrarian strategy 
 Return of the passive strategy 
 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Glamour 26.3% 14.3% 10.4% 4.5% 16.4% 28.1% 10.6% 46.3% 29.0% 30.8% -23.0% 4.8% -22.3% 37.6% 4.8% 18.7% 7.8% -2.1% -29.3% 47.0% 23.9% 12.2% 12.5% 
St Div of Glamour 33.5% 26.0% 24.5% 26.6% 23.1% 32.9% 26.6% 54.0% 61.2% 93.4% 37.9% 27.1% 26.6% 34.8% 27.9% 33.7% 24.1% 27.0% 27.4% 35.5% 25.0% 24.0% 20.0% 
T-statistics for glamour 5.9 4.1 3.1 1.3 5.5 6.8 3.2 7.0 4.1 3.0 -5.7 1.7 -8.3 10.8 1.8 5.6 3.2 -0.7 -9.9 11.8 8.5 4.4 5.3 
Value 3.1% 27.7% 26.7% 8.5% 11.2% 34.6% 15.9% 40.5% -11.9% 12.4% 27.3% 18.4% -28.4% 75.9% 20.7% 23.0% 15.9% -19.0% -45.6% 131.9% 19.2% 2.2% 20.4% 
St Div of value 29.6% 37.9% 34.1% 25.5% 18.6% 27.9% 29.4% 44.0% 26.6% 61.0% 45.6% 34.4% 26.3% 67.0% 30.3% 31.8% 24.8% 33.6% 31.5% 133.0% 23.8% 20.1% 24.6% 
T-statistics for value 0.8 5.5 5.8 2.5 4.7 9.9 4.3 7.5 -3.9 1.8 5.6 5.1 -10.6 11.3 7.0 7.4 6.4 -5.5 -13.4 8.8 7.2 0.9 7.2 
Number of stocks in 
sample 
222 222 220 228 244 254 253 268 304 323 352 369 388 401 420 415 399 372 344 317 316 302 297 
Number of stocks in 
each portfolio 
56 56 55 57 61 64 63 67 76 81 88 92 97 100 105 104 100 93 86 79 79 76 74 
Difference -23.2% 13.4% 16.4% 4.0% -5.2% 6.5% 5.3% -5.9% -40.9% -18.4% 50.2% 13.6% -6.1% 38.3% 15.9% 4.3% 8.1% -16.9% -16.3% 84.9% -4.7% -10.0% 8.0% 
T-statistics -3.9 2.2 2.9 0.8 -1.4 1.2 1.1 -0.7 -5.3 -1.5 8.0 3.0 -1.6 5.1 4.0 1.0 2.3 -3.8 -3.6 5.5 -1.2 -2.8 2.2 
Note: The returns and other figures are calculated on the base of portfolios formed as at the end of March each year from 1990 to 2012. The period from end March 1990 to end March 1991 is 
considered to be 1990, from end March 1991 to end March 1992 – 1991, etc. 
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3.4.4. Returns based on Ohlson (γ=0, ω=1) model, O01 
I will estimate the model for the case of ω=1, γ=0 (which is identical to ω=0, γ=1) 
with the use of the following formula:  
𝑃𝑡 =
𝐸𝑡(𝑥𝑡+1)
𝑟
   (3.7) 
In this version of the Ohlson model the abnormal level of profits, deriving from 
some competitive advantage the company has, remains unchallenged by competitors 
forever. This might be thought of as a “first mover advantage” that translates into a 
longer-term sustainable advantage (say like that of Facebook or Uber). 
It was more likely to get a profit from this strategy than to get a loss over a one 
year period during the 23 years in the analysis, while in most case the strategy would 
give an investor no return once statistical significance is taken into consideration (see 
details on graph 3.4.4.1.).   There are seven statistically significant positive results and 
only three statistically negative ones, while all other years produced statistically 
insignificant returns. 
In the same way, as for most of the simple strategies the RIM strategy performed 
better than a passive one during turmoil periods on the market. During the dot-com 
crash in 2000 it returned an impressive 55.5%, far above the 9.8% of the passive 
strategy. This was a result of capturing contrarian profits when glamour stocks declined 
by 25.6%, while value stocks rose by 23.7%. During 2002 and 2007-2008 the losses of 
the strategy were insignificant, while the recoveries of  2003 and in 2009 were smaller, 
but overall this brought the return for the period, averaged over eras of decline and 
recovery, to a higher level than for passive strategy.   
Again, there are the usual reasons for a better performance of the strategy during 
the turmoil on the market followed by the subsequent recovery. 
Firstly, it performed better on a downside mainly due to a long-short nature of the 
strategy. On a standalone basis glamour and value portfolios perform as badly as the 
passive strategy or even worse. In 2002 the losses for glamour and value portfolios 
were 26.2% and 25.4% respectively, while the passive strategy made a loss of 26.6%. 
In 2007-2008 the glamour and value portfolios performed roughly in line with the 
passive one. 
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Secondly, it performed better on the upside of the market due to more demand 
for value stocks once there is a recovery. In the recovery of 2003 value stocks returned 
a 59.9% profit, while the glamour and the passive strategy portfolios gained 46.9% and 
54% respectively. In 2009 the value portfolio jumped by 110.5% vs 71.1% for a glamour 
one and 79% for the passive strategy. 
In line with the most of the simple strategies besides having a lower number of 
statistically significant results it performed worse than the passive strategy in most of 
the other years. This includes statistically significant losses of 40.9% and 52.2% in 1998 
and 1999 respectively. 
The Ohlson (0,1) strategy had mixed results compared to the passive strategy if 
only statistically significant years are taken into consideration. It produced on average a 
23.5% positive return during profitable years and a loss of 34.2% during loss-making 
ones. The first figure is better than the return of 20% to the passive strategy during up 
markets, while the second one is worse than a loss of 25% for the passive strategy 
during down markets. 
From a maximum drawdown point of view the strategy is worse than a passive 
one with a 73.1% figure vs 52.7%. In contrast to the passive strategy this drawdown 
was during the market turmoil of 2000, while the 2007-2008 period passed with a 
substantially smaller drawdown of 35.6%.  
The strategy looks worse than the passive one from a risk/return perspective with 
the Calmar ratio of -0.01 vs 0.19 for the passive strategy. The main reasons are 
substantially a lower number of statistically significant returns, a smaller ratio of the 
number of statistically significant annual gains and the number of statistically significant 
annual losses and a larger drawdown. 
In line with many simple strategies I conclude that the Ohlson (0,1) contrarian 
strategy seems to be a rather poor tool to capture contrarian profits, which could be 
significant enough compared to the profits of the passive strategy. Recovery periods 
and the dot-com crash are the only time when it performed relatively well due to the 
embedded idea of captured value stocks being able to substantially outperform glamour 
stocks and the average market level. This is in line with the overall test of significance, 
which shows that average return is not statistically significantly different from zero 
across the 23 years of the sample. 
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Graph 3.4.4.1. Annual returns of a contrarian strategy based on Ohlson (0,1) 
 
 Statistically significant return of the contrarian strategy 
 Statistically insignificant return of the contrarian strategy 
 Return of the passive strategy 
 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Glamour 17.6% 21.0% 16.7% 10.0% 11.0% 25.8% 6.4% 38.0% 31.5% 51.7% -25.6% -0.5% -26.2% 46.9% 3.8% 20.6% 7.3% -9.3% -43.2% 71.1% 25.3% -2.5% 13.8% 
St Div of Glamour 35.0% 38.2% 27.5% 28.2% 29.0% 31.0% 26.6% 44.8% 58.5% 108.0% 34.9% 31.4% 22.5% 45.4% 33.1% 30.4% 26.5% 30.9% 22.5% 64.3% 27.8% 26.5% 28.4% 
T-statistics for 
glamour 
3.8 4.1 4.5 2.7 2.9 6.7 1.9 7.0 4.8 4.4 -7.1 -0.2 -11.4 10.4 1.2 7.2 2.9 -3.2 -20.1 11.2 9.6 -1.0 5.2 
Value 6.6% 14.8% 23.1% 3.4% 11.9% 30.8% 16.1% 38.1% -9.4% -0.5% 29.8% 23.7% -25.4% 59.9% 14.7% 20.2% 15.1% -10.0% -37.4% 110.5% 15.7% 11.0% 18.6% 
St Div of value 27.6% 30.3% 31.0% 21.7% 17.8% 34.1% 30.5% 33.8% 30.8% 50.2% 47.7% 33.2% 24.3% 38.2% 24.8% 24.2% 18.8% 29.7% 30.9% 122.7% 23.0% 18.0% 19.4% 
T-statistics for value 1.8 3.6 5.5 1.2 5.2 7.2 4.2 9.3 -2.7 -0.1 6.0 6.9 -10.3 15.8 6.2 8.8 8.6 -3.6 -12.7 9.1 7.2 6.6 10.3 
Number of stocks in 
sample 
227 220 220 225 241 254 257 273 312 331 372 375 387 408 440 447 450 452 438 412 446 465 461 
Number of stocks in 
each portfolio 
57 55 55 56 60 64 64 68 78 83 93 94 97 102 110 112 113 113 110 103 112 116 115 
Difference -11.0% -6.3% 6.5% -6.7% 0.9% 4.9% 9.6% 0.1% -40.9% -52.2% 55.5% 24.3% 0.8% 13.1% 10.9% -0.4% 7.8% -0.8% 5.8% 39.4% -9.6% 13.5% 4.8% 
T-statistics -1.9 -1.0 1.2 -1.4 0.2 0.9 1.9 0.0 -5.5 -4.0 9.0 5.2 0.2 2.2 2.8 -0.1 2.6 -0.2 1.6 2.9 -2.8 4.5 1.5 
Note: The returns and other figures are calculated on the base of portfolios formed as at the end of March each year from 1990 to 2012. The period from end March 1990 to end March 1991 is 
considered to be 1990, from end March 1991 to end March 1992 – 1991, etc. 
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3.4.5. Returns based on Discounted cash flow model, DCF 
The implementation of the model, which I will use, assumes that free cash flow is 
forecast to grow at the same rate as earnings for the first two years, and then remains 
constant afterwards. The equation is given as follows: 
𝑃 =
𝐹𝐶𝐹1
1 + 𝑟
+
𝐹𝐶𝐹2
𝑟(1 + 𝑟)
    ,   (3.8) 
where  
FCF1  = the current free cash flow to equity (FCF) multiplied by 1 plus the one year ahead 
forecast proportionate change in earnings per share,  
FCF2  = the current FCF multiplied by 1 plus the two year ahead forecast proportionate 
change in earnings per share, and  
r  = the cost of capital.  
One was more likely to get a profit from this strategy than to get a loss over a one 
year period during the 23 years in the analysis, while in most case the strategy would 
give an investor a zero return once statistical significance is taken into consideration 
(see details on graph 3.4.5.1.). There are eight statistically significant positive results 
and no statistically negative ones, while all other years produced statistically 
insignificant returns. 
In the same way, as for most of the simple strategies the strategy performed 
better than a passive one during turmoil periods on the market. During dot-com crash in 
2000 it returned an impressive 51.1%, far above the 9.8% of the passive strategy. This 
was a result of capturing contrarian profits when glamour stocks declined by 18.1%, 
while value stocks gained 33%. During 2002 and 2007-2008 the returns of the strategy 
were insignificant, while in the recoveries of 2003 and of 2009 returns were smaller, but 
overall this brought the return for the period averaging over declines and recoveries to 
higher levels than for passive strategy.   
Again, there are the same reasons for a better performance of the strategy during 
is turmoil on the market followed by the subsequent recovery. 
Firstly, it performed better on the downside mainly due to the long-short nature of 
the strategy. On a standalone basis the glamour and value portfolios perform almost as 
badly as the passive strategy. In 2002 the losses for the glamour and value portfolios 
were 24.5% and 18% respectively, while the passive strategy made a loss of 26.6%. In 
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2007-2008 the glamour and value portfolios performed roughly in line with the passive 
one. 
Secondly, it performed better on the upside due to more demand for value stocks 
once there is a recovery. In the recovery of 2003 value stocks returned a 67.4% profit, 
while glamour and passive strategy gained 36.4% and 54% respectively. In 2009 the 
value portfolio jumped by 101.9% vs 66.9% for the glamour portfolio and 79% for the 
passive strategy. 
In contrast with the most of the simple strategies besides having lower number of 
statistically significant results is that it performed almost as well as the passive one in 
other years and has had no statistically significant losses 
The DCF strategy has better results than the passive one if only statistically 
significant years are taken into consideration. It produced on average a 26% positive 
return during positive years and there are no losses. The passive strategy returned on 
average 20% during profitable years, while the average loss was 25% during the loss-
making ones. 
From a maximum drawdown point of view the strategy is better than a passive 
one with a 27.8% return vs 52.7%. In contrast to the passive strategy this drawdown 
was during the turmoil of 2000, while the 2007-2008 period passed by with a 
substantially smaller drawdown of 16.5%.  
The strategy looks as good as the passive one from a risk/return perspective with 
the Calmar ratio of 0.19, which the ratio passive strategy also has. The strategy 
compensates the smaller number of statistically significant years with a higher average 
return per statistically significant profitable year and lower drawdown. 
In contrast to many simple strategies I could conclude that the DCF contrarian 
strategy seems to be a rather efficient tool to capture contrarian profits, which could be 
incremental to the profits of the passive strategy. However, it does not look better than 
the passive strategy and hence it would be hard for an investor to commit to using it, 
despite the average return across 23 years being statistically significantly different from 
zero according to a t-test, with t-statistics being 3.4. 
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Graph 3.4.5.1. Annual returns of a contrarian strategy based on DCF 
 
 Statistically significant return of the contrarian strategy 
 Statistically insignificant return of the contrarian strategy 
 Return of the passive strategy 
 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Glamour 8.3% 13.2% 9.2% 0.0% 11.1% 18.2% 10.5% 33.9% 7.2% 19.8% -18.1% 8.8% -24.5% 36.4% 9.8% 21.3% 9.9% -6.8% -41.6% 66.9% 23.1% 5.4% 12.7% 
St Div of Glamour 25.3% 26.2% 26.2% 19.4% 20.3% 24.7% 29.7% 31.9% 43.1% 74.4% 38.5% 31.3% 20.4% 32.6% 24.8% 30.9% 27.5% 30.2% 22.5% 59.5% 25.7% 26.9% 24.4% 
T-statistics for 
glamour 
2.0 3.0 2.0 0.0 3.4 4.8 2.2 7.0 1.1 1.9 -3.6 2.1 -8.7 8.3 3.2 5.8 3.2 -2.0 -16.2 9.2 7.4 1.8 4.7 
Value 19.8% 16.7% 23.0% 7.8% 19.7% 49.3% 20.2% 58.6% 1.8% 5.1% 33.0% 20.8% -18.0% 67.4% 16.1% 21.8% 17.1% -11.5% -36.6% 101.9% 15.4% 11.0% 21.8% 
St Div of value 31.1% 24.1% 26.1% 18.4% 20.0% 35.6% 20.1% 47.5% 27.5% 56.1% 42.5% 25.0% 25.3% 38.7% 25.4% 22.0% 20.0% 25.5% 28.5% 116.0% 21.0% 23.0% 19.1% 
T-statistics for value 3.8 4.1 5.1 2.4 6.1 9.1 6.3 8.1 0.4 0.6 5.9 6.3 -5.2 12.9 5.2 8.3 7.5 -3.9 -11.3 7.2 6.0 4.4 10.4 
Number of stocks in 
sample 
143 139 130 128 151 170 155 173 184 199 231 227 212 220 267 285 307 307 309 269 268 336 328 
Number of stocks in 
each portfolio 
36 35 33 32 38 43 39 43 46 50 58 57 53 55 67 71 77 77 77 67 67 84 82 
Difference 11.5% 3.6% 13.9% 7.8% 8.6% 31.1% 9.7% 24.7% -5.4% -14.7% 51.1% 12.0% 6.5% 31.1% 6.3% 0.6% 7.2% -4.7% 5.0% 34.9% -7.7% 5.6% 9.1% 
T-statistics 1.7 0.6 2.2 1.7 1.9 4.7 1.7 2.8 -0.7 -1.1 6.8 2.3 1.5 4.6 1.5 0.1 1.8 -1.0 1.2 2.2 -1.9 1.4 2.7 
Note: The returns and other figures are calculated on the base of portfolios formed as at the end of March each year from 1990 to 2012. The period from end March 1990 to end March 1991 is 
considered to be 1990, from end March 1991 to end March 1992 – 1991, etc. 
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3.5. Sensitivity analysis: six and three months returns 
The results for one year are rather similar across various strategies. Probably this 
is significantly affected by the selected one year testing period. To check whether there 
is sensitivity of the overall finding that none of the tested strategies is better than a 
passive one I will run the test for a smaller testing periods (six and three months). For a 
six-month testing period the portfolio formation dates will be end of March and end of 
September each year, while for three months the portfolio formation dates will be end of 
successive quarters. 
For smaller testing periods of six and three months there is the same key finding 
that none of the simple or sophisticated strategies is better than the passive strategy 
from a risk/return perspective prevails, even in cases when the strategy manages to 
produce statistically significant positive returns over the whole sample according to t-
statistics. 
In the same way, as for one-year testing period in most cases contrarian 
strategies were far worse than a passive strategy from a risk/return point of view. 
Calmar ratios are in the range of -0.03 to 0.03 for the six-month period and -0.04 to 0.08 
for most of them, while the passive strategy level continues to be 0.19 for the six-month 
period tests and 0.17 for the three-month period tests. The key problems continue to be 
a smaller number of statistically significant positive returns, a smaller ratio of statistically 
significant positive returns divided by statistically significant negative returns and a 
larger drawdown in some cases. The number of statistically significant positive returns 
varies from 8 to 19 vs. 33 half-years for a passive strategy for the six-month period. For 
the three-month period tests the respective figures are 17 to 32 and 58. The ratio 
between the number of statistically significant half-yearly positive returns and negative 
ones is 4.1 for a passive strategy for the six-month period, while for the active ones it 
varies from 1 to 2 for most of the strategies. Finally, in some cases drawdown is larger 
than for a passive strategy figure of 54.1% and 54.3% respectively for the six- and 
three-month periods.   
On the other hand, most of the strategies continue to have, an on average, better 
return for statistically significant positive years. 
Again, as in the one year period analysis most of the strategies not only 
performed worse than the passive one, but also do not have a statistically significant 
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positive return over the whole 23 years period in the analysis according to the t-test, 
which is commonly used in the literature. 
However, some strategies performed relatively well: DCF, CF/P and FCFE/P 
strategies. All of them have statistically significant positive returns across the whole 
period for six months, with t-statistics of 3.8, 2.6 and 2.1 respectively, while for the 
three-month period tests only DCF and CF/P have the same characteristic. However, 
none of the strategies has a Calmar ratio, which could be considered as even close to 
the one for a passive strategy. For the six-month period tests the Calmar ratios for the 
active strategies are 0.12, 0.11 and 0.01 respectively vs 0.19 for the passive strategy. 
For the three-month period tests the Calmar ratios are 0.11, 0.14 and 0.06 for the active 
strategies respectively vs 0.17 for the passive one.  
Graph 3.5.1. Efficiency vs statistical significance (6 months testing period) 
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Graph 3.5.2. Efficiency vs statistical significance (3 months testing period) 
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3.6. Test on the overall sample 
The above analysis was done using the data only taking into consideration only 
those years where contrarian profits are statistically significant. In this sub-section I 
include the whole sample, without distinguishing between years with statistically 
significant and non-significant contrarian profits.  
The comparison of the cumulative growth for passive strategy and contrarian ones 
confirms the result of the previous analysis that there is  no  rational reason to use any 
of the examined contrarian strategies over the period under review given the 
significantly better results of the passive strategy (see graph 3.6.1). In the same way as 
in the previous analysis DCF and CF/P strategies stand out from the other ones, but 
they still underperformed the passive strategy. 
Graph 3.6.1. Cumulative return for various strategies (annual rebalancing) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: formation date for the strategies is the end of March each year 
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Comparison of the cumulative return for the strategies with six and three months 
rebalancing also confirms the superiority of the passive strategy (see graphs 3.6.2 and 
3.6.3). At the same time DCF and CF/P continue to outperform the other contrarian 
strategies. The only notable change of the picture compared to the 12 months 
rebalancing period is that for three months rebalancing period CF/P resulted in a 
significantly better return vs DCF and is closer to passive strategy than in 12 months 
case.  
Graph 3.6.2. Cumulative return for various strategies (six months rebalancing) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: formation date for the strategies is the  end of March and end of September each year 
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Graph 3.6.3. Cumulative return for various strategies (three months rebalancing) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: formation date for the strategies is end of a quarter each year 
In the same way as in the previous analysis a passive strategy is better than 
contrarian ones from a risk/return perspective according to Calmar ratio (see table 
3.6.1). The only significant difference from the analysis on the basis of only including 
years where contrarian profit is statistically significant is a better Calmar ratio for DCF 
strategy (0.25 vs 0.20 for passive one). This is a result of inclusion into the sample of 
those years when  the strategy had positive returns, but which cannot be considered as 
statistically significant ones. This means that at these additional years the profits were 
more driven by luck rather than by the fundamental ability of the strategy to capture 
contrarian profits. The fact that with these years in the sample for the analysis DCF 
started to look better that a passive strategy while this was not observed with the initial 
approach is a sign of a weakness of the approach when there is no separation of years 
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on the base of the statistical significance of contrarian profits in each of them. Addition 
of the years where contrarian profits happened mostly due to luck factor (as there is no 
statistically significant difference between returns of glamour and value portfolios) 
resulted in the boost of results for DCF which was not due to some fundamental 
characteristics of the strategy.  
Moreover, comparison for six and three months rebalancing options shows that 
the superiority of DCF strategy disappears over this tighter test window. 
Table 3.6.1 Calmar ratio for contrarian strategies and a passive strategy 
 
Strategy 
Calmar ratio 
 12m 6m 3m 
 Passive strategy 0.20 0.20 0.18 
 Past returns 0.03 0.02 -0.02 
 Past earnings to price ratio 0.03 0.05 0.03 
 Forecasted earnings to price ratio -0.03 0.00 -0.01 
 Book value to price ratio 0.03 0.03 0.02 
 Cash flow to price ratio 0.19 0.14 0.17 
 Free cash flow to equity to price 0.10 0.06 0.06 
 Abnormal earnings growth model -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
 Residual income model 0.01 -0.03 0.01 
 Ohlson (γ=0, ω=0) model 0.03 0.03 0.00 
 Ohlson (γ=0, ω=1) model -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 
 Discounted cash flow model 0.25 0.20 0.15 
 Note: 12m, 6m and 3m are lengths of testing periods where “m” stands for “month”. The Calmar ratio is calculated on the basis 
of the formula: 
𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑎𝑟 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
(𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 − 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛)
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑤𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛
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3.7. Conclusion 
I conclude that the passive strategy was better than any of the tested contrarian 
ones over the period 1990-2012 with the use of one year testing period as well as six- 
and three-month test periods. Consequently, there was no point using any of the 
contrarian strategies over this period, which could be the reason why the contrarian 
profits were not arbitraged away. Table 3.7.1 below gives the summary of the relative 
efficiency analysis for comparison when I take into consideration only the periods where 
contrarian profit for a particular strategy are statically significant.  
Table 3.7.1 Calmar ratio for contrarian strategies and a passive strategy 
 
Strategy 
Calmar ratio 
 12m 6m 3m 
 Passive strategy 0.19 0.19 0.17 
 Past returns 0.04 0.03 -0.02 
 Past earnings to price ratio 0.01 0.02 0.01 
 Forecasted earnings to price ratio 0.04 0.00 -0.02 
 Book value to price ratio 0.06 0.00 0.01 
 Cash flow to price ratio 0.18 0.11 0.14 
 Free cash flow to equity to price 0.08 0.01 0.06 
 Abnormal earnings growth model -0.01 0.00 -0.04 
 Residual income model 0.03 -0.03 0.00 
 Ohlson (γ=0, ω=0) model 0.06 0.02 0.01 
 Ohlson (γ=0, ω=1) model -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 
 Discounted cash flow model 0.19 0.12 0.11 
 Note: 12m, 6m and 3m are lengths of testing periods where “m” stands for “month”. The Calmar ratio is calculated on the basis 
of the formula: 
𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑎𝑟 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
(𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 − 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛)
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑤𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛
 
This result extends the non-risk type of explanations of contrarian profits 
existence. In the same way as trading costs (i.e. Lo and Coggins (2006)) inability to 
produce better results than a passive strategy limits the ability of a portfolio manager to 
pitch a particular contrarian strategy to his or her management or to investors given that 
this pitch requires back-testing of the strategy they seek to promote.  
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In most cases contrarian strategies were far worse than a passive strategy from a 
risk/return point of view both for simple and sophisticated approaches. Calmar ratios are 
in the range of -0.01 to 0.08 for most of them, while the passive strategy value level is 
0.19. The key problems being the smaller number of statistically significant positive 
returns and a smaller ratio of statistically significant positive returns to the number of 
statistically significant negative returns. The number of statistically significant positive 
returns varies from 5 to 12 vs. 19 for a passive strategy. The ratio between the number 
of statistically significant positive returns and negative ones is 6.3 for a passive strategy, 
while for the examined strategies it varies from 0.9 to 4 for most of them.  
On the other hand, most of the strategies have on average a better return for 
statistically significant positive years. However, to a large extent this is due to a large 
difference in results between passive and active strategies in two years 2000 and 2009. 
In 2000 all of the active strategies have a negative return for a glamour portfolio and a 
positive return for a value portfolio. In 2009 all of the strategies have a positive return for 
the value portfolio, which is substantially higher than the return to the glamour portfolio 
or for the passive strategy. 
For simple strategies, there is normally smaller drawdown than for a passive 
strategy. In most cases, maximum drawdown varies from 28.1% to 47.9%. Only for the 
E/P strategy with expected EPS (the “forward” EPS) does the Calmar ratio go 
substantially below the level of a passive strategy at 72%, while for E/P with past EPS it 
is roughly the same as for a passive strategy at 58.2%.  
For sophisticated strategies, the situation is different. In most cases drawdown is 
larger than a passive strategy figure of 52.7%. In most cases, it is more than 70%, in 
one case of Ohlson (0,0) it is 56.4%, which could be considered as being close to the 
passive strategy.   
Overall most of the strategies not only performed worse than a passive strategy, 
but also do not have a statistically significant positive return over the 23 years according 
to the t-test, which is normally used in the literature. 
The only three strategies, which performed relatively well, are the CF/P, FCFE/P 
and DCF. These strategies have a statistically significant positive return across the 23 
years in the sample according to the t-test, with t-statistics being 2.5, 2.1 and 3.4 
respectively for CF/P, FCFE/P and DCF. CF/P strategy has a smaller drawdown 
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(43.7%) than a passive strategy, a rather high number of statistically significant positive 
returns and relatively high ratio of profits to losses. This helps it to perform almost as 
well as the passive strategy. FCFE/P has a substantially smaller drawdown (28.1%) 
than a passive strategy and a higher ratio of profits to losses (seven). DCF has a 
smaller number of statistically significant positive returns, but there are no statistically 
significant losses and a maximum drawdown is substantially smaller than for the 
passive strategy (27.8% figure vs 52.7%). However, all of them failed to perform better 
than the passive strategy from a risk/return perspective. Their respective Calmar ratios 
are 0.18, 0.08 and 0.19 for CF/P, FCFE/P and DCF, which is smaller or on par with the 
0.19 figure for a passive strategy.  
The above described results are for the one year testing period are confirmed by 
the tests for six and three months testing periods. Again, as in the one year period 
analysis most of the strategies not only performed worse than the passive one, but also 
do not have a statistically significant positive return over the whole period of the analysis 
according to the t-test, which is normally used in the literature. 
The only exception, which performed relatively well, is the DCF, CF/P and 
FCFE/P strategies. All of them have statistically significant positive returns when 
averaged across the whole period for six months, with t-statistics of 3.8, 2.6 and 2.1 
respectively, while for the three-month period only DCF and CF/P have this 
characteristic. However, none of the strategies has a Calmar ratio, which could be 
considered as even close to the one for a passive strategy. For the six-month period 
test the respective Calmar ratios for the active strategies are 0.12, 0.11 and 0.01 vs 
0.19 for the passive strategy. For the three-month period tests the Calmar ratios are 
0.11, 0.14 and 0.06 for the active strategies respectively vs 0.17 for the passive one.  
From what I have found contrarian strategies can dominate a passive one only 
when there are some unusual situations of the market (like the stock market rebound of 
2009 or the dot-com crash in 2000 or market turmoil in 2008). Once there is a turmoil 
contrarian strategies perform better due to their long/short nature. Once there is a 
rebound contrarian strategies can perform better due to the market recovering from 
unduly depressed valuations. Consequently, this rebound could be related to the 
correction of prior mispricing which is due to behavioral factors. In the next chapter I will 
check whether behavioral factor related to the observed price correction can be 
considered as a significant factor in explaining contrarian profits. 
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In most cases when there is a standard situation on the market (investors think 
more about getting an excess return rather than trying to limit their risks) performance of 
the contrarian strategies fail to be better than the passive one. I think this is because in 
such circumstance the level of inefficiency left on the market should be low, especially 
on the US one with lots of investors trying to identify mispriced securities. Given that 
such standard situation is the most common one on the market over a long period of 
time passive strategy performs better than any of the contrarian ones.  
Figures in the table 3.7.2 represent the difference between a statistically 
significant return of a particular strategy for a particular year or zero in case the return is 
insignificant and return of the passive strategy over the same year (in case this return is 
insignificant, zero is used as a return for a passive strategy for that year). 
Table 3.7.2. Statistically significant returns of the contrarian strategies vs statistically 
significant returns of the passive one 
Year RET E/P EE/P B/P CF/P FCFE/P AEG RIM O00 O01 DCF 
1990 -9.8% -9.8% -9.8% -9.8% -20.5% 1.5% -9.8% -9.8% -9.8% -9.8% -9.8% 
1991 -2.7% -16.3% -16.3% 0.8% 0.7% -16.3% -16.3% -16.3% -2.9% -16.3% -16.3% 
1992 -20.5% -20.5% -20.5% -5.7% 9.9% -20.5% -20.5% -7.0% -4.2% -20.5% -6.7% 
1993 -5.1% -5.1% -5.1% -5.1% 9.7% -5.1% -5.1% -5.1% -5.1% -5.1% -5.1% 
1994 -5.1% -13.1% -13.1% -13.1% -13.1% -13.1% -13.1% -13.1% -13.1% -13.1% -13.1% 
1995 -42.0% -27.8% -27.8% -27.8% -27.8% -0.7% -27.8% -27.8% -27.8% -27.8% 3.3% 
1996 -14.0% -5.4% -0.1% -14.0% -14.0% -5.9% -14.0% -0.7% -14.0% -14.0% -14.0% 
1997 -42.7% -42.7% -42.7% -42.7% -24.9% -17.3% -42.7% -42.7% -42.7% -42.7% -17.9% 
1998 -24.3% -34.7% -36.3% -32.9% -15.6% 0.0% -35.3% -36.7% -40.9% -40.9% 0.0% 
1999 -11.7% -46.4% -67.0% -11.7% -40.7% -11.7% -57.4% -70.1% -11.7% -63.9% -11.7% 
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Year RET E/P EE/P B/P CF/P FCFE/P AEG RIM O00 O01 DCF 
2000 30.7% 51.0% 46.7% 34.6% 49.3% 35.9% 31.4% 43.4% 40.4% 45.7% 41.3% 
2001 13.4% 10.3% 12.1% 3.6% 12.0% 5.6% -10.3% 5.0% 3.3% 13.9% 1.7% 
2002 15.1% 26.1% 34.2% 18.0% 34.8% 44.1% 16.4% 26.1% 26.1% 26.1% 26.1% 
2003 -12.6% -54.3% -54.3% -21.2% -29.9% -54.3% -15.4% -25.3% -16.0% -41.3% -23.3% 
2004 -20.9% 5.1% 1.6% 2.9% 11.8% -10.6% -10.6% 5.9% 5.3% 0.3% -10.6% 
2005 -18.1% -18.1% -18.1% -18.1% -7.1% -29.3% -18.1% -18.1% -18.1% -18.1% -18.1% 
2006 -12.4% -1.5% -2.2% -3.8% 4.6% -12.4% -2.4% -1.7% -4.4% -4.6% -12.4% 
2007 -10.9% -1.8% 8.3% -9.3% 8.3% 8.3% 8.3% 8.3% -8.6% 8.3% 8.3% 
2008 39.3% 39.3% 31.8% 21.2% 39.3% 39.3% 39.3% 39.3% 23.0% 39.3% 39.3% 
2009 34.2% -4.2% -78.8% 8.9% 1.0% -78.8% -25.5% 4.1% 6.1% -39.4% -43.9% 
2010 -31.8% -26.8% -29.3% -19.7% -19.7% -19.7% -19.7% -19.7% -19.7% -29.3% -19.7% 
2011 -24.7% -4.7% -4.7% -13.2% -4.7% -4.7% -4.7% -4.7% -14.7% 8.8% -4.7% 
2012 -16.9% -16.9% -16.9% -16.9% -16.9% -16.9% -5.5% -16.9% -9.0% -16.9% -7.8% 
 
The dominance of the passive strategy is also confirmed by the analysis on the 
basis of the full sample of periods.  
Cumulative return for the passive strategy since the end of March 1990 till end of 
March 2013 is better than for any of the contrarian strategies under review. This result is 
robust to changes in the frequency of the portfolio rebalancing as it holds for 12, 6 and 3 
months frequency.  
In the same way as the previous analysis a passive strategy is better than 
contrarian ones from risk/return perspective according to Calmar ratio. The only 
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significant difference from the analysis including only years when contrarian profits are 
statistically significant is better ratio for DCF strategy (0.25 vs 0.20 for passive one). 
This is a result of inclusion into the sample of those years where the strategy had 
positive (or negative) returns, but which cannot be considered as statistically significant 
ones (which is driven more by luck rather than by the fundamental ability of the strategy 
to capture contrarian profits).  
The fact that with these years in the sample for the analysis DCF started to look 
better that a passive strategy while this was not observed with the initial approach is a 
sign of a weakness of the approach when there is no separation of years on the base of 
the statistical significance of contrarian profits in each of them. Addition of the years 
where contrarian profits happened mostly due to luck factor (as there is no statistically 
significant difference between returns of glamour and value portfolios) resulted in the 
boost of results for DCF which was not due to some fundamental characteristics of the 
strategy. 
Moreover, comparison for six and three months rebalancing options show that 
superiority of DCF strategy disappears.  
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Chapter 4. Are contrarian returns mainly due to corrections to 
prior mispricing? 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter identifies that one of the reasons behind contrarian profits 
not being arbitraged away is that even best of them (among tested) are not able to 
perform better from risk/return perspective than a simple passive long-only investing. 
Another rational factor which could be a reason for the existence of contrarian profits is 
that the new information over the testing period has a larger impact on value stocks 
than on glamour ones (on the assumption that the market is able to price in the new 
information efficiently). Finally, a rather popular factor in the literature is the behavioural 
explanation which is that contrarian profits are the outcome of a correction to prior 
mispricing. 
In this chapter I attempt to distinguish between these two competing 
explanations. The model which will be used for the analysis is based on the assumption 
of periodical correction of stock prices to some fair levels, when dynamics of the fair 
price set the long term trend in a particular stock’s price. This is what some of the 
researches observe. For example, Shiller (1981) showed that prices fluctuate around 
fundamental fair value based on the discounted dividend stream. 
In efficient markets the prices of stocks should behave in line with the dynamics 
of the underlying valuations according to some particular valuation method which 
incorporates company’s fundamentals. This reflects the fact the fact any test of the EMH 
hypothesis is a joint test of a specific asset pricing model, for example, the CAPM and 
market efficiency itself. This means that the market price of a stocks at time t (let’s call it 
Pt) should always be equal to a fair value of this stock at time t (let’s call it Pt*). 
Consequently, the return between t and t+1 for a particular stock should be equal to: 
𝑃𝑡+1 − 𝑃𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡+1
∗ − 𝑃𝑡
∗  in absolute terms   (4.1) 
and  
𝑃𝑡+1−𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡
=
𝑃𝑡+1
∗ −𝑃𝑡
∗
𝑃𝑡
 in percentage points scaled by actual price   (4.2) 
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In reality it is normal that there is some deviation from the fair value due to flights 
to quality during periods of turmoil on the markets, inducing fund flows into passive 
strategies (i.e. ETFs), trading on the basis of technical indicators and other factors 
which affect stocks prices, but are not based on the analysis of any fundamentals like 
earnings or dividends and the fact that there are many points of clarification, such as 
earnings re-statements, which investors await at any given point in time. To take this 
into consideration I can introduce a component dt and assume that at time t a price for 
particular stocks is equal to: 
𝑃𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡
∗ + 𝑑𝑡   ,   (4.3) 
where dt captures some disturbance from the true value 𝑃𝑡
∗.  
Hence, the dynamics of a stock price should depend on the dynamics of 
underlying fair value and any changes in the deviations from the fair value.  
𝑃𝑡+1 − 𝑃𝑡 =  𝑃𝑡+1
∗ + 𝑑𝑡+1 − 𝑃𝑡
∗ − 𝑑𝑡 = (𝑃𝑡+1
∗ − 𝑃𝑡
∗) + (𝑑𝑡+1 − 𝑑𝑡) = ∆𝑃𝑡+1
∗ + ∆𝑑𝑡+1 
in absolute terms   (4.4) 
and in percentage points scaled by the price at time t 
𝑅𝑡+1 =
𝑃𝑡+1 −  𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡
=
∆𝑃𝑡+1
∗
𝑃𝑡
+
∆𝑑𝑡+1
𝑃𝑡
   (4.5) 
So stock price volatility has two parts, a real and “noisy” part (De Long et al 
(1990)).  
Let us define  
𝐹𝑡+1 =
∆𝑃𝑡+1
∗
𝑃𝑡
   (4.6) 
and 
𝐵𝑡+1 =
∆𝑑𝑡+1
𝑃𝑡
   (4.7) 
which decompose price volatility into its fundamental and behavioural parts.   
In this case the equation 4.5 can be rewritten in the form of: 
𝑅𝑡+1 = 𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝐵𝑡+1   (4.8) 
This model could help to identify the reasons behind existence of contrarian 
profits. As I have discussed in the literature review chapter there are two main points of 
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view regarding the reasons behind the existence of contrarian profits: rational and 
behavioural. Rational reasons include all the different factors (discount rate, fluctuating 
expectations regarding future fundamentals, which are inputs into the valuation model) 
which should affect the change in fair value, Ft over the analysed period and proponents 
of this approach suggest that these reasons are the most important ones for existence 
of contrarian profits. Consequently, this approach is more inclined to relate contrarian 
profits to the difference in Ft+1, the fundamental component of the equation (4.8) 
between value and glamour stocks. Proponents of behavioural explanations of 
contrarian profits suggest that correction of mispricing is the key reason behind 
existence of contrarian profits. This implies that the difference in the Bt+1 component of 
the formula (4.8) should be more important for the existence of contrarian profits. 
I assume that the greater the difference in the misvaluation between a particular 
glamour and a particular value stock, then the contrarian profit for this pair of stocks 
should be larger. I assume this because the more the stock is under/overvalued the 
stronger should be the correction in the following period in the market has a tendency to 
correct its own errors Consequently, in the case where a particular valuation metric is a 
valid tool to identify misvaluation the largest difference in return over the following 
period (i.e. the following year) should be between the value stock which is considered to 
be the most undervalued and the glamour stock which is considered to the be the most 
overvalued. For the most undervalued stock there should be a strong positive 
correction, which should result in its strong outperformance compared to the market and 
most of other stocks. In contrast the most overvalued stocks should lag behind most of 
the other stocks given that negative correction to a more fundamentally justifiable level 
should limit the stock’s return significantly. 
On the basis of this assumption and the model based on the formula (4.8) I will 
run the following regression in order to identify which factor, F or B, is more important 
for the existence and persistence of contrarian profits over a particular period between t 
and t+1 (let us call this period p) as follows. 
Firstly, value stocks are ranked in a descending order according to their 
estimated undervaluation. The identifier given to the first value stock (the most 
undervalued stock) will be v1. 
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Secondly, glamour stocks are ranked in an ascending order according to their 
estimated overvaluation. The identifier given to the first glamour stock after the ranking 
(the most overvalued stock) will be g1. 
Thirdly, the regression equation used to test the significance of rational or 
behavioural factors is the following: 
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘 = 𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘 − 𝑅𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘 = 𝑎 + 𝑎1(𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘 − 𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘 ) + 𝑎2(𝐵𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘 − 𝐵𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘 ) + 𝑒𝑘   ,   (4.9) 
where 
k  =1, …, n, where n is the number of observations in each glamour and value portfolio 
for a particular period between t and t+1, 
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘
 = stock price return in percentage points between a time t and t+1 for a particular 
value stock, which is ranked k, according to the extent of undervaluation at time t, with 
the rank 1 being an indicator that the stock is the most undervalued one, 
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘
  = stock price return in percentage points between a time t and t+1 for a particular 
glamour stock, which was identified as ranked k according to the extent of 
overvaluation at time t, with the rank 1 being indicating that the stock is the most 
overvalued one, 
𝑎  = constant,  
𝑎1, 𝑎2 = linear coefficients upon the rational and behavioural factors respectively, 
𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘
 = the change of the fair value for a particular value stock between time t and t+1 
scaled by the stock price at time t, 
𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘
   = the change of the fair value for a particular glamour stock between time t and t+1 
scaled by the stock price at time t, 
𝐵𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘   = correction of misevaluation of a particular value stock between time t and t+1 scaled 
by the stock price at time t, 
𝐵𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘
 = correction of misevaluation of a particular glamour stock between time t and t+1 
scaled by the stock price at time t, and 
𝑒𝑘 = residuals. 
An estimation of the Ft+1 component for glamour and value stocks is a rather 
straight forward exercise once one applies a particular valuation method. 
An estimation of a Bt+1 component is a harder task given that there is no ready 
way to use formula which will give an idea of how to estimate the correction of 
mispricing during a particular period p. Nobody have incorporated this factor directly to a 
test of reasons for contrarian profits so far, according to my knowledge.  
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Let’s consider a simple situation when there is no change in fair price over a 
particular period p. In this case if stock price reach the fair price at the end of the period 
I can say that the stock price change is completely due to mispricing correction. In the 
example below, let’s assume that at the beginning of the period the stock price was 
USD 90 while fair price was USD 100 throughout the period, including its end. In the 
case that the stock price reaches USD 100 at the end of the period the mispricing 
correction is USD 10 over the period. 
Table 4.1.1. Example 1 specification 
 t-1 t 
Fair value 100 100 
Market value 90 100 
Mispricing correction  10 
 
To make example more complicated let’s consider that fair price changes over a 
period p. In this case if stock price dynamics reflects only fair price change I can 
conclude that there is no mispricing correction. In the example below, let’s assume that 
at the beginning of the period the stock price was USD 90 while fair price was USD 100 
and at the end of the period the fair price moved to USD 120. In this case without any 
mispricing correction the market price will move to USD 110 at the end of the period, 
which is 90+ change in fair price (120-100).  
Table 4.1.2. Example 2 specification 
 t-1 t 
Fair value 100 120 
Market value 90 110 
Mispricing correction  0 
Another example, given below, is when at the beginning of the period the market 
price of USD 100 is equal to the fair price of USD 100 while at the end market price 
moves to USD 110 while fair price is USD 120. In this case there is a negative 
mispricing correction of minus USD 10 over the period. If the market price remain equal 
to fair price at the end of the period as well it should be USD 120, but it is USD 110. 
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Consequently, the appeared mispricing at the end of the period is a result of negative 
mispricing correction or mispricing creation. 
Table 4.1.3. Example 3 specification 
 t-1 t 
Fair value 100 120 
Market value 100 110 
Mispricing correction  -10 
 
The above examples show that mispricing correction over a period should be a 
function of fair prices at the beginning and at the end of the period. In the first example, 
there is no change in fair price over the period p and the market price reach fair price. 
Consequently, the price change is totally attributed to mispricing correction. In the 
second example the stock price moves above the fair price at the beginning of the 
period (100), but we cannot say that this is due to mispricing correction as the fair price 
itself reaches a higher level at the end of the period and the total change of the market 
price is exactly the same as the change in fair price. In the third example if we take into 
consideration only the initial fair price we would not be able to understand whether there 
was any mispricing correction at all as at the beginning of the period the market price is 
equal to the fair price and only fair price at the end of the period gives us reasons to 
identify negative mispricing correction or mispricing creation. 
Also we should include in the function of mispricing market prices at the 
beginning and at the end of the period. Mispricing correction over a period is the 
difference between the actual mispricing at the end of the period and the actual 
mispricing at the beginning of the period. For the three examples above it will look like it 
is shown in the table 4.1.4. 
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Table. 4.1.4. Mispricing correction calculation in various examples 
Example Mispricing at the 
beginning (the potential 
for subsequent 
mispricing correction) 
Mispricing at the end 
(the potential for 
subsequent mispricing 
correction) 
Mispricing 
correction over the 
period 
1 10=100-90 0=100-100 10=10-0 
2 10=100-90 10=120-110 0=10-10 
3 0=100-100 10=120-110 -10=0-10 
 
The problem is that I cannot follow the above ideal formula in using the 
mispricing correction to explain changes in market prices. If I include in the mispricing 
function the market prices at the beginning and at the end of the period it will make the 
regression spurious as the dependent variable (the difference in market prices at the 
end and at the beginning of the period) and one of the independent variables, (the 
mispricing correction), will be affected by the same figures – market prices at the end 
and at the beginning of the period. This is why I should exclude market prices from the 
mispricing correction formula and take into consideration only fair prices.  
One of the ways to exclude market prices from the mispricing correction formula 
is to assume that mispricing at the beginning and at the end of the period is equal to a 
particular share of the fair price. In this case the mispricing calculation will look like it is 
shown in the table 4.1.5. 
Table. 4.1.5. Mispricing correction calculation based only on fair prices in various 
examples 
Example Mispricing at the 
beginning (as a % of 
opening fair value) 
Mispricing at the end 
(as % of closing fair 
value 
Mispricing correction 
over the period 
1 10=10%*100 0=0%*100 10=10-0 
2 10=10%*100 10=8.3%*120 0=10-10 
3 0=0%*100 10=8.3%*120 -10=0-10 
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The key issue with this approach is that it makes the regression rather 
complicated. Mispricing, as a share of fair value at the beginning of the period and 
mispricing as a share of fair value at the end of the period are going to be estimated by 
regression. In this case there will be two coefficients to estimate for value stocks  and 
two coefficients to estimate for glamour stocks. 
Simplification of the formula with the assumption that the two coefficients are 
equal is misleading. In this case mispricing correction will become a function of the 
difference between fair prices at the end and at the beginning. In some cases it can 
work. In the third example above -10 can be assume to be equal to -50%*(120-100). 
However, in the first example I will not be able to explain mispricing correction as 
difference in fair prices in the end and at the beginning of the period is zero. 
 Consequently, I will use another simplification, that the mispricing correction is a 
function of the average of the two fair prices at the beginning and at the end of the 
period. For simplicity I will assume that this function is a linear one. I this case the 
mispricing correction functions for the three examined examples will look like it is shown 
in the table 4.1.6. 
Table. 4.1.6. Mispricing correction calculation based on the average of the two fair 
prices in various examples 
Example Fair price at the 
beginning 
Fair price at the 
end 
Mispricing 
correction 
Mispricing correction 
function 
1 100 100 10 10=10%*(100+100)/2 
2 100 120 0 0=0%*(120+100)/2 
3 100 120 -10 -10=-
9.1%*(120+100)/2 
 
 
Consequently, the formula for the behavioural component of return for a value 
stock will look like: 
𝐵𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘 =
∆𝑑𝑡+1
𝑣 𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘∗
𝑃𝑡
𝑣𝑘    ,   (4.10) 
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where  
∆𝑑𝑡+1
𝑣
   = the percent of the average fair price which affects the scale of mispricing correction 
between t and t+1. This is assumed to be the same for all value stocks. It should be 
positive given that correction of undervaluation should be positive a current price rises 
towards the fair/fundamental price. This coefficient will be estimated from the 
regression 4.9 in the form which incorporates formulas 4.10 and 4.11,  
𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘∗
  = average between fair prices at time t and t+1 for a particular value stock, and 
𝑃𝑡
𝑣𝑘  = market price for a particular value stocks at time t. 
. 
Application of the same approach to the behavioural component 𝐵𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘  for glamour 
stocks will result in the expression: 
𝐵𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘 =
∆𝑑𝑡+1
𝑔 𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘∗
𝑃𝑡
𝑔𝑘    ,   (4.11) 
where  
∆𝑑𝑡+1
𝑔
 = the percent of the average fair price which affects the scale of mispricing correction 
between t and t+1. This is assumed to be the same for all glamour stocks. It should be 
negative given that correction of overvaluation should be negative as price descends 
back down to fair/fundamental value. This coefficient will be estimated from the 
regression 4.9 in the form which incorporates formulas 4.10 and 4.11,  
𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘∗
 = average between fair prices at time t and t+1 for a particular glamour stock, and 
𝑃𝑡
𝑔𝑘
 = market price for a particular glamour stock at time t. 
Incorporation of this view of the behavioural component for the value/glamour 
stocks return into equation 4.9 will result in: 
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘 = 𝑎 + 𝑎1(𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘 − 𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘 ) + 𝑎2 (
∆𝑑𝑡+1
𝑣 𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘∗
𝑃𝑡
𝑣𝑘 −
∆𝑑𝑡+1
𝑔 𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘∗
𝑃𝑡
𝑔𝑘 ) + 𝑒𝑘
= 𝑎 + 𝑎1(𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘 − 𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘 ) +
𝑎2∆𝑑𝑡+1
𝑣 𝑃𝑡
𝑣𝑘∗
𝑃𝑡
𝑣𝑘 −
𝑎2∆𝑑𝑡+1
𝑔 𝑃𝑡
𝑔𝑘∗
𝑃𝑡
𝑔𝑘 + 𝑒𝑘
= 𝑎 + 𝑎1(𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘 − 𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘 ) + 𝑏1
𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘∗
𝑃𝑡
𝑣𝑘 + 𝑏2
𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘∗
𝑃𝑡
𝑔𝑘 + 𝑒𝑘   ,   (4.12) 
where 𝑏1 = 𝑎2∆𝑑𝑡+1
𝑣  and 𝑏2 = 𝑎2∆𝑑𝑡+1
𝑔
 
Chapter 4. Are contrarian returns mainly due to corrections to prior mispricing? 
4.1. Introduction 145 
The term (𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘 − 𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘 ) captures changes in the fundamental characteristics of the 
paired value and glamour stocks. The variable 
𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘∗
𝑃𝑡
𝑣𝑘  captures the adjustment to prior 
misvaluation in the value stock. The variable 
𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘∗
𝑃𝑡
𝑔𝑘  captures the adjustment to prior 
misevaluation of the glamour stock as described above. 
With the use of formula 4.12 it is possible to test the following hypothesis for a 
particular contrarian strategy. 
Firstly, formula 4.12 for a particular valuation model can be considered as 
explanation of the contrarian profit for a particular year which is consistent with efficient 
markets which allows some time to embed “news” about a stock’s valuation. In this case 
R2 is higher than 50% the formula 4.12 will be considered as an efficient explanation 
and vice versa. This is needed to understand whether the results of the tested 
regressions are significant enough to make conclusions of the base of them. It would be 
excessive to ask from the regression to be able to explain 100% of contrarian returns, 
but I will demand that it can explain more than half of them. I will also consider R2 being 
above 40% as a sufficient success of the test given that it is still can be called a 
significant part of the explanation of the contrarian profits. 
Secondly, for contrarian profit a rational explanation is less important than one 
related to the correction of mispricing. This holds in the case where a1 is not statistically 
significant while b1 and b2 are statistical significant. 
I will look at only those years where contrarian profits are statistically positive 
given that in other years the contrarian profit is found to be zero or negative and 
consequently there are no contrarian profits to analyse. 
There is a variation of application of this formula to the strategies based on ratios 
and valuation models. 
For valuations models, which identify fair price directly (AEG, RIM, DCF. Ohlson), 
the component 𝐹𝑡+1 and 
𝑃𝑡
𝑣𝑘∗
𝑃𝑡
𝑔𝑘∗ for a particular stock is based on the fair prices at time t 
and t+1 according to the model used. 
For ratios, the situation is more complicated given that there is a need for 
identification of a “fair”/true ratio to get an estimate of a fair price when I use of this 
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method. I will assume that this fair ratio level is a function of expected earnings growth 
relative to the current price given that normally the higher the expected earnings growth 
the higher various fundamental ratios for this stock. Consequently, one of the possible 
proxies for a fair ratio for a particular valuation approach r, might be: 
𝐾𝑡
𝑟 = 𝑐𝑡   ,   (4.13) 
where 𝑐𝑡  is an average level for a particular ratio at time t across all stocks in the 
sample.  
This is in line with the underlying assumption behind application of the ratio 
approach to contrarian strategies that in the case when a stock ratio is too high vs an 
average level it can be considered being glamourous, which means overvalued, and 
vice versa for value, which means undervalued. This could be seen as a rather 
simplistic approach given that it does not take into consideration expected growth of a 
particular company. Normally the higher the expected growth rate the higher should be 
various ratios. However, there are so much errors in market expectations regarding the 
future earnings growth that incorporation of it into the fair price calculation would only 
add additional errors in the calculations rather than add precision (Gigerenzer and Todd 
(1999)). 
Consequently, a fair price for stocks based on a particular fundamental figure 𝐶𝑟 
(for example, earnings per share, book value per share, cash flow per share etc.) is 
equal to: 
𝑃𝑡
∗ = 𝑐𝑡𝐶𝑡
𝑟    ,   (4.14) 
This parameter will be calculated for all stocks at a particular time t and will be 
used in the regression (4.12). 
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4.2. Ratio based strategies 
 
4.2.1. Past earnings to price, E/P 
The E/P approach has proved to be one of the least efficient ones in terms of 
producing contrarian profits as was reported in Chapter 3 – all other simplified 
approaches (except “exp E/P” where “exp E” is expected next year’s earnings per 
share) have a higher Calmar ratio than the E/P approach. For this approach, there was 
approximately the same number of statistically significant positive and negative returns 
over the examined sample of years (1990-2012).  
As stated in the introduction I will look at only those years where contrarian 
profits are statistically positive given that in other years the contrarian profit is assumed 
to be zero or negative and consequently there are no contrarian profits to analyse. 
For the years where contrarian profits are statistically positive the results are 
summarised in the table 4.2.1.1. 
Table 4.2.1.1. Distinguishing between rational and behavioural factors in explaining 
contrarian profits 
 
 
Average 1996 2000 2001 2004 2006 2009 
 Value return 41,2% 18,0% 35,2% 23,2% 17,7% 15,7% 137,3% 
 Glamour return 9,3% 9,4% -25,6% 2,6% 2,0% 4,8% 62,7% 
 Contrarian profit 31,9% 8,6% 60,8% 20,6% 15,7% 10,9% 74,6% 
 
Number of stocks 
in value/glamour 
portfolios 
 117 118 120 122 123 121 
 Value-Glamour regression results 
 a 34,5% 35,0% 78,5% 22,2% 34,0% 16,5% 20,6% 
 t-stat for a 2,56 2,03 5,45 2,36 2,93 1,53 1,07 
R
a
ti
o
n
a
l h1 1,1% 3,9% 0,9% 0,2% 3,0% 2,4% -3,5% 
t-stat for h1 0,50 1,708 0,412 0,081 0,689 1,743 -1,646 
B
e
h
a
v
io
ra
l 
b1 1,8% -3,5% -0,9% 2,1% -6,6% -1,6% 21,4% 
t-stat for b1 0,14 -0,925 -0,322 1,106 -1,420 -0,665 3,097 
b2 -15,7% -14,9% -37,3% -16,8% -16,5% -0,1% -8,8% 
t-stat for b2 -1,52 -1,376 -2,798 -1,055 -2,040 -0,008 -1,862 
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 R2 9,8% 6,7% 12,1% 7,0% 9,5% 5,5% 18,1% 
Note: highlighted cells indicate statistically significant coefficients; average figures are over the years 
specified in the table. 
The tested regression: 
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘 = 𝑎 + ℎ1(𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘 − 𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘 ) +
𝑏1𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘∗
𝑃𝑡
𝑣𝑘 +
𝑏2𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘∗
𝑃𝑡
𝑔𝑘 + 𝑒𝑘   ,  
where  
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘
 = the difference between a return of a k rated value stock over the period between t 
and t+1 and the return over the same period for a k rated glamour stock (the rank 1 for 
a value stock is the indicator that the stock is the most undervalued one among value 
stocks; the same rank for the glamour stock means that the stock is the most 
overvalued one amongst the glamour stocks),  
𝑎  = constant, 
ℎ1 = linear coefficient upon a rational factor, 
𝑏1, 𝑏2 = linear coefficients on the behavioural factors, 
𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘  = the change of the fair value for a particular value stock between a time t and t+1 
scaled by the stock price at time t, 
𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘
 = the change of the fair value for a particular glamour stock between time t and t+1 
scaled by the stock price at time t, 
𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘∗  = average between fair prices at time t and t+1 for a particular value stock, 
𝑃𝑡
𝑣𝑘  = market price for a particular value stock at time t, 
𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘∗
 = average between fair prices at time t and t+1 for a particular glamour stock, 
𝑃𝑡
𝑔𝑘
 = market price for a particular glamour stock at time t, and 
𝑒𝑘 = residuals. 
In table 4.2.1.1, the results are as follows. The constant a is statistically 
significant in half of the years under review. In most of these statistically significant 
cases, it is rather close to the actual contrarian profit. This can be considered as an 
indirect sign that the variables in the regression are a not a useful tool to explain 
contrarian profits over the years in review. 
This is also supported by a relatively small value of R2 in all the years. However, 
the range is overall higher than for the statistically significant negative years, which 
were discussed before. R2 varies from 5.5% to 18.1%.  
The linear coefficient on the rational factor related to the dynamics of underlying 
fair values is not significant in any of the examined years.  
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At the same time, linear coefficients related to mispricing correction are 
statistically significant in two years. In 2000 – b2 and in 2009 – b1.  
In 2000 the value of linear coefficient b2 is negative, which is counter to the 
rational assumption. A negative value means that there was a positive mispricing 
correction, which could not be the case in a year where the return for glamour stocks 
was overall negative while the return for value was positive. 
In 2009 the value of linear coefficient b1 is positive and this is within the rational 
assumption especially given that 2009 was a year after the turmoil on the market in 
2008. During such “correction” years I expect that depressed valuations should rebound 
to more fair values. The figure for b1 in 2008 is substantially larger than it was in 2007 – 
the year with statistically negative contrarian profit and a significant linear coefficient b1 
value. This also fits well with the assumption that after a year of turmoil year the 
mispricing correction should be larger than during normal years. 
As a result, I conclude that the test of both hypothesis to a large extent failed in 
the years with positive contrarian profits. R2 is small in all cases, which means that the 
suggested regression proved to be a weak tool to explain contrarian profits. There is a 
very weak sign that the behavioural factor is more important than the examined rational 
one given that in two years either b1 or b2 are statistically significant, while h1 is not 
statistically significant across all the years. However, out of two years with the 
statistically significant behavioural linear coefficients only one case fits well with the 
underlying behavioural assumptions of a positive mispricing correction for this group of 
stocks. 
 
4.2.2. Forecasted earnings to price, FE/P 
This is the strategy with the lowest efficiency among the strategies under review 
as stated in the Chapter 3. However, in terms of the number of years when the 
contrarian profit was positive and statistically significant so in that it resembles the E/P 
strategy where E is earning per share for the previous year. 
As stated in the introduction I will look at only those years where contrarian 
profits are statistically positive given that in other years the contrarian profit is assumed 
to be zero or negative and consequently there is nothing to analyse. 
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For the years where contrarian profits are statistically positive the results are 
summarised in the Table 4.2.2.1. 
Table 4.2.2.1. Distinguishing between rational and behavioural factors in explaining 
contrarian profits 
 
 
Average 1996 2000 2001 2002 2004 2006 
 Value return 14.1% 22.9% 32.1% 23.7% -25.5% 15.5% 15.8% 
 Glamour return -6.5% 9.0% -24.5% 1.2% -33.6% 3.2% 5.6% 
 Contrarian profit 20.6% 13.9% 56.5% 22.4% 8.1% 12.2% 10.3% 
 
Number of 
stocks in 
value/glamour 
portfolios 
 117 119 120 121 122 123 
 Value-Glamour regression results 
 a 28.3% 43.47% 27.52% 52.15% 2.89% 13.54% 30.23% 
 t-stat for a 2.26 2.75 2.27 4.44 0.32 1.00 2.82 
R
a
ti
o
n
a
l h1 13.8% 11.9% 3.9% 14.2% 17.1% 25.8% 9.7% 
t-stat for h1 4.591 3.05 1.44 4.82 8.13 6.44 3.67 
B
e
h
a
v
io
ra
l 
b1 2.3% -4.9% 13.0% -8.7% 12.9% 3.7% -1.9% 
t-stat for b1 0.50 -1.13 4.03 -2.17 2.18 0.78 -0.72 
b2 -18.1% -30.0% -0.9% -39.1% -4.8% -12.7% -20.9% 
t-stat for b2 -1.53 -2.14 -0.05 -3.44 -0.64 -1.01 -1.88 
 R2 21.6% 15.5% 14.7% 19.4% 37.7% 29.7% 12.4% 
Note: highlighted cells indicate statistically significant coefficients; average figures are over the years 
specified in the table.Note: highlighted cells – statistically significant coefficients; average figures are over 
the years specified in the table. 
The tested regression: 
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘 = 𝑎 + ℎ1(𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘 − 𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘 ) +
𝑏1𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘∗
𝑃𝑡
𝑣𝑘 +
𝑏2𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘∗
𝑃𝑡
𝑔𝑘 + 𝑒𝑘   , 
where  
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘
 = the difference between a return of a k rated value stock over the period between t 
and t+1 and the return over the same period for a k rated glamour stock (the rank 1 for 
a value stock is the indicator that the stock is the most undervalued one among value 
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stocks; the same rank for the glamour stock means that the stock is the most 
overvalued one amongst the glamour stocks),  
𝑎  = constant, 
ℎ1 = linear coefficient for a rational factor, 
𝑏1, 𝑏2 = linear coefficients for the behavioural factors, 
𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘  = the change of the fair value for a particular value stock between a time t and t+1 
scaled by the stock price at time t, 
𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘
 = the change of the fair value for a particular glamour stock between a time t and t+1 
scaled by the stock price at time t, 
𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘∗  = average between fair prices at time t and t+1 for a particular value stock, 
𝑃𝑡
𝑣𝑘  = market price for a particular value stock at time t, 
𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘∗
 = average between fair prices at time t and t+1 for a particular glamour stock, 
𝑃𝑡
𝑔𝑘
 = market price for a particular glamour stock at time t, and 
𝑒𝑘 = residuals. 
Constant 𝑎 is statistically significant in most of the years under review. However, 
its value varies substantially in all the cases from the actual value for a particular 
contrarian profit, which is an indirect sign that the contribution of other factors is 
important as well. 
Overall, R2 is relatively low in all of the cases with the figures being below 40%.  
The linear coefficient for the rational factor related to the dynamics of underlying 
fair values is significant and positive in four out of six years in the sample. This is what 
seems to be justifiable to expect given that it confirms that the more the difference 
between the growth of fair prices for value stocks and the same figure for glamour ones 
the larger should be contrarian profit.  
The linear coefficients related to a mispricing correction are statistically significant 
also in four years out of six. However, they are statistically significant simultaneously 
only in one year (2001) and that year both of them are negative, which quite a different 
result from a rational assumption. Under the rational assumption value stocks prices 
should make a positive contribution to contrarian profits once excessive prior pessimism 
is eliminated. For glamour stocks, there should be the opposite situation and there 
should be a negative contribution to contrarian profits from the correction of excessive 
prior optimism. The situation when both linear coefficients are negative contradicts this 
rational explanation. The same counter rational negative figure for b2 is observed in 
1996. 
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The situation which is in line with the rational assumption regarding the 
behavioural coefficients is observed in 2000 and 2002 when b1 is positive and 
statistically significant. In 2000 this is the only statistically significant coefficient, which 
adds to the argument that behavioural factors are more significant than rational ones. 
However, R2 for 2000 is substantially lower than for 2002 (14.7% vs 37.7%) which 
makes this evidence less valuable than it could be in the opposite situation. 
As a result, I conclude that test of both hypothesis effectively failed. R2 is 
relatively low in all the cases. It is impossible to conclude which explanation is more 
important given the absence of many years with high R2. In addition, there is an equal 
number of years when the linear coefficient for the rational factors or one of the linear 
coefficients for behavioural factors are statistically significant.  
 
4.2.3. Book value to price, B/P 
This strategy is rather close to the E/P one in terms of the overall efficiency of the 
approach as it was outlined in Chapter 3. In the same way, as for E/P the number of 
years when contrarian profit was positive and statistically significant are close to the 
number of years when the strategy’s contrarian profit was negative and statistically 
significant.  
As stated in the introduction I will look at only those years where contrarian 
profits are statistically positive, given that in other years the contrarian profit is assumed 
to be zero or negative and consequently there is nothing to analyse. 
For the years where contrarian profits are statistically positive the results are 
summarised in the Table 4.2.3.1. 
Table 4.2.3.1. Distinguishing between rational and behavioural factors in explaining 
contrarian profits 
 
 
Average 1991 1992 2000 2001 2003 2004 2006 2009 
 
Value 
return 
44.3% 27.9% 25.5% 30.4% 20.9% 77.4% 19.9% 17.1% 135.0% 
 
Glamour 
return 
15.1% 10.8% 10.7% -14.0% 6.9% 44.2% 6.4% 8.4% 47.3% 
 
Contrarian 
profit 
29.2% 17.1% 14.8% 44.4% 13.9% 33.1% 13.5% 8.7% 87.7% 
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Number of 
stocks in 
value/gla
mour 
portfolios 
 112 113 114 115 113 113 107 88 
 Value-Glamour regression results 
 a 25.97% 14.72% -2.97% 50.46% 
-
14.06% 
71.30% 49.03% 20.51% 18.78% 
 t-stat for a 1.26 0.92 -0.15 3.68 -0.77 1.97 1.96 1.99 0.51 
R
a
ti
o
n
a
l h1 4.6% -6.7% 9.9% -8.2% -22.6% 4.6% 21.8% 6.3% 31.7% 
t-stat for 
h1 
0.27 -0.60 1.35 -0.83 -3.16 0.24 2.07 0.88 2.20 
B
e
h
a
v
io
ra
l 
b1 3.0% 4.8% 3.5% 1.8% 14.9% -5.1% -4.4% -3.1% 11.7% 
t-stat for 
b1 
0.65 1.72 0.72 0.51 2.67 -0.53 -0.61 -0.75 1.44 
b2 -25.9% -19.2% 12.7% -34.4% 18.3% -64.7% -74.2% -15.3% -30.7% 
t-stat for 
b2 
-0.80 -0.74 0.49 -1.23 0.54 -1.51 -2.32 -1.15 -0.48 
 R2 11.0% 6.2% 3.5% 2.0% 9.5% 4.6% 16.8% 3.6% 41.5% 
Note: highlighted cells indicate statistically significant coefficients; average figures are over the years 
specified in the table.Note: highlighted cells – statistically significant coefficients; average figures are over 
the years specified in the table. 
The tested regression: 
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘 = 𝑎 + ℎ1(𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘 − 𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘 ) +
𝑏1𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘∗
𝑃𝑡
𝑣𝑘 +
𝑏2𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘∗
𝑃𝑡
𝑔𝑘 + 𝑒𝑘   , 
where  
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘
 = the difference between a return of a k rated value stock over the period between t 
and t+1 and the return over the same period for a k rated glamour stock (the rank 1 for 
a value stock is the indicator that the stock is the most undervalued one among value 
stocks; the same rank for the glamour stock means that the stock is the most 
overvalued one amongst the glamour stocks),  
𝑎  = constant, 
ℎ1 = linear coefficient for a rational factor, 
𝑏1, 𝑏2 = linear coefficients for the behavioural factors, 
𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘  = the change of the fair value for a particular value stock between a time t and t+1 
scaled by the stock price at time t, 
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𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘
 = the change of the fair value for a particular glamour stock between a time t and t+1 
scaled by the stock price at time t, 
𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘∗  = average between fair prices at time t and t+1 for a particular value stock, 
𝑃𝑡
𝑣𝑘  = market price for a particular value stock at time t, 
𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘∗
 = average between fair prices at time t and t+1 for a particular glamour stock, 
𝑃𝑡
𝑔𝑘
 = market price for a particular glamour stock at time t, and 
𝑒𝑘 = residuals. 
The constant 𝑎 is statistically significant only in one year under review (2000). In 
this year is also rather close to the actual contrarian profit. This can be considered as an 
indirect sign that the variables in the regression are a not a useful tool to explain 
contrarian profits in 2000. 
Overall it is not possible to accept the regression as a sufficient one for 
explanation of contrarian profits given that in most cases R2 is very low – below 20%. 
However, in one case (2009) it is abnormally high – 41.5%. This can be explained by 
the fact that in 2009 many stocks prices rebounded after being under excessive 
pressure during the crisis in 2008.  
At the same time 2009 is the year when the linear coefficient for the rational 
factor related to the dynamics of underlying fair values is significant and positive. This is 
what seems to be justifiable to expect given that it confirms that the greater the 
difference between growth of fair prices for value stocks and the same figure for 
glamour ones the larger should be contrarian profits. In the other year (2001) when this 
linear coefficient is also significant it is negative, which is counter to the intuition behind 
the regression. A negative figure for this linear coefficient implies that the more the 
difference mentioned above the lower should be reported contrarian profits. 
Linear coefficients related to mispricing correction are statistically significant in 
two years. In 2001 – b1 and in 2004 – b2.  
In 2001 the value of linear coefficient b1 is positive, which is in line with the 
rational assumption that a excessively depressed valuation of value stocks should then 
rebound afterwards and this factor should have a positive contribution to the contrarian 
profit. However, overall significance of the regression that year is rather small with R2 
being 9.5%. In addition, as discussed above the linear coefficient for the rational factor 
that year was counterintuitive, which also make the validity of regression that year 
rather low. 
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In 2004 the value of the linear coefficient b2 is negative, which contradicts with 
the rationale behind the regression. A negative figure means that there was on average 
a positive correction of prior mispricing for glamour stocks, while it should be a negative 
correction given that the stocks are assumed to be overpriced, rather than underpriced.  
As a result, I conclude that tests of both hypothesis weakly succeeded only in 
one year. R2 is small in all cases except 2009, when the R2 (41.5%) is still not very high, 
but could be considered as being high enough to assume that some part of the 
contrarian profit that year was explained by the regression. In 2009 the rational factor 
proved to be the only factor, which can be considered as an important one for 
explaining the contrarian profit given that the linear coefficient for this factor is 
statistically significant, while linear coefficients for behavioural factors are not 
statistically significant. 
 
4.2.4. Cash flow to price, CF/P 
This is the best strategy in terms of efficiency among the simple strategies based 
on ratios or past returns as stated in Chapter 3. One of the crucial factors for  its 
superiority is that is has the largest number of years with statistically significant positive 
returns (12). In more than half of years in the sample the strategy managed to be 
profitable. 
As stated in the introduction I will look at only those years where contrarian 
profits are statistically positive given that in other years the contrarian profit is assumed 
to be zero or negative and consequently there is nothing to analyse. 
For the years where contrarian profits are statistically positive the results are 
summarised in the Table 4.2.4.1. 
Table 4.2.4.1. Distinguishing between rational and behavioural factors in explaining 
contrarian profits 
Part 1 
 
 
Average 1991 1992 1993 1997 2000 2001 
 Value return 36.4% 25.7% 39.2% 12.2% 52.9% 35.9% 23.8% 
 Glamour return 9.3% 8.7% 8.7% -2.6% 35.1% -23.2% 1.5% 
 Contrarian profit 27.1% 17.0% 30.4% 14.8% 17.7% 59.1% 22.3% 
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Number of 
stocks in 
value/glamour 
portfolios 
 108 108 110 114 115 114 
 Value-Glamour regression results 
 a 37.8% 27.2% 49.3% -3.1% 86.4% 38.1% -14.2% 
 t-stat for a 1.6 2.0 2.5 -0.2 3.4 2.4 -0.9 
R
a
ti
o
n
a
l h1 6.0% 5.1% 0.2% -0.6% 11.5% 7.4% 0.6% 
t-stat for h1 1.5 1.8 0.1 -0.2 2.0 1.8 0.1 
B
e
h
a
v
io
ra
l 
b1 5.8% -0.6% 8.6% 11.8% -9.2% 16.7% 17.6% 
t-stat for b1 1.5 -0.3 1.8 2.8 -1.9 3.6 3.4 
b2 -40.4% -13.6% -68.3% -9.7% -66.5% -56.3% -0.8% 
t-stat for b2 -1.7 -0.8 -2.9 -0.5 -2.5 -2.7 0.0 
 R2 15.4% 3.9% 14.3% 8.1% 9.5% 28.0% 16.2% 
Part 2 
 
 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2009 
 Value return  -20.3% 69.2% 22.5% 23.4% 20.2% 132.2% 
 Glamour return  -29.0% 44.8% 0.1% 12.4% 3.1% 52.4% 
 Contrarian profit  8.7% 24.4% 22.4% 11.0% 17.0% 79.8% 
 
Number of 
stocks in 
value/glamour 
portfolios 
 114 118 119 120 120 121 
 Value-Glamour regression results 
 a  -14.7% 114.9% 44.9% 22.7% 18.3% 83.3% 
 t-stat for a  -1.1 3.1 2.7 1.2 1.5 2.2 
R
a
ti
o
n
a
l h1  5.7% 23.8% 14.6% 6.4% -1.8% -1.4% 
t-stat for h1  1.5 3.9 4.8 2.3 -0.5 -0.2 
B
e
h
a
v
io
ra
l 
b1  13.6% -14.7% 10.6% 4.1% 3.8% 6.9% 
t-stat for b1  3.1 -2.3 2.9 0.9 1.3 2.2 
b2  -2.9% -99.5% -75.9% -32.7% -15.7% -43.1% 
t-stat for b2  -0.1 -2.3 -4.1 -1.6 -1.2 -1.0 
 R2  13.9% 19.1% 35.1% 10.1% 4.3% 22.0% 
Note: highlighted cells indicate statistically significant coefficients; average figures are over the years 
specified in the table. 
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The tested regression: 
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘 = 𝑎 + ℎ1(𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘 − 𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘 ) +
𝑏1𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘∗
𝑃𝑡
𝑣𝑘 +
𝑏2𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘∗
𝑃𝑡
𝑔𝑘 + 𝑒𝑘   , 
where  
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘
 = the difference between a return of a k rated value stock over the period between t 
and t+1 and the return over the same period for a k rated glamour stock (the rank 1 for 
a value stock is the indicator that the stock is the most undervalued one among value 
stocks; the same rank for the glamour stock means that the stock is the most 
overvalued one amongst the glamour stocks),  
𝑎  = constant, 
ℎ1 = linear coefficient for a rational factor, 
𝑏1, 𝑏2 = linear coefficients for the behavioural factors, 
𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘  = the change of the fair value for a particular value stock between a time t and t+1 
scaled by the stock price at time t, 
𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘
 = the change of the fair value for a particular glamour stock between a time t and t+1 
scaled by the stock price at time t, 
𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘∗  = average between fair prices at time t and t+1 for a particular value stock, 
𝑃𝑡
𝑣𝑘  = market price for a particular value stock at time t, 
𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘∗
 = average between fair prices at time t and t+1 for a particular glamour stock, 
𝑃𝑡
𝑔𝑘
 = market price for a particular glamour stock at time t, and 
𝑒𝑘 = residuals. 
The constant 𝑎 is statistically significant half of the reviewed years. However, in 
most of the cases there is a significant difference between the constant value and the 
actual contrarian profit for a particular year. This is an indirect sign that the suggested 
regression is a relatively efficient tool in explaining the contrarian profit for the strategy. 
In terms of R2 in most cases the regression can be considered as a weak method 
to analyse the contrarian profits given that R2 is below 40%. 
Linear coefficients for the rational factor are statistically different from zero in only 
three years out of 12. However, in all these three years the linear coefficients are 
positive which is in line with the rational assumption that the more the difference 
between growth of fair prices for value and glamour stocks the larger should be 
contrarian profits. 
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At least one linear coefficients related to behavioural factors is statistically 
significant in eight out of 12 years of the sample. In three years they are significant 
simultaneously for both value and glamour factors.  
The linear coefficients related to a mispricing correction for glamour stocks are 
negative in all the cases. This outcome contradicts with the rational assumption behind 
the regression. A negative figure means that there was on average a positive correction 
of prior mispricing for glamour stocks, while one expects a negative correction given 
that the stocks are assumed to be overpriced, rather than underpriced. 
The linear coefficients related to the mispricing correction for value stocks are 
positive in all the cases except one in 2003. This is in line with the rational assumption 
that excessively depressed value stocks should rebound afterwards and this factor 
should have make a positive contribution to the contrarian profit.  
In the two years where the R2 is relatively high the rational factor is significant 
only once, while the behavioural factor related to value stocks is valid in both years and 
the one related to glamour stock prices correction is valid only in one year. 
As a result, I conclude that test of both hypotheses effectively failed. R2 is 
relatively small in all cases. There is weak evidence that behavioural factors are more 
important for the explanation of contrarian profits than rational one. Overall there are 
much more years with at least one of the behavioural factors being significant (nine) vs 
the number of years when the rational factor is significant (three). 
 
4.2.5. Free cash flow to equity to price, FCFE/P  
This strategy has one of the highest levels of efficiency among simple strategies 
based on ratios and past returns as stated in the Chapter 3. However, the overall 
number of years with statistically significant positive contrarian profits (seven) is only 
slightly higher than for less efficient strategies (i.e. E/P with six years with positive and 
significant contrarian profits) and even smaller than for the less efficient B/P strategy 
(eight).  
As stated in the introduction I will look at only those years where contrarian 
profits are statistically positive given that in other years the contrarian profit is assumed 
to be zero or negative and consequently there is nothing to analyse. 
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For the years where contrarian profits are statistically positive the results are 
summarised in the Table 4.2.5.1. 
Table 4.2.5.1. Distinguishing between rational and behavioural factors in explaining 
contrarian profits 
 
 
Average 1990 1995 1996 1997 2000 2001 2002 
 Value return 24.6% 14.1% 41.9% 19.4% 57.9% 36.6% 19.7% -17.4% 
 Glamour return 3.0% 2.9% 14.9% 11.3% 32.6% -9.1% 3.8% -35.4% 
 Contrarian profit 21.6% 11.3% 27.0% 8.2% 25.3% 45.7% 15.9% 18.0% 
 
Number of stocks 
in value/glamour 
portfolios 
 87 90 90 89 92 92 94 
 Value-Glamour regression results 
 a 24.1% 23.1% 22.4% 17.9% 32.7% 36.9% 21.0% 14.6% 
 t-stat for a 3.09 3.14 2.98 3.44 3.31 3.78 2.34 2.62 
R
a
ti
o
n
a
l h1 1.8% 4.5% -0.1% 0.8% 2.2% 4.6% 0.8% 0.1% 
t-stat for h1 1.10 2.71 -0.09 0.99 0.98 2.63 0.38 0.12 
B
e
h
a
v
io
ra
l 
b1 -0.3% -1.6% 1.5% -5.4% -2.9% 5.9% -2.6% 2.8% 
t-stat for b1 -0.21 -0.64 0.45 -2.72 -0.94 1.92 -0.54 1.01 
b2 0.7% 15.4% -5.6% 0.1% 0.3% -3.1% -0.9% -1.6% 
t-stat for b2 0.04 2.40 -0.62 0.03 0.04 -0.56 -0.15 -0.84 
 R2 6.4% 10.2% 4.3% 9.4% 2.6% 12.1% 1.3% 5.0% 
Note: highlighted cells indicate statistically significant coefficients; average figures are over the years 
specified in the table. 
The tested regression: 
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘 = 𝑎 + ℎ1(𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘 − 𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘 ) +
𝑏1𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘∗
𝑃𝑡
𝑣𝑘 +
𝑏2𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘∗
𝑃𝑡
𝑔𝑘 + 𝑒𝑘   , 
where  
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘
 = the difference between a return of a k rated value stock over the period between t 
and t+1 and the return over the same period for a k rated glamour stock (the rank 1 for 
a value stock is the indicator that the stock is the most undervalued one among value 
stocks; the same rank for the glamour stock means that the stock is the most 
overvalued one amongst the glamour stocks),  
𝑎  = constant, 
ℎ1 = linear coefficient for a rational factor, 
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𝑏1, 𝑏2 = linear coefficients for the behavioural factors, 
𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘  = the change of the fair value for a particular value stock between a time t and t+1 
scaled by the stock price at time t, 
𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘
 = the change of the fair value for a particular glamour stock between a time t and t+1 
scaled by the stock price at time t, 
𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘∗  = average between fair prices at time t and t+1 for a particular value stock, 
𝑃𝑡
𝑣𝑘  = market price for a particular value stock at time t, 
𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘∗
 = average between fair prices at time t and t+1 for a particular glamour stock, 
𝑃𝑡
𝑔𝑘
 = market price for a particular glamour stock at time t, and 
𝑒𝑘 = residuals. 
The constant 𝑎 is statistically significant in all of the years under review. In many 
cases its value is close to the actual value of contrarian profit, which can be considered 
as an indirect sign that the suggested regression is not an efficient tool in the 
explanation of the contrarian profits. 
R2 also supports the argument that the regression is a weak tool to analyse 
contrarian profits for the strategy. In most cases, it is below 10% and only in 2000 is 
slightly above this level. 
The linear coefficient for the rational factor related to the dynamics of underlying 
fair values is significant and positive in two out of seven years in the sample. This is 
what seems to be justifiable to expect given that it confirms that the greater the 
difference between the growth of fair prices for value stocks and glamour stocks the 
larger should be contrarian profits.  
Linear coefficients related to behavioural mispricing correction are statistically 
significant also in two years out of seven years. However, they are not statistically 
significant simultaneously. For b1 the estimated value is negative, which contradicts with 
the rational assumption that value stocks prices should make a positive contribution to 
contrarian profits once excessive prior pessimism is eliminated. In the only year when b2 
is statistically different from zero it is positive, which is in line with the rational 
assumption that the correction of overoptimistic valuations of glamour stocks should 
contribute negatively to their return and hence positively to the contrarian profits.  
As a result, I conclude that test of both hypothesis failed. R2 is relatively is low in 
all the cases while the constant is statistically significant and close to the actual 
contrarian profit in a particular year. There is very weak evidence that the rational factor 
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is more important given that the linear coefficient for this factor is positive (which is in 
line with the rational assumption) and statistically significant in two years. In one of 
these years it is the only statistically significant factor. There is also one year when the 
only statistically significant factor is the behavioural one related to value stocks. 
However, the linear coefficient is negative which contradicts with the rational pricing 
assumption. In the other year (1990) the linear coefficient for the behavioural factor 
related to glamour stocks is statistically significant together with the linear coefficient for 
the rational factor. Moreover, the linear coefficient for this factor is positive, which 
means that there is a positive contribution form the negative effect of mispricing 
correction for glamour stocks. 
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4.3. Strategies based on valuation models 
 
4.3.1. Abnormal earnings growth, AEG  
This strategy is the worst one among sophisticated strategies in terms of overall 
efficiency as stated in the Chapter 3. However, the overall number of years with 
statistically significant positive contrarian profits (five) is actually higher than the number 
of years with statistically significant negative returns (three).  
As stated in the introduction I will look at only those years where contrarian 
profits are statistically positive given that in other years the contrarian profit is assumed 
to be zero or negative and consequently there is nothing to analyse. 
For the years where contrarian profits are statistically positive the results are 
summarised in the Table 4.3.1.1. 
Table 4.3.1.1. Distinguishing between rational and behavioural factors in explaining 
contrarian profits 
 
 
Average 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 
 Value return 50.2% 25.1% 79.1% 17.5% 105.1% 24.4% 
 Glamour return 19.2% -16.1% 40.1% 7.4% 51.8% 12.9% 
 
Contrarian 
profit 
31.0% 41.2% 38.9% 10.1% 53.3% 11.5% 
 
Number of 
stocks in 
value/glamour 
portfolios 
 88 99 108 67 105 
 Value-Glamour regression results 
 a 34.3% 41.0% 35.0% 20.6% 56.4% 18.7% 
 t-stat for a 3.6 3.6 3.4 4.2 2.2 4.3 
R
a
ti
o
n
a
l h1 -0.09% -0.05% 0.15% 0.13% 0.00% -0.71% 
t-stat for h1 0.2 0.0 1.7 0.1 0.2 -1.0 
B
e
h
a
v
io
ra
l 
b1 0.8% 3.5% 0.3% -0.6% 0.0% 1.1% 
t-stat for b1 0.8 0.7 3.3 -0.4 -0.3 0.8 
b2 -11.03% -6.03% -1.00% -18.38% -0.01% -29.75% 
t-stat for b2 -2.2 -1.3 -2.5 -3.5 0.0 -3.4 
 R2 12.1% 10.1% 24.4% 13.4% 0.5% 12.1% 
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Note: highlighted cells indicate statistically significant coefficients; average figures are over the years 
specified in the table. 
The tested regression: 
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘 = 𝑎 + ℎ1(𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘 − 𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘 ) +
𝑏1𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘∗
𝑃𝑡
𝑣𝑘 +
𝑏2𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘∗
𝑃𝑡
𝑔𝑘 + 𝑒𝑘   , 
where  
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘
 = the difference between a return of a k rated value stock over the period between t 
and t+1 and the return over the same period for a k rated glamour stock (the rank 1 for 
a value stock is the indicator that the stock is the most undervalued one among value 
stocks; the same rank for the glamour stock means that the stock is the most 
overvalued one amongst the glamour stocks),  
𝑎  = constant, 
ℎ1 = linear coefficient for a rational factor, 
𝑏1, 𝑏2 = linear coefficients for the behavioural factors, 
𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘  = the change of the fair value for a particular value stock between a time t and t+1 
scaled by the stock price at time t, 
𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘
 = the change of the fair value for a particular glamour stock between a time t and t+1 
scaled by the stock price at time t, 
𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘∗  = average between fair prices at time t and t+1 for a particular value stock, 
𝑃𝑡
𝑣𝑘  = market price for a particular value stock at time t, 
𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘∗
 = average between fair prices at time t and t+1 for a particular glamour stock, 
𝑃𝑡
𝑔𝑘
 = market price for a particular glamour stock at time t, and 
𝑒𝑘 = residuals. 
The constant 𝑎 is statistically significant in all of the years under review. In many 
cases its value is close to the actual value of reported contrarian profits, which can be 
considered as an indirect sign that the suggested regression is not an efficient tool in 
explanation of the contrarian profits. 
R2 also supports the argument that the regression is a weak tool to analyse 
contrarian profits for the strategy. In most cases, it is below 15% and only in 2003 it is 
close to 25%. 
The linear coefficient for the rational factor, related to the dynamics of underlying 
fair values is not statistically significant in any of the examined years. This also can be 
considered as another sign of the regression being a weak tool to analyse contrarian 
profits for this strategy.  
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The linear coefficients related to a behavioural mispricing correction are 
statistically significant in three years out of five years under review. However, there is 
only one year when they are statistically significant simultaneously (2003). In this year 
for b1 the estimated value is positive, which is in line with the rational assumption that 
value stocks prices should make a positive contribution to contrarian profits once 
excessive prior pessimism is eliminated. On the other side b2 is negative which 
contradicts with the rational assumption that correction of overoptimistic valuations of 
glamour stocks should contribute negatively to their return and consequently positively 
to contrarian profits. Moreover, b2 is negative in all of the other years where it is 
statistically different from zero.  
As a result, I conclude that test of both hypothesis almost failed to succeed. R2 is 
relatively is low in all the cases while the constant is statistically significant and close to 
the actual contrarian profit in a particular year. There is a very weak evidence that the 
behavioural factor is more important given that the linear coefficient for the rational 
factor is not statistically significant in any of the examined years, while in three years at 
least one of the two behavioural coefficients are statistically significant. The linear 
coefficient for value stocks is consistent with the rational assumption of positive 
correction of prior mispricing. However, the linear coefficient for glamour in all the cases 
is negative which contradicts with the rational pricing assumption. 
 
4.3.2. Residual income model, RIM  
This strategy it one of the worst among sophisticated strategies in terms of 
overall efficiency as stated in the Chapter 3. However, the overall number of years with 
statistically significant positive contrarian profits (eight) is actually significantly higher 
than the number of years with statistically significant negative returns (three).  
As stated in the introduction I will look at only those years where contrarian 
profits are statistically positive given that in other years the contrarian profit is assumed 
to be zero or negative and consequently there is nothing to analyse. 
For the years where contrarian profits are statistically positive the results are 
summarised in the Table 4.3.2.1. 
Table 4.3.2.1. Distinguishing between rational and behavioural factors in explaining 
contrarian profits 
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Average 1992 1996 2000 2001 2003 2004 2006 2009 
 
Value 
return 
42.1% 25.3% 20.2% 30.6% 21.6% 72.4% 19.2% 15.9% 131.5% 
 
Glamour 
return 
12.8% 11.7% 6.9% -22.6% 6.3% 43.3% 2.7% 5.1% 48.6% 
 
Contrarian 
profit 
29.3% 13.6% 13.3% 53.2% 15.3% 29.0% 16.5% 10.8% 82.9% 
 
Number of 
stocks in 
value/gla
mour 
portfolios 
 54 62 87 91 99 104 100 80 
 Value-Glamour regression results 
 a 52% 11.08% 27.10% 89.99% 
43.05
% 
138.90
% 
20.98% 25.46% 59.33% 
 t-stat for a 2.7 0.8 1.9 6.1 2.6 3.9 1.3 2.8 1.9 
R
a
ti
o
n
a
l h1 27.0% 76.5% -7.4% 2.7% 12.0% 33.4% 61.2% 36.1% 1.8% 
t-stat for 
h1 
2.5 3.7 -0.5 0.3 1.9 4.2 6.9 3.1 0.3 
B
e
h
a
v
io
ra
l 
b1 3.2% -0.5% 5.4% -1.3% 9.1% -12.9% 6.2% -8.0% 27.4% 
t-stat for 
b1 
1.407 -0.071 0.443 -0.096 2.325 -1.960 1.277 -0.967 10.308 
b2 -65.8% 10.5% -88.0% 
-
141.6% 
-
85.3% 
-85.0% -13.0% -47.0% -76.9% 
t-stat for 
b2 
-2.3 0.3 -1.9 -4.1 -3.4 -3.0 -0.8 -1.7 -3.5 
 R2 28.6% 23.5% 11.1% 19.6% 24.4% 27.0% 34.5% 20.0% 68.5% 
Note: highlighted cells indicate statistically significant coefficients; average figures are over the years 
specified in the table. 
The tested regression: 
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘 = 𝑎 + ℎ1(𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘 − 𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘 ) +
𝑏1𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘∗
𝑃𝑡
𝑣𝑘 +
𝑏2𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘∗
𝑃𝑡
𝑔𝑘 + 𝑒𝑘   , 
where  
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘
 = the difference between a return of a k rated value stock over the period between t 
and t+1 and the return over the same period for a k rated glamour stock (the rank 1 for 
a value stock is the indicator that the stock is the most undervalued one among value 
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stocks; the same rank for the glamour stock means that the stock is the most 
overvalued one amongst the glamour stocks),  
𝑎  = constant, 
ℎ1 = linear coefficient for a rational factor, 
𝑏1, 𝑏2 = linear coefficients for the behavioural factors, 
𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘  = the change of the fair value for a particular value stock between a time t and t+1 
scaled by the stock price at time t, 
𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘
 = the change of the fair value for a particular glamour stock between a time t and t+1 
scaled by the stock price at time t, 
𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘∗  = average between fair prices at time t and t+1 for a particular value stock, 
𝑃𝑡
𝑣𝑘  = market price for a particular value stock at time t, 
𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘∗
 = average between fair prices at time t and t+1 for a particular glamour stock, 
𝑃𝑡
𝑔𝑘
 = market price for a particular glamour stock at time t, and 
𝑒𝑘 = residuals. 
The constant 𝑎 is statistically significant in half of the years under review. 
However, the value of the coefficient is substantially different from the actual contrarian 
profit. This is a sign that there are other factors important for contrarian profit analysis 
which are not present in the regression. 
Overall it is not possible to accept the regression as an efficient tool for 
explanation of contrarian profits given that in most cases R2 is below 40%. However, in 
one case (2009) it is abnormally high – 68.5%. This can be explained by the fact that 
that in 2009 many stocks prices rebounded after being under excessive pressure driven 
by behavioural rather than rational factors during the crisis in 2008. 
At the same time 2009 is the year when the linear coefficient for the rational 
factor related to the dynamics of underlying fair values is not significantly different from 
zero, while the behavioural linear coefficients both are statistically different from zero. 
However, in four other years the coefficient a1 is statistically significant and positive. 
This is what seems to be justifiable to expect given that it confirms that the greater the 
difference between the growth of fair prices for value stocks glamour stocks the larger 
should be contrarian profits. 
Linear coefficients related to the mispricing correction are statistically significant 
also in four years. Only in two years (2001 and 2009)  are they statistically significant 
simultaneously and these are the only years when b1 is positive. A positive value of b1 is 
in line with the rational assumption that an excessively depressed valuation of value 
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stocks should rebound afterwards and this factor should contribute positively to 
contrarian profits. At the same time in all the statistically significant cases b2 is negative, 
which contradicts with the rationale behind the regression. A negative figure means that 
there was on average a positive correction of prior mispricing for glamour stocks, while 
there should be a negative correction given that the stocks are assumed to be 
overpriced, rather than underpriced. However, in 2009 the negative figure can be seen 
as a rational if I assume that in 2008 all the stocks were depressed. Consequently, in 
2009 when there was a correction it affected value stocks more than glamour ones.  
As a result, I conclude that test of both hypothesis succeeded only in one year. 
R2 is small in all cases except 2009, when the R2 (68.5%), this level could be 
considered as being high enough to assume that most of the contrarian profit that year 
was explained by the regression. In 2009 rational factor is not significantly different from 
zero, while both behavioural factors are statistically different from zero. The negative b2 
can be seen as rational here given that 2008 was likely to be a year when even 
relatively glamourous stocks were pushed to depressed levels. Consequently, the fact 
that they also rebounded on 2009 can be considered as an understandable situation.  
 
4.3.3. Ohlson (γ=0, ω=0) model  
This strategy is one of the best among sophisticated strategies in terms of overall 
efficiency as stated in the Chapter 3. One of the factors which contributes to this is that 
the overall number of years with statistically significant positive contrarian profits (nine) 
is significantly higher than the number of years with statistically significant negative 
returns (five).  
As stated in the introduction I will look at only those years where contrarian 
profits are statistically positive given that in other years the contrarian profit is assumed 
to be zero or negative and consequently there is nothing to analyse. 
For the years where contrarian profits are statistically positive the results are 
summarised in the Table 4.3.3.1. 
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Table 4.3.3.1. Distinguishing between rational and behavioural factors in explaining 
contrarian profits 
 
 
Avera
ge 
1991 1992 2000 2001 2003 2004 2006 2009 2012 
 
Value 
return 
40.5% 27.7% 26.7% 27.3% 18.4% 75.9% 20.7% 15.9% 
131.9
% 
20.4% 
 
Glamour 
return 
12.9% 14.3% 10.4% 
-
23.0% 
4.8% 37.6% 4.8% 7.8% 47.0% 12.5% 
 
Contrarian 
profit 
27.6% 13.4% 16.4% 50.2% 13.6% 38.3% 15.9% 8.1% 84.9% 8.0% 
 
Number of 
stocks in 
value/glam
our 
portfolios 
 56 55 88 92 100 105 100 79 74 
 Value-Glamour regression results 
 a 41.9% 16.9% 4.6% 64.0% 35.0% 91.4% 88.5% 25.2% 50.0% 1.5% 
 t-stat for a 1.8 1.1 0.3 3.5 2.0 2.7 4.0 1.7 1.2 0.1 
R
a
ti
o
n
a
l h1 24.0% 
104.8
% 
-25.8% 46.6% 36.3% -30.3% -1.3% -2.6% 27.7% 60.8% 
t-stat for h1 1.0 2.9 -0.9 1.2 3.0 -1.6 -0.1 -0.1 2.0 2.4 
B
e
h
a
v
io
ra
l 
b1 2.2% 0.3% 8.4% -12.0% 13.8% 4.0% -29.0% -1.6% 46.4% -10.4% 
t-stat for b1 0.5 0.0 0.6 -0.8 1.3 0.2 -1.8 -0.1 6.4 -1.0 
b2 
-
109.4
% 
-13.4% 6.7% -78.5% 
-
194.2
% 
-
251.0
% 
-
258.8
% 
-90.7% 
-
180.4
% 
75.4% 
t-stat for b2 -1.4 -0.3 0.1 -0.7 -2.5 -3.2 -4.0 -1.8 -1.7 1.3 
 R2 16.1% 18.0% 9.4% 4.4% 19.4% 13.5% 16.2% 4.1% 49.3% 10.3% 
Note: highlighted cells indicate statistically significant coefficients; average figures are over the years 
specified in the table. 
The tested regression: 
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘 = 𝑎 + ℎ1(𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘 − 𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘 ) +
𝑏1𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘∗
𝑃𝑡
𝑣𝑘 +
𝑏2𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘∗
𝑃𝑡
𝑔𝑘 + 𝑒𝑘   , 
where  
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘
 = the difference between a return of a k rated value stock over the period between t 
and t+1 and the return over the same period for a k rated glamour stock (the rank 1 for 
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a value stock is the indicator that the stock is the most undervalued one among value 
stocks; the same rank for the glamour stock means that the stock is the most 
overvalued one amongst the glamour stocks),  
𝑎  = constant, 
ℎ1 = linear coefficient for a rational factor, 
𝑏1, 𝑏2 = linear coefficients for the behavioural factors, 
𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘  = the change of the fair value for a particular value stock between a time t and t+1 
scaled by the stock price at time t, 
𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘
 = the change of the fair value for a particular glamour stock between a time t and t+1 
scaled by the stock price at time t, 
𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘∗  = average between fair prices at time t and t+1 for a particular value stock, 
𝑃𝑡
𝑣𝑘  = market price for a particular value stock at time t, 
𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘∗
 = average between fair prices at time t and t+1 for a particular glamour stock, 
𝑃𝑡
𝑔𝑘
 = market price for a particular glamour stock at time t, and 
𝑒𝑘 = residuals. 
The constant 𝑎 is statistically significant in only three out of nine years under 
review. However, the value of the coefficient is substantially different from the actual 
contrarian profit in two out of three years. This can be a sign that there are other factors 
important for contrarian profit analysis which are not present in the regression. In the 
only year where it is close to the actual contrarian profit the R2 is below 5%, which is 
quite low. 
Overall it is not possible to accept that the regression is an efficient tool for 
explanation of contrarian profits given that in most cases R2 is below 20%. However, in 
one case (2009) it is abnormally high – 49.3%. This can be explained by the fact that in 
2009 many stocks prices rebounded after being under excessive pressure driven by 
behavioural rather than rational factors during the crisis in 2008.  
At the same time 2009 is the year when the linear coefficient for the rational 
factor related to the dynamics of underlying fair values is not significantly different from 
zero, while the behavioural linear coefficient related to value stocks is statistically 
different from zero. However, in three other years the coefficient a1 is statistically 
significant and positive. This is what seems to be justifiable to expect given that it 
confirms that the greater the difference between growth of fair prices for value stocks 
and glamour stocks the larger should be contrarian profits. 
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Linear coefficients related to the mispricing correction are statistically significant 
also in four years. However, there are no years when they are statistically significant 
simultaneously. In the only year (2009) when b1 is statistically significant it is positive. A 
positive value of b1 is in line with the rational assumption that excessively depressed 
valuation of value stocks should rebound afterwards and this factor should have a 
positive contribution to explaining contrarian profits. At the same time in all the 
statistically significant cases b2 is negative, which contradicts with the rationale behind 
the regression. A negative figure means that there was on average a positive correction 
of prior mispricing for glamour stocks, while there should be a negative correction given 
that the stocks are assumed to be overpriced, rather than underpriced.  
As a result, I conclude that test of both hypothesis weakly succeeded only in one 
year. R2 is small in all cases except 2009, when the R2 (49.3%), this level could be 
considered as being high enough to assume that a significant part of contrarian profits 
that year was explained by the regression. In 2009 rational factor is not significantly 
different from zero, while the behavioural factor related to value stocks is statistically 
different from zero and positive. Positive value of b1 is in line with the rational 
assumption that an excessively depressed valuation of value stocks rebounds 
afterwards and this factor should have a positive contribution to the contrarian profit. 
 
4.3.4. Ohlson (γ=0, ω=1) model  
This strategy was one of the worst among sophisticated strategies in terms of 
overall efficiency as stated in the Chapter 3. However, the overall number of years with 
statistically significant positive contrarian profits (seven) is actually significantly higher 
than the number of years with statistically significant negative returns (three).  
As stated in the introduction I will look at only those years where contrarian 
profits are statistically positive given that in other years the contrarian profit is assumed 
to be zero or negative and consequently there is nothing to analyse. 
For the years where contrarian profits are statistically positive the results are 
summarised in the Table 4.3.4.1. 
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Table 4.3.4.1. Distinguishing between rational and behavioural factors in explaining 
contrarian profits 
 
 
Averag
e 
2000 2001 2003 2004 2006 2009 2011 
 Value return 37.8% 29.8% 23.7% 59.9% 14.7% 15.1% 
110.5
% 
11.0% 
 Glamour return 14.4% -25.6% -0.5% 46.9% 3.8% 7.3% 71.1% -2.5% 
 Contrarian profit 23.5% 55.5% 24.3% 13.1% 10.9% 7.8% 39.4% 13.5% 
 
Number of stocks in 
value/glamour 
portfolios 
 93 94 102 110 113 103 116 
 Value-Glamour regression results 
 a 29.6% 75.0% 28.7% 38.8% 8.6% 11.8% 15.9% 28.5% 
 t-stat for a 2.0 5.7 2.3 1.9 0.5 1.5 0.5 1.7 
R
a
ti
o
n
a
l h1 3.3% -2.2% 1.5% 3.6% 12.4% 6.0% -0.2% 1.9% 
t-stat for h1 1.6 -0.3 0.8 3.2 5.5 1.0 -0.2 1.2 
B
e
h
a
v
io
ra
l 
b1 3.9% 8.6% 1.2% 0.0% 11.6% 2.6% 2.5% 0.5% 
t-stat for b1 1.8 0.8 0.8 -0.1 4.6 0.5 5.9 0.2 
b2 -24.7% -89.5% -12.0% -6.1% -11.5% -33.4% -5.4% -14.9% 
t-stat for b2 -1.8 -3.8 -1.0 -1.1 -1.8 -1.6 -2.7 -0.9 
 R2 17.8% 21.0% 5.0% 24.5% 24.3% 7.0% 41.1% 1.6% 
Note: highlighted cells indicate statistically significant coefficients; average figures are over the years 
specified in the table. 
The tested regression: 
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘 = 𝑎 + ℎ1(𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘 − 𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘 ) +
𝑏1𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘∗
𝑃𝑡
𝑣𝑘 +
𝑏2𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘∗
𝑃𝑡
𝑔𝑘 + 𝑒𝑘   , 
where  
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘
 = the difference between a return of a k rated value stock over the period between t 
and t+1 and the return over the same period for a k rated glamour stock (the rank 1 for 
a value stock is the indicator that the stock is the most undervalued one among value 
stocks; the same rank for the glamour stock means that the stock is the most 
overvalued one amongst the glamour stocks),  
𝑎  = constant, 
ℎ1 = linear coefficient for a rational factor, 
𝑏1, 𝑏2 = linear coefficients for the behavioural factors, 
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𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘  = the change of the fair value for a particular value stock between a time t and t+1 
scaled by the stock price at time t, 
𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘
 = the change of the fair value for a particular glamour stock between a time t and t+1 
scaled by the stock price at time t, 
𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘∗  = average between fair prices at time t and t+1 for a particular value stock, 
𝑃𝑡
𝑣𝑘  = market price for a particular value stock at time t, 
𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘∗
 = average between fair prices at time t and t+1 for a particular glamour stock, 
𝑃𝑡
𝑔𝑘
 = market price for a particular glamour stock at time t, and 
𝑒𝑘 = residuals. 
The constant 𝑎 is statistically significant in only two of the years under review. 
During these two years it is close to the actual contrarian profit, which is indirect sign 
that regression is a poor tool for explaining contrarian profits over these two years, 
which is supported by the relatively low R2 during these two years.  
Overall it is not possible to accept the regression as an efficient tool for 
explanation of contrarian profits given that in most cases R2 is below 25%. However, in 
one case (2009) it is abnormally high – 41.1%. This can be explained by the fact that in 
2009 many stocks prices rebounded after being under excessive pressure driven by 
behavioural rather than rational factors during crisis in 2008.  
At the same time 2009 is the year when the linear coefficient for the rational 
factor related to the dynamics of underlying fair values, is not significantly different from 
zero, while behavioural linear coefficients both are statistically different from zero. 
However, in the two other years coefficient a1 is statistically significant and positive. This 
is what seems to be justifiable to expect given that it confirms that the more the 
difference between growth of fair prices for value stocks and the same figure for 
glamour ones the larger should be contrarian profits. 
Linear coefficients related to mispricing correction are statistically significant in 
three years. Only in one year (2009) are they statistically significant simultaneously. In 
all the cases b1 is positive which is in line with the rational assumption that excessively 
depressed valuation of value stocks should rebound afterwards and this factor should 
have a positive contribution to the contrarian profit. At the same time in all the 
statistically significant cases b2 is negative, which contradicts with the rationale behind 
the regression. Negative figure means that there was on average a positive correction 
of prior mispricing for glamour stocks, while there should be a negative correction given 
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that the stocks are assumed to be overpriced, rather than underpriced. However, in 
2009 the negative figure can be seen as rational because perhaps  all the stocks were 
depressed in the previous year 2008. Consequently, in 2009 when there was a 
correction it is just affected more value stocks rather than glamour ones but it still 
increased the absolute value of value and glamour portfolios.  
As a result, I conclude that test of both hypothesis weakly succeeded only in one 
year. R2 is small in all cases except 2009, when the R2 (41.1%), this level could be 
considered as being high enough to assume that a significant part of the contrarian 
profit that year was explained by the regression. In 2009 the rational factor is not 
significantly different from zero, while both behavioural factors are statistically different 
from zero. The coefficient b1 is positive which is in line with rational pricing assumptions. 
The coefficient b2 is negative which can be seen as rational here given that 2008 was 
likely to be a year when even relatively glamour stocks were pushed to depressed 
levels. Consequently, the fact that they also rebounded on 2009 can be considered as 
an understandable outcome.  
  
4.3.5. Discounted cash flow model, DCF 
This strategy is the best one among all revised strategies investigated in Chapter 
3. The number of statistically significant positive returns (eight) is close to the average 
level across all the strategies, but there are no negative returns, which really makes the 
difference to its attractiveness to potential investors. 
As stated in the introduction I will look at only those years where contrarian 
profits are statistically positive given that in other years the contrarian profit is assumed 
to be zero or negative and consequently there is nothing to analyse. 
For the years where contrarian profits are statistically positive the results are 
summarised in the Table 4.3.5.1. 
Table 4.3.5.1. Distinguishing between rational and behavioural factors in explaining 
contrarian profit 
 
 
Average 1992 1995 1997 2000 2001 2003 2009 2012 
 
Value 
return 
47.0% 23.0% 49.3% 58.6% 33.0% 20.8% 67.4% 101.9% 21.8% 
 Glamour 21.0% 9.2% 18.2% 33.9% -18.1% 8.8% 36.4% 66.9% 12.7% 
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return 
 
Contrarian 
profit 
26.0% 13.9% 31.1% 24.7% 51.1% 12.0% 31.1% 34.9% 9.1% 
 
Number of 
stocks in 
value/glam
our 
portfolios 
 33 43 43 58 57 55 67 82 
 Value-Glamour regression results 
 a 19.3% 14.4% 13.0% 3.5% 54.8% 8.6% 57.4% -9.9% 12.9% 
 t-stat for a 1.9 1.5 1.1 0.3 4.3 1.2 4.6 -0.7 3.3 
R
a
ti
o
n
a
l h1 -0.6% -0.1% 2.6% -6.6% 0.5% -1.0% -0.1% 0.2% -0.4% 
t-stat for h1 -0.1 -0.3 1.9 -1.5 0.1 -1.7 -0.6 1.8 -0.4 
B
e
h
a
v
io
ra
l 
b1 2.3% 0.0% 1.1% 13.1% 1.1% 1.9% 0.3% 0.4% 0.7% 
t-stat for b1 0.9 0.0 0.4 1.4 0.2 1.7 1.3 1.9 0.3 
b2 5.6% 0.6% 6.1% 81.9% -20.2% -4.2% -10.7% 1.4% -10.0% 
t-stat for b2 -0.5 0.1 2.0 1.5 -1.5 -2.0 -3.6 1.7 -2.3 
 R2 19.3% 0.4% 14.1% 11.1% 8.6% 8.4% 35.8% 63.9% 11.8% 
Note: highlighted cells indicate statistically significant coefficients; average figures are over the years 
specified in the table. 
The tested regression: 
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘 = 𝑎 + ℎ1(𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘 − 𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘 ) +
𝑏1𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘∗
𝑃𝑡
𝑣𝑘 +
𝑏2𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘∗
𝑃𝑡
𝑔𝑘 + 𝑒𝑘   , 
where  
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘
 = the difference between a return of a k rated value stock over the period between t 
and t+1 and the return over the same period for a k rated glamour stock (the rank 1 for 
a value stock is the indicator that the stock is the most undervalued one among value 
stocks; the same rank for the glamour stock means that the stock is the most 
overvalued one amongst the glamour stocks),  
𝑎  = constant, 
ℎ1 = linear coefficient for a rational factor, 
𝑏1, 𝑏2 = linear coefficients for the behavioural factors, 
𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘  = the change of the fair value for a particular value stock between a time t and t+1 
scaled by the stock price at time t, 
𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘
 = the change of the fair value for a particular glamour stock between a time t and t+1 
scaled by the stock price at time t, 
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𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘∗  = average between fair prices at time t and t+1 for a particular value stock, 
𝑃𝑡
𝑣𝑘  = market price for a particular value stock at time t, 
𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘∗
 = average between fair prices at time t and t+1 for a particular glamour stock, 
𝑃𝑡
𝑔𝑘
 = market price for a particular glamour stock at time t, and 
𝑒𝑘 = residuals. 
The constant 𝑎 is statistically significant in three years under review. In these 
years it is also rather close to the actual contrarian profit. This can be considered as an 
indirect sign that the variables in the regression are a not a useful tool to explain 
contrarian profits. 
Overall it is not possible to accept the regression as a sufficient explanation of 
contrarian profits given that in most cases R2 is very low – below 20%. However, in one 
case (2009) it is abnormally high – 63.9%. This is understandable given that in 2009 
many stocks prices rebounded after being under excessive pressure during the crisis in 
2008.  
At the same time 2009 is the year when none of the linear coefficients are 
statistically different from zero. Moreover, the same situation is for all other years under 
review for a1 and b1. Only b2 stand out from the others with the coefficient being 
statistically negative in 2003 and 2012. However, this contradicts with the rationale 
behind the regression. A negative figure means that there was on average a positive 
correction of prior mispricing for glamour stocks, while there should be a negative 
correction given that the stocks are assumed to be overpriced, rather than underpriced.  
As a result, I conclude that test of the first hypothesis weakly succeeded only in 
one year, while the test for the second hypothesis is never supported. R2 is small in all 
cases except 2009, when the R2 (63.9%) can be considered as being high enough to 
assume that a substantial part of contrarian profits that year were explained by the 
regression. However, all the linear coefficients are not significant in 2009, which does 
not allow me to compare them. On the other side among other years only b2 is 
statistically significant in two cases. At the same time, it is negative, which contradicts 
with the rational pricing assumption behind the regression.  
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4.4. Test on the overall sample 
The above analysis was done on the basis of the data when I take into 
consideration only those years where contrarian profit is statistically significant and 
positive. In this sub-section I will apply the common approach of testing using the full 
sample without distinguishing between years with statistically significant and non-
significant contrarian profits. I will run regression 4.12 for all the data  pairing value with 
glamour stocks for all the 23 years in the analysis.  
Table 4.4.1. Distinguishing between rational and behavioural factors in explaining 
contrarian profit 
Part 1 Ratio based contrarian strategies 
 
 
P/E 
P/E (E-
expected 
EPS) B/P CF/P FCFE/P 
 Value return 18.0% 16.2% 19.2% 21.2% 20.0% 
 Glamour return 12.9% 15.0% 13.9% 9.2% 13.5% 
 Contrarian profit 5.1% 1.2% 5.3% 12.0% 6.5% 
 
Number of 
stocks in 
value/glamour 
portfolios 
118 118 107 116 94 
 Value-Glamour regression results 
 A 2,5% 4,3% -7,9% 16,0% 5,4% 
 t-stat for a 1,3 1,5 -2,2 4,9 2,9 
R
a
ti
o
n
a
l h1 
0,4% 11,9% 1,0% 3,0% 0,3% 
t-stat for h1 1,2 13,3 0,7 6,6 1,0 
B
e
h
a
v
io
ra
l 
b1 1,5% 2,6% 8,7% 4,2% 0,7% 
t-stat for b1 2,4 2,4 8,2 8,6 1,0 
b2 -1,9% -11,6% -15,2% -23,1% -0,8% 
t-stat for b2 -2,1 -5,7 -2,6 -5,0 -0,8 
 R2 0,7% 8,3% 4,1% 5,2% 0,2% 
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Part 2 Valuation models based contrarian strategies 
 
 
AEG RIM Ohlson (00) Ohlson (01) DCF 
 Value return 16.0% 17.9% 18.7% 16.6% 21.0% 
 Glamour return 13.4% 13.2% 13.4% 13.5% 10.2% 
 Contrarian profit 2.5% 4.7% 5.3% 3.0% 10.8% 
 
Number of 
stocks in 
value/glamour 
portfolios 
82 78 79 88 56 
 Value-Glamour regression results 
 A 2,0% -14,6% -23,5% -0,4% 6,2% 
 t-stat for a 1,4 -6,5 -6,4 -0,3 4,2 
R
a
ti
o
n
a
l h1 
0,0% 16,7% 22,3% 0,7% -0,1% 
t-stat for h1 1,1 9,0 5,3 3,8 -1,3 
B
e
h
a
v
io
ra
l 
b1 0,0% 20,8% 36,2% 2,0% 0,4% 
t-stat for b1 0,9 18,9 16,6 13,0 3,8 
b2 0,3% -9,6% 6,4% -3,3% 0,3% 
t-stat for b2 3,2 -2,2 0,4 -6,4 1,1 
 R2 0,6% 22,0% 14,0% 10,5% 4,6% 
Note: the data regarding pairs of value/glamour stocks for all the years are taken into consideration; 
highlighted cells indicate statistically significant coefficients; 
The tested regression: 
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘 = 𝑎 + ℎ1(𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘 − 𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘 ) +
𝑏1𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘∗
𝑃𝑡
𝑣𝑘 +
𝑏2𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘∗
𝑃𝑡
𝑔𝑘 + 𝑒𝑘   , 
where  
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘
 = the difference between a return of a k rated value stock over the period between t 
and t+1 and the return over the same period for a k rated glamour stock (the rank 1 for 
a value stock is the indicator that the stock is the most undervalued one among value 
stocks; the same rank for the glamour stock means that the stock is the most 
overvalued one amongst the glamour stocks),  
𝑎  = constant, 
ℎ1 = linear coefficient for a rational factor, 
𝑏1, 𝑏2 = linear coefficients for the behavioural factors, 
𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘  = the change of the fair value for a particular value stock between a time t and t+1 
scaled by the stock price at time t, 
𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘
 = the change of the fair value for a particular glamour stock between a time t and t+1 
scaled by the stock price at time t, 
𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘∗  = average between fair prices at time t and t+1 for a particular value stock, 
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𝑃𝑡
𝑣𝑘  = market price for a particular value stock at time t, 
𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘∗
 = average between fair prices at time t and t+1 for a particular glamour stock, 
𝑃𝑡
𝑔𝑘
 = market price for a particular glamour stock at time t, and 
𝑒𝑘 = residuals. 
 
The linear coefficient on the rational factor, associated with the difference in the 
dynamics of fair values for glamour/value stocks, is statistically significant in five out of 
ten examined strategies. In all cases it is positive which means that the higher the 
difference between the change of fair price over the testing period of a particular pair of 
value and glamour stocks the higher the contrarian profit. This is in line with expectation 
formed from a rational point of view and in line with the result of the analysis when only 
years with statistically significant positive contrarian profits are taken into consideration.   
The linear coefficient on the behavioural factor, associated with the correction of 
mispricing for value stocks, is statistically significant in eight out of ten examined 
strategies. In all the cases it is positive, which means that there was a reduction of the 
mispricing for value stocks over the testing period, which is in line with the behavioural 
assumption behind the explanation of the contrarian profits. Again, this is the same 
result as in the analysis on a smaller sample. 
The linear coefficient for the behavioural factor associated with the correction of 
mispricing for glamour stocks is statistically significant in six out of ten strategies under 
review. In five cases linear coefficient is negative. This contradicts with the rationale 
behind the regression. A negative figure means that there was on average a positive 
correction of prior mispricing for glamour stocks, while there should be a negative 
correction given that the stocks are assumed to be overpriced, rather than underpriced. 
This is the same results as in the analysis on a smaller sample.  
Overall result of the analysis on the full sample shows that the examined 
behavioural factors are more important in explaining contrarian profits than the rational 
one given that in nine out of ten cases linear coefficient for at least one behavioural 
factor is statistically significant, while linear coefficient for the rational factor is 
statistically significant only in five cases. In the regression for the FCFE/P strategy when 
none of the behavioural factors are statistically significant the rational factor is not 
statistically significant as well. This is in line with the outcome of the analysis done only 
on the base of the year when contrarian profit for a particular strategy is statistically 
significant. 
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With the whole sample in the analysis the conclusion is stronger than the 
conclusion on the base of the years where contrarian profit is statistically significant. For 
some strategies this is particular visible.  
On one hand, for B/P and DCF strategies there is a clear dominance of 
behavioural factors over the examined rational one. The linear coefficient for the rational 
factor is not statistically significant, while at least one of the behavioural factors has 
statistically significant linear coefficient.  
On the other hand, when analysis is done only on the base of the year where 
contrarian profit is statistically significant and positive the conclusions for these two 
strategies is weaker and in case of B/P is actually different.  
As it was shown in the section 4.2.3 rational factor is statistically significant in 
regressions for two out of eight years in review. Each of the two behavioural factors is 
statistically significant in only one out of eight years. Moreover, in the year with the 
rather higher R2 (41.5%) only rational factor is statistically significant. I my view this 
justifies that rational factor is more important than the behavioural ones. However, this 
conclusion is rather weak as the numbers of year where rational/behavioural factors are 
statistically significant is small.  
As for the DCF strategy the analysis on the base of the years where contrarian 
profit is statistically significant leads to the same outcome as for the analysis on the 
base of the whole 23 years – behavioural factors are more important than the rational 
one. However, in the same way as for B/P this conclusion is weak as there is only one 
behavioural factor (associated with mispricing correction for glamour stocks) is 
statistically significant and this is observed only in two out of eight years.  
Consequently, in the same way as in Chapter 3 (with the improved result for DCF 
strategy when all years were taken into consideration) the approach with the whole 
sample in the analysis in chapter 4 has increased the strength on the conclusion 
regarding the overall superiority of behavioural factors vs the rational one. This could be 
a sign of the misleading effect after an inclusion in the analysis the years where 
contrarian profit happened mainly due to luck rather than the due to fundamental ability 
of a particular strategy to distinguish between under and overvalued companies.  
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4.5. Conclusion 
Overall, I conclude that behavioural factors are more important than any rational 
ones associated with the dynamics of fair value. This is affirms the results of Lakonishok 
et al (1994), La Porta (1996) and Dechow and Sloan (1997) who argue that there are 
errors in the future expectations priced into asset prices by the market deriving from a 
failure to evaluate available information about the relative prospects of value and 
glamour stocks, perhaps due to extrapolation of past results, or due to pricing in 
analysts’ expectations which contain errors. My results extend their analysis as I show 
that mispricing correction directly impacts the scale of  contrarian profits while the above 
mentioned authors did not do this, but and confirms  there is mispricing for both value 
and glamour stocks at formation dates. 
However, this conclusion is rather weak given that the test of the first hypothesis, 
which examines the ability of the regression to explain contrarian profit, partially 
succeeded only in one year (2009), when the R2 was close to or higher than 50% for 
RIM, Ohlson (0,0) and DCF. It  was also in the range of 40-45% for Ohlson (1,0) and 
B/P strategies. These strategies represent five out of eight strategies which have a 
statistically significant contrarian profit in 2009. This looks logical given that in 2009 the 
market was rebounding from the oversold levels of the crisis in 2008 and consequently 
more focus should be put on the value stocks, which reflects rational pricing behaviour. 
However, glamour stocks also rebounded and consequently instead of a price decline to 
a fair value there was prices growth given that in 2008 valuations of glamour stocks 
seem to have also been depressed. 
Graph 4.5.1. Average R2 across strategies 
 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
1990 1991 1992 1993 1995 1996 1997 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2009 2011 2012
Chapter 4. Are contrarian returns mainly due to corrections to prior mispricing? 
4.5. Conclusion 181 
The fact that the regression was able to explain the contrarian profits in only one 
year out of eight years with statistically significant contrarian profits (on average for the 
above-mentioned strategies) shows that there are some other factors which are missing 
from the regression which were important in the years when the markets were not 
recovering from as severe turmoil as in 2008, a “once in a Century event” as Alan 
Greenspan termed it. A flight to quality, which normally happen during periods of turmoil 
on the market, is when irrational factors (in the sense that investors are driven by 
factors other than trying to buy undervalued stocks and sell overvalued ones to get 
alpha) affect stock prices and result in the deviation of prices from fair levels. This factor 
is a top-down one and a rather strong one. Consequently, the assumption, underlying 
the behavioural factor in the regression, that there is the same mispricing correction for 
all glamour stocks and the same mispricing correction for value stocks as a part of their 
fair value can be closer to reality than for years when other irrational factors (more 
bottom-up ones) resulted in stock prices deviation from their fair values.  
The fact that the regression was not able to explain the contrarian profits in any 
year for one of the most efficient strategy P/CF with the largest number of years where 
contrarian profits were significant also indicates that there could be other behavioural 
factors which regularly induce mispricing and consequently to mispricing correction.  
Further extension of research in this sphere can be done with the aim to 
incorporate the impact of other irrational factors such as the effects of fund flows into 
passive strategies (i.e. ETFs), trading on the basis of technical indicators and other 
factors which affect stocks prices, but are not based on the analysis of their 
fundamentals. 
On the other hand, extension of rational part can be also useful. One rather 
popular approach is applying the Fama and French three/five-factor model, although the 
exact interpretation of their 3/5 factors remains somewhat controversial. This model is 
not based on a strong theoretical background. However, it is able to explain contrarian 
profits in many cases. This will be the focus of the next chapter. 
The second test, which is about the relative significance of the explanatory 
factors,  in most cases shows that behavioural ones (related to mispricing correction of 
value and glamour stocks) are more important than the rational one (related to fair price 
dynamics) (see table 4.5.1.).   
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Table 4.5.1. Tests results  
Strategy 
Test of regression significance and 
average R2 
Test of relative importance of 
rational and behavioural factors 
P/E Failed (10%) Behavioural 
P/E (E-expected EPS) Failed (22%) Impossible to conclude 
B/P 
Weakly succeeded once (11%) – in 
2009 R2=42% 
Rational 
CF/P Failed (15%) Behavioural 
FCFE/P Failed (6%) Rational 
AEG Failed (12%) Behavioural 
RIM 
Succeeded once (29%) – in 2009 
R2=69% 
Behavioural 
Ohlson (00) 
Succeeded once (16%) – in 2009 
R2=49% 
Behavioural 
Ohlson (01) 
Weakly succeeded once (18%) – in 
2009 R2=41% 
Behavioural 
DCF 
Succeeded once (19%) – in 2009 
R2=64% 
Behavioural 
Note: figures in () are average R2. 
 
In the only year when overall regression have relatively high R2 (2009) for some 
of the strategies in three cases of strategies (RIM, Ohlson (0,0), Ohlson (1,0)) the linear 
coefficient for the rational factor is not statistically different from zero, while both linear 
coefficients for behavioural factors are statistically different from zero. In one case 
(DCF) all linear coefficients are not significant, while in one case (B/P) the rational factor 
is the only one with a statistically significant coefficient.  
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In 2009 when the average R2 across the examined strategies is the highest 
behavioural factor associated with the rebound of value stocks is significant in 75% 
cases (see graph 4.5.2). In the second year, according to the average R2 the situation is 
not that clear given that fair value dynamics is significant in more than 50% and 
dominates the two behavioural factors associated with the rebound of value or glamour 
stocks.  
The fact that behavioural factors appeared to be more important in 2009 than a 
rational one in my view can be explained by the following reasons.  
Firstly, on the base date when there was extreme turmoil on the market it is likely 
that most of the investors do not care about fair price. Consequently, the fair price value 
at the starting point for the change of fair price over that year was to a large extent not 
taken into consideration by the market. 
Secondly, after the market started to move to a more normal state and investors 
started to look for investment opportunities value stocks were likely the first choice to 
look. These stocks are supposed to be cheap during normal circumstances on the 
market. Consequently during the sell-off their valuations became extremely cheap so 
that they screen out with the use of most of the valuation technics. 
Graph 4.5.2. Share of significance of the examined factors for the years where at least 
half of the strategies have significant contrarian profits 
 
Note: FV – rational factors associated with the dynamics of the fair value; V – behavioural factor associated with the correction of 
mispricing for value stocks; G – behavioural factor associated with the correction of mispricing for glamour stocks. 
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The results of the analysis on the base of the full sample confirms the overall 
conclusion of the analysis on the base of the years, when contrarian profits are 
statistically significant. In nine or out ten examined strategies at least one behavioural 
factor has a statistically significant linear coefficient, while for the rational factor this the 
case for only five strategies. In the only regression when neither of the behavioural 
factors are statistically significant (for contrarian strategy based on the FCFE/P ratio) 
the linear coefficient for the rational factor is also not significant.  
With the whole sample in the analysis the conclusion is stronger than the 
conclusion on the base of the years where contrarian profit is statistically significant. 
Consequently, in the same way as in chapter 3 (with the improved result for DCF 
strategy when all years were taken into consideration) the approach with the whole 
sample in the analysis in chapter 4 has increased the strength on the conclusion 
regarding the overall superiority of behavioural factors vs the rational one. This could be 
a sign of the misleading effect after an inclusion in the analysis the years where 
contrarian profit happened mainly due to luck rather than the due to fundamental ability 
of a particular strategy to distinguish between under and overvalued companies. 
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Chapter 5. Are contrarian returns mainly explained by the Fama 
French three-factor risk model?  
 
5.1. Introduction and method 
As I have found out the model which was used in Chapter 4 to analyse the crucial 
factors for contrarian profit existence requires extension given its poor ability to explain 
contrarian profits in most of the analysed years for all the strategies under review. One 
of the possible extensions could be incorporation of rational factors, other than 
dynamics of the stock’s fundamental fair value according to a particular valuation model. 
One of the possible ways is to incorporate risk factors. This implies that over a particular 
period of time the rational change in price is not only driven by the change in fair price, 
but also by change expected in accord with the change of underlying risk factors. 
Fama and French (1996, 1998) argue that their three-factor model (these are 
excess return of the market over risk free rate, the difference in returns between large 
and small companies and difference in returns between companies with high B/P and 
low B/P) can explain the existence of contrarian profits: 
E(𝑅𝑖) − 𝑅𝑓 = 𝑏𝑖[E(𝑅𝑀) − 𝑅𝑓] + 𝑠𝑖E(SMB) + ℎ𝑖E(HML)   ,   (5.1) 
where 
E(𝑅𝑖) = expected return for stock i, 
𝑅𝑓 = risk-free rate, 
E(𝑅𝑀) = expected return for the market, 
E(SMB) = expected difference in returns between large and small companies, and 
E(HML) = expected difference in returns between companies with high B/P and low B/P. 
There is an extension of this model to a five-factor one, but I will use an initial one 
for simplicity and will leave the five-factor one for further research. 
To incorporate these factors in the methodology used in Chapter 4 I will include 
the difference in expected return according to FF three-factor model between a 
particular pair of glamour and value stocks into the equation 4.5. As a result, this 
equation transforms into the following: 
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘 = 𝑎 + 𝑎1(𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘 − 𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘 ) + 𝑎2∆𝐹𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘 + 𝑏1
𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘∗
𝑃𝑡
𝑣𝑘 + 𝑏2
𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘∗
𝑃𝑡
𝑔𝑘 + 𝑒𝑘   ,   (5.2) 
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where there are the factors which were already used in Chapter 4: 
𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘  = the change of the fair value for a particular value stock between a time t and t+1 
scaled by the stock price at time t, 
𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘
 = the change of the fair value for a particular glamour stock between a time t and 
t+1 scaled by the stock price at time t, 
𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘∗  = average between fair prices at time t and t+1 for a particular value stock, 
𝑃𝑡
𝑣𝑘  = market price for a particular value stock at time t, 
𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘∗
 = average between fair prices at time t and t+1 for a particular glamour stock, 
𝑃𝑡
𝑔𝑘
 = market price for a particular glamour stock at time t –  
and the new rational factor: 
∆𝐹𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘
 = difference in expected returns according to FF model between a particular 
value and glamour stocks between a time t and t+1. 
Fama and French suggested to use the data for the all years in the analysis to 
estimate loadings for FF factors (Fama and French (1996, 1998)). In my case this is to 
use monthly data for stocks returns across the whole 23-year period (1990-2012) in 
order to estimate FF loading and then use them each year to estimate expected returns 
for all the stocks in the analysis.  
However, this approach does seem to be the best one in the analysis when 
contrarian profits are assessed not across all the years but on a year by year basis. This 
is due to the fact that the conventional method of FF loadings estimation will incorporate 
substantial size of future information for a particular year analysis. For example, when I 
will run the regression (5.2) for the period between end of March 1990 and end of March 
1991 I will use the data for the future 22 years in order to assess FF loadings. None of 
the investors in 1990 or 1991 knows this future data and is able to apply it somehow to 
the analysis. So using all the data I have would involve a huge amount of data-
snooping. 
Consequently, to mitigate this issue I will use prior five-year trailing period to 
estimate FF loadings for all the stocks. For example, for the regression over the period 
between end of March 1990 and end of March 1991 I will use FF loadings estimated on 
the basis of the monthly data during the period from end of March 1985 to end of March 
1990.  
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Besides building upon of rational part of the methodology examined in chapter 4 I 
will also extend behavioural part of it. As a result of the analysis in chapter 4 I have 
found out that behavioural factor, which is the prior mispricing correction, explains 
contrarian profits for many approaches in 2009 – the year when the market was 
recovering from a turmoil of 2008. Consequently, the model was able to capture 
mispricing correction only after an extremely strong and universal effect of the flight to 
quality, which affected prices of all stocks, what Alan Greenspace called “a once in a 
Century event”.  
To make the behavioural factor more sensitive to stock specific outcomes I will 
incorporate into the model 5.2 the stocks specific factor which is prior mispricing 
accumulation for a particular stock. The assumption is that the more the prior mispricing 
accumulation the more should be the correction over the testing period. In case a 
particular stock in the past significantly underperformed its implied rational trajectory, 
determined by the FF three factor model and fair price dynamics, it is likely to rebound 
over the testing period to catch up with the rational trajectory and vice versa for a stock, 
which outperformed in the past the rational trajectory. Instead of 𝑏1𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘∗  and 𝑏2𝑎𝑣𝑃𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘∗
 I 
will use 𝑏1𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑣𝑘 𝑃𝑡
𝑣𝑘 and 𝑏2𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑔𝑘
𝑃𝑡
𝑔𝑘
 where 𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑣𝑘  and 𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑔𝑘
 are prior mispricing accumulation 
over the last five-year period for a particular value or glamour stock which is expressed 
in percentage terms. Consequently, the formula 5.2 transforms into: 
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘 = 𝑎 + 𝑎1(𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘 − 𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘 ) + 𝑎2∆𝐹𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘 + 𝑏1𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑣𝑘 − 𝑏2𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑔𝑘 + 𝑒𝑘   (5.3) 
The question is how to estimate 𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑣𝑘  or 𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑔𝑘 ? The suggested approach is to 
estimate this figure with the use of an implied assumption in the overall regression I am 
testing that there is a rational part of the stock performance (defined by fair value 
dynamics and expected return in line with the FF three factors model) and 
irrational/behavioural one which result in the overall deviation from the rational trajectory 
due to various factors which are not related to the desire of active investors to capture 
market inefficiencies. In short, the prior mispricing is the constant factors in the following 
regression over a particular five-year period for a particular stock k: 
 
𝑅𝑝
𝑘 = 𝑎𝑚
𝑘 + 𝑎1
𝑘𝐹𝑝
𝑘 + 𝑎2
𝑘𝐹𝐹𝑝
𝑘 + 𝑒𝑝   ,   (5.4) 
where  
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𝐹𝑝
𝑘 = the change of the fair value for a particular stock k over a period p scaled by the 
stock price at the beginning of this period 
𝐹𝐹𝑝
𝑘  = expected returns according to FF model for a particular stock k over the period p, 
incorporates all three factors of the regression 5.1 
𝑎𝑚
𝑘
  = the indication of mispricing accumulation.  
I will incorporate the mispricing component of regression (5.4) into (5.3) by 
assuming that 𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑣𝑘  / 𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑔𝑘
 are equal to a 𝑎𝑚
𝑘  estimated coefficient for a particular 
glamour or value stock for a prior five-year period. Furthermore I assume that b1 is 
equal to b2. Consequently, the regression, which will be tested is the following: 
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘 = 𝑎 + 𝑎1(𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘 − 𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘 ) + 𝑎2∆𝐹𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘 + 𝑏1(𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑣𝑘 − 𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑔𝑘 ) + 𝑒𝑘   , (5.5) 
where  
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘
  = the difference between a return of a k rated value stock over the period 
between t and t+1 and the return over the same period for a k rated glamour 
stock (the rank 1 for a value stock is the indication that the stock is the most 
undervalued one among value stocks; the same rank for the glamour stock 
means that the stock is the most overvalued one among glamour stocks; value 
and glamour stocks are identified as at the end of March each year, 
𝑎  = constant, 
𝑎1  = linear coefficient for a rational factor related to dynamics of the fair price, 
𝑎2  = linear coefficient for a rational factor related to the expected dynamics of the 
stock price according to FF three factor model, 
𝑏1  = linear coefficient for the behavioural factor, 
𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘   = the change of the fair value for a particular value stock between a time t and 
t+1 scaled by the stock price at time t, 
𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘
  = the change of the fair value for a particular glamour stock between a time t 
and t+1 scaled by the stock price at time t, 
∆𝐹𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘
  = difference in expected returns according to FF model between a particular 
value and glamour stocks between a time t and t+1, 
𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑣𝑘  / 𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑔𝑘   = prior mispricing accumulation over the last five-year period for a particular 
value or glamour stock which is expressed in percentage terms, and 
𝑒𝑘   = residuals. 
As in Chapter 4 the key point of interest is to understand whether contrarian 
profits derive mainly from a change in rational factors or from the  influence of the 
Chapter 5. Are contrarian returns mainly explained by the Fama French three-factor risk model? 
5.1. Introduction and method 189 
behavioural ones. To understand this I will use the regression on the base of formula 
5.5 to test the hypothesis for a particular contrarian strategy which are similar to the 
ones tested in Chapter 4. 
Formula (5.5) for a particular valuation model can be considered as explanation 
of the contrarian profit for a particular year. In case R2 is higher than 50% the formula 
5.5 will be considered as an efficient explanation and vice versa. This is needed to 
understand whether the results of the tested regressions are significant enough to make 
conclusions of the base of them. It would be hard to ask require the regression explain 
100% of contrarian returns, but I will demand that it can explain more than half of them. 
I will also consider R2 being above 40% as a modest success of the test, given that it is 
still can be called a significant part of the explanation of the contrarian profits. 
For contrarian profits a rational explanation is less important than the behavioural 
one related to the correction of prior mispricing. This holds in those cases where a1 
(related to the dynamics of fair price) and a2 (related to the expected returns according 
to FF three factors model) are not statistically significant while the b1 (coefficient which 
represents the relation between prior mispricing and its correction over the testing 
period) is statistical significant. 
As in Chapter 4 I will run this regression for each year where the contrarian profit 
is considered to be statistically significant and positive. To identify the rule for forming 
the pair of stocks for contrarian return calculation I will use the same approach as in 
Chapter 4. Value stocks are ranked in an ascending order according to their estimated 
undervaluation. The identifier of the first value stock (the most undervalued stock) will 
be v1. Glamour stocks are ranked in an descending order according to their estimated 
overvaluation. The identifier of the first glamour stock after the ranking (the most 
overvalued stock) will be g1. 
In the same way, as in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 the glamour group of stocks are 
the ones which are in the top quartile in all stocks in a review in particular year ranked 
by a particular ratio (P/E, P/B, etc.) or a particular ratio vs fair value for difference 
valuation methods. Group of value stocks will be formed on the same principle, but I will 
use the ones from the bottom quartile.  
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5.2. Ratio based strategies 
 
5.2.1. Past earnings to price, E/P 
As I have found in Chapter 4 the regression results for this strategy were one of 
the weakest among examined strategies with the R2 being low for all of the years (it was 
in the range of 5.5-18.1%) with a positive contrarian profit and with only weak evidence 
that behavioural factors are more important for contrarian profits than rational ones. In 
two years either b1 or b2 (coefficients related to behavioural factor) are statistically 
significant, while h1 (related to fair price dynamics) is not statistically significant across 
all the years. However, out of two years with the statistically significant behavioural 
linear coefficients only one case accords with the behavioural assumptions of a positive 
mispricing correction for this group of stocks. 
In this part I will run a test with the regression (5.5) and compare the results with 
the ones I got in Chapter 4. 
For the years where contrarian profits are statistically positive the results are 
summarised in the Table 5.2.1.1. 
Table 5.2.1.1. Distinguishing between rational and behavioural factors in explaining 
contrarian profit 
 
 
Average 1996 2000 2001 2004 2006 2009 
 Value return 41.2% 18.0% 35.2% 23.2% 17.7% 15.7% 137.3% 
 Glamour return 9.3% 9.4% -25.6% 2.6% 2.0% 4.8% 62.7% 
 Contrarian profit 31.9% 8.6% 60.8% 20.6% 15.7% 10.9% 74.6% 
 
Number of stocks 
in value/glamour 
portfolios 
 117 118 120 122 123 121 
 Value-Glamour regression results 
 a 18.60% 11.35% 29.17% 16.62% 10.47% 8.77% 35.18% 
 t-stat for a 2.612 2.183 2.744 3.448 2.152 2.449 2.695 
R
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
a1 1.3% 2.5% -2.0% -2.1% 5.3% 2.7% 1.4% 
t-stat for a1 0.558 1.263 -0.837 -1.524 1.346 2.208 0.893 
a2 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.9 
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t-stat for a2 2.376 1.742 3.139 0.735 2.203 1.163 5.276 
B
e
h
a
v
io
ra
l b1 -1.3 0.1 -0.6 -0.8 0.6 -2.1 -4.7 
t-stat for b1 -0.867 0.153 -0.481 -1.253 0.909 -2.187 -2.341 
 R2 11.02% 8.02% 10.87% 4.42% 9.50% 10.13% 23.18% 
Note: highlighted cells indicate statistically significant coefficients; average figures are over the years 
specified in the table. 
The tested regression: 
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘 = 𝑎 + 𝑎1(𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘 − 𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘 ) + 𝑎2∆𝐹𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘 + 𝑏1(𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑣𝑘 − 𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑔𝑘 ) + 𝑒𝑘   , 
where  
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘
  = the difference between a return of a k rated value stock over the period 
between t and t+1 and the return over the same period for a k rated glamour 
stock (the rank 1 for a value stock is the indication that the stock is the most 
undervalued one among value stocks; the same rank for the glamour stock 
means that the stock is the most overvalued one among glamour stocks; value 
and glamour stocks are identified as at the end of March each year, 
𝑎  = constant, 
𝑎1  = linear coefficient for a rational factor related to dynamics of the fair price, 
𝑎2  = linear coefficient for a rational factor related to the expected dynamics of the 
stock price according to FF three factor model, 
𝑏1  = linear coefficient for the behavioural factor, 
𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘   = the change of the fair value for a particular value stock between a time t and 
t+1 scaled by the stock price at time t, 
𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘
  = the change of the fair value for a particular glamour stock between a time t 
and t+1 scaled by the stock price at time t, 
∆𝐹𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘
  = difference in expected returns according to FF model between a particular 
value and glamour stocks between a time t and t+1, 
𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑣𝑘  / 𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑔𝑘   = prior mispricing accumulation over the last five-year period for a particular 
value or glamour stock which is expressed in percentage terms, and 
𝑒𝑘   = residuals. 
Overall there is only a small improvement in terms of the ability of the regression 
to explain contrarian profits compared to the results for this strategy presented in 
Chapter 4 (see graph 5.2.1.2). The R2 is low in all the years and in all cases it  
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coincided with the statistically significant constant estimate. However, overall average 
R2 is slightly higher than in Chapter 4 and in five years constant is significantly different 
from the actual contrarian profit. 
Graph 5.2.1.2. R2 for the two regressions 
 
Note: R2 are presented only for those years where there is a statistically significant contrarian profit; old- 
regression used in Chapter 4; new – regression used in Chapter 5. 
On the other hand, there is a notable improvement in terms of the significance of 
rational and behavioural coefficients. 
In the same way, as in Chapter 4 there are two years when behavioural factor is 
significant. However, in contrast to Chapter 4 in both cases the sign of a linear 
coefficient is in line with the rational assumption motivating its inclusion. In Chapter 4 
only in one year the value of coefficient was in line with the logical assumption. With the 
new model, which is designed to capture behavioural factor more directly, in 2006 and 
2009 the value of linear coefficient for a behavioural factor is negative. This is in line 
with the assumption that there should be a negative difference between the value 
portfolio’s prior accumulated overreaction (in best case it should be negative, meaning 
that the price performance should underperform the expected dynamics according to 
rational factors) and glamour portfolio’s prior accumulated overreaction (in best case it 
should be positive, meaning that the price performance should outperform the expected 
dynamics according to rational factors). Consequently, the logical assumption is that the 
more the difference between the value and glamour portfolios’ accumulated 
overreaction in the past the more significant should be the contribution from this factor 
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to a contrarian profit while the linear coefficient should be negative given that the 
difference should be negative. This is exactly the case in 2006 and 2009.  
Almost in the same way as in Chapter 4 for this strategy fair price dynamics is not 
significant in most of the cases. Only in 2006 this factor is significant and its sign is in 
line with the rational assumption that the higher the difference between the fair price 
dynamics of value and glamour stocks the higher should be the contrarian profit. 
However, the addition of the FF three factors model improved the contribution from 
rational factors. In three years (2000, 2004,2009) the linear coefficient related to 
expected return according to FF model is statistically significant and positive. A positive 
linear coefficient on the accumulated overreaction term is also in line with the logical 
assumption that the higher the difference in expected return between value and glamour 
stocks the higher will be the contrarian profit.  
Finally, the results under a new method give an opposite result on the 
comparable contribution of the rational and behavioral factors for this strategy that in 
Chapter 4. Rational factors are significant in four out of six years, while the behavioral 
one is valid only in two. What is also interesting to note that the behavioral factor is not 
valid in 2004, while it is valid in 2009. 2004 resembles 2009 as it was also preceded by 
a year when the market was overreacting. Both years 2003 and 2008 can be assumed 
as the years when overreaction happened, to the Enron/WorldCom/Global crossing 
Telecom stock implosion (positive and negative). In 2003 the market on average rose 
by 54% - the highest growth during the whole observed sample, while in 2008 the 
market overall dropped by 39% - again the sharpest drop over the whole analysed 
sample. Consequently, in the same way as in 2009 I could expect that behavioral factor 
should capture part of the overreaction correction in 2004.  
As a result, I conclude that the test of the first hypothesis failed like in Chapter 4 
while the test of the second hypothesis gives the opposite result to what was found in 
Chapter 4. R2 is small in all cases, which means that the suggested regression proved 
to be a weak tool to explain contrarian profits. However, overall R2 is higher than in 
Chapter 4 and in most cases constants are significantly different from the actual 
contrarian profit despite being statistically significant. Addition of the rational factor – 
expected return under FF three factor model – improved the contribution of rational 
factors to the explanation of contrarian profits for this strategy vs the results of Chapter 
4. I conclude that for this strategy rational factors are more important than behavioural 
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ones given that rational factors are valid in four out of six cases while behavioural factor 
is valid only in two and failed to contribute in 2004 the year which resembles 2009 as it 
was also a year of correction of prior market overreaction.  
 
5.2.2. Forecasted earnings to price FE/P 
This strategy is also among the strategies for which the tests run in Chapter 4 
failed. Regression was not able to explain significantly contrarian profits in all the cases 
where the R2 lay below 40% (range 12.4-37.7%). In addition, it was impossible to 
conclude which type of factors are the dominant ones (rational or behavioural). There 
was an equal number of years when the linear coefficient for the rational and 
behavioural factors were statistically significant. 
In this part I will examine whether the new regression on the basis of formula 
(5.5) is able to improve the test results and give more clarity regarding which type of 
factors (rational or behavioural) are more important in explaining contrarian profits. 
For the years where contrarian profits are statistically positive the results are 
summarised in the Table 5.2.2.1. 
Table 5.2.2.1. Distinguishing between rational and behavioural factors in explaining 
contrarian profit 
 
 
Average 1996 2000 2001 2002 2004 2006 
 Value return 14.1% 22.9% 32.1% 23.7% -25.5% 15.5% 15.8% 
 Glamour return -6.5% 9.0% -24.5% 1.2% -33.6% 3.2% 5.6% 
 Contrarian profit 20.6% 13.9% 56.5% 22.4% 8.1% 12.2% 10.3% 
 
Number of stocks 
in value/glamour 
portfolios 
 117 119 120 121 122 123 
 Value-Glamour regression results 
 a 14.48% 15.00% 17.06% 22.23% 13.22% 12.13% 7.25% 
 t-stat for a 3.195 4.008 1.796 5.370 3.071 2.876 2.048 
R
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
a1 10.63% 11% -1% 8% 11% 23% 10% 
t-stat for a1 3.622 2.832 -0.342 3.124 5.858 6.072 4.187 
a2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.3 
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t-stat for a2 1.581 0.948 3.964 0.452 2.032 0.028 2.060 
B
e
h
a
v
io
ra
l b1 -1.0 0.5 -3.0 -0.8 -0.1 0.7 -3.0 
t-stat for b1 -0.912 0.722 -2.585 -1.722 -0.124 1.436 -3.201 
 R2 20.15% 13.41% 20.27% 11.38% 26.99% 27.86% 20.96% 
Note: highlighted cells indicate statistically significant coefficients; average figures are over the years 
specified in the table. 
The tested regression: 
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘 = 𝑎 + 𝑎1(𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘 − 𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘 ) + 𝑎2∆𝐹𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘 + 𝑏1(𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑣𝑘 − 𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑔𝑘 ) + 𝑒𝑘   , 
where  
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘
  = the difference between a return of a k rated value stock over the period 
between t and t+1 and the return over the same period for a k rated glamour 
stock (the rank 1 for a value stock is the indication that the stock is the most 
undervalued one among value stocks; the same rank for the glamour stock 
means that the stock is the most overvalued one among glamour stocks; value 
and glamour stocks are identified as at the end of March each year, 
𝑎  = constant, 
𝑎1  = linear coefficient for a rational factor related to dynamics of the fair price, 
𝑎2  = linear coefficient for a rational factor related to the expected dynamics of the 
stock price according to FF three factor model, 
𝑏1  = linear coefficient for the behavioural factor, 
𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘   = the change of the fair value for a particular value stock between a time t and 
t+1 scaled by the stock price at time t, 
𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘
  = the change of the fair value for a particular glamour stock between a time t 
and t+1 scaled by the stock price at time t, 
∆𝐹𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘
  = difference in expected returns according to FF model between a particular 
value and glamour stocks between a time t and t+1, 
𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑣𝑘  / 𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑔𝑘   = prior mispricing accumulation over the last five-year period for a particular 
value or glamour stock which is expressed in percentage terms, and 
𝑒𝑘   = residuals. 
There are no improvements in terms of overall significance of the regression 
compared to Chapter 4 (see graph 5.2.2.2). R2 is lower than in Chapter 4 is four out of 
six years in the sample, while on average R2 is slightly smaller than in Chapter 4. 
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Moreover, the constant is close to the actual value of contrarian profit in five out of six 
cases and is statistically significant in four years, which is additional sign of poor ability 
of the new regression to explain contrarian profits. 
Graph 5.2.2.2. R2 for the two regressions 
Note: R2 are presented only for those years where there is a statistically significant contrarian profit; old- 
regression used in Chapter 4; new – regression used in Chapter 5. 
On the other hand, there is no notable improvement in terms of the significance 
of rational and behavioural coefficients. Moreover, there is deterioration on behavioural 
side. 
In contrast to Chapter 4 there are only two years when behavioural factor is 
significant. However, in contrast to Chapter 4 in both cases the sign of a linear 
coefficient is in line with the rational assumption behind it. With the new model which is 
designed to capture behavioural factor more directly in 2000 and 2006 the value of 
linear coefficient for a behavioural factor is negative. This is in line with the assumption 
that there should be a negative difference between value prior accumulated 
overreaction (in best case it should be negative, meaning that the price performance 
should underperform the expected dynamics according to rational factors) and glamour 
prior accumulated overreaction (in best case it should be positive, meaning that the 
price performance should outperform the expected dynamics according to rational 
factors). Consequently, the logical assumption is that the more the difference between 
the value and glamour accumulated overreaction in the past the more significant should 
be the contribution from this factor to a contrarian profit while the linear coefficient 
should be negative given that the difference should be negative. This is exactly the case 
in 2000 and 2006.  
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In the same way, as in Chapter 4 for this strategy fair price dynamics is 
significant in most of the cases. Only in 2000 this factor is not significant However, this 
is the only year where FF three factors model improved the contribution from rational 
factors as it is statistically significant this year and positive. Positive linear coefficient is 
in line with the logical assumption that the higher the difference in expected return 
between value and glamour stocks the higher the contrarian profit.  
However, the results under a new method give more clarity on the comparable 
contribution of the rational and behavioral factors for this strategy that in Chapter 4. 
Rational factors are significant in all six years, while behavioral one is valid only in two. 
Again, it is interesting to note that behavioral factor is not valid in 2004. 2004 was 
preceded by a year when the market was overreacting. 2003 can be assumed as the 
year when overreaction happened. In 2003 the market on average rose by 54% – the 
highest growth during the whole observed sample. Consequently, I could expect that 
behavioral factor should capture part of the overreaction correction in 2004.  
As a result, I conclude that test of the first hypothesis failed like in Chapter 4 
while the test of the second hypothesis gives more clarity vs Chapter 4. R2 is small in all 
cases, which means that the suggested regression proved to be a weak tool to explain 
contrarian profits. Moreover, overall R2 is lower than in Chapter 4 and in most cases 
constants are close to the actual contrarian profit are is statistically significant. Addition 
of the rational factor – expected return under FF three factor model – slightly improved 
the contribution of rational factors to the explanation of contrarian profits for this strategy 
vs the results of Chapter 4. Now in all the years at least one rational factor is statistically 
significant. On the other hand, a behavioural factor is valid only in two years. Moreover, 
it is not valid in 2004 – the year when the behavioural factor should capture part of the 
overreaction correction which happened in 2003. Consequently, I conclude that rational 
factors are more important in contrarian profit explanation than a behavioural one. 
 
5.2.3. Book value to price, B/P 
Both tests weakly succeeded for this strategy in Chapter 4. In one year, 2009, R2 
is higher than 40%. In 2009 rational factor proved to be the only factor, which can be 
considered as an important one for explaining the contrarian profit given that the linear 
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coefficient for this factor is statistically significant, while linear coefficients for 
behavioural factors are not statistically significant. 
In this part I will examine whether the new regression based on formula 5.5 is 
able to improve the test results and give more clarity regarding which type of factors 
(rational or behavioural) are more important in explanation of contrarian profits 
For the years where contrarian profits are statistically positive the results are 
summarised in the table 5.2.3.1. 
Table 5.2.3.1. Distinguishing between rational and behavioural factors in explaining 
contrarian profit 
 
 
Avera
ge 
1991 1992 2000 2001 2003 2004 2006 2009 
 Value return 44.3% 27.9% 25.5% 30.4% 20.9% 77.4% 19.9% 17.1% 
135.0
% 
 
Glamour 
return 
15.1% 10.8% 10.7% -14.0% 6.9% 44.2% 6.4% 8.4% 47.3% 
 
Contrarian 
profit 
29.2% 17.1% 14.8% 44.4% 13.9% 33.1% 13.5% 8.7% 87.7% 
 
Number of 
stocks in 
value/glamour 
portfolios 
 112 113 114 115 113 113 107 88 
 Value-Glamour regression results 
 a 6.7% 13.2% 11.7% 12.4% 8.8% 14.6% 6.2% 4.9% -17.9% 
 t-stat for a 1.28 2.22 2.14 1.45 1.64 1.12 1.44 1.46 -1.19 
R
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
a1 10% -4% 12% 5% -7% 14% 26% 1% 37% 
t-stat for a1 1.27 -0.35 1.89 0.83 -1.26 1.06 2.56 0.17 5.25 
a2 0.4 0.2 -0.1 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.7 
t-stat for a2 2.54 1.12 -0.84 4.35 2.83 3.35 2.15 3.15 4.21 
B
e
h
a
v
io
ra
l 
b1 -1.0 -0.4 -0.3 -1.4 -0.8 3.4 0.2 -1.7 -6.9 
t-stat for b1 -0.77 -0.36 -0.25 -1.19 -1.52 1.77 0.26 -1.57 -3.34 
 R2 16.5% 2.3% 4.2% 18.5% 11.4% 16.7% 13.7% 11.2% 53.9% 
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Note: highlighted cells indicate statistically significant coefficients; average figures are over the years 
specified in the table. 
The tested regression: 
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘 = 𝑎 + 𝑎1(𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘 − 𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘 ) + 𝑎2∆𝐹𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘 + 𝑏1(𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑣𝑘 − 𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑔𝑘 ) + 𝑒𝑘   , 
where  
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘
  = the difference between a return of a k rated value stock over the period 
between t and t+1 and the return over the same period for a k rated glamour 
stock (the rank 1 for a value stock is the indication that the stock is the most 
undervalued one among value stocks; the same rank for the glamour stock 
means that the stock is the most overvalued one among glamour stocks; value 
and glamour stocks are identified as at the end of March each year, 
𝑎  = constant, 
𝑎1  = linear coefficient for a rational factor related to dynamics of the fair price, 
𝑎2  = linear coefficient for a rational factor related to the expected dynamics of the 
stock price according to FF three factor model, 
𝑏1  = linear coefficient for the behavioural factor, 
𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘   = the change of the fair value for a particular value stock between a time t and 
t+1 scaled by the stock price at time t, 
𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘
  = the change of the fair value for a particular glamour stock between a time t 
and t+1 scaled by the stock price at time t, 
∆𝐹𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘
  = difference in expected returns according to FF model between a particular 
value and glamour stocks between a time t and t+1, 
𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑣𝑘  / 𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑔𝑘   = prior mispricing accumulation over the last five-year period for a particular 
value or glamour stock which is expressed in percentage terms, and 
𝑒𝑘   = residuals. 
There is a slight improvement in terms of overall significance of the regression 
compared to Chapter 4 (see graph 5.2.3.2). R2 is higher than in Chapter 4 is five out of 
eight years in the sample, while on average R2 is slightly higher than in Chapter 4. 
Moreover, the constant is close to the actual value of contrarian profit in only two year 
out of eight cases and is statistically significant in those years, which is additional sign 
of relatively good ability of the new regression to explain contrarian profits in most of the 
cases. Finally, in 2009 R2 is even higher than 50% with all linear coefficients being 
statistically significant. 
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Graph 5.2.3.2. R2 for the two regressions 
 
Note: R2 are presented only for those years where there is a statistically significant contrarian profit; old- 
regression used in Chapter 4; new – regression used in Chapter 5. 
In addition, there is a notable improvement in terms of the significance of rational 
and behavioural coefficients. 
From first glance, there is a bit of deterioration of behavioural factor significance 
compared to Chapter 4 as it is significant only in one year vs two years in the previous 
Chapter. However, in Chapter 4 only in one case the sign of the coefficient is in line with 
the rational assumption behind it. With the new model which is designed to capture 
behavioural factor more directly in 2009 the value of linear coefficient for a behavioural 
factor is negative. This is in line with the assumption that there should be a negative 
difference between value prior accumulated overreaction (in best case it should be 
negative, meaning that the price performance should underperform the expected 
dynamics according to rational factors) and glamour prior accumulated overreaction (in 
best case it should be positive, meaning that the price performance should outperform 
the expected dynamics according to rational factors). Consequently, the logical 
assumption is that the more the difference between the value and glamour accumulated 
overreaction in the past the more significant should be the contribution from this factor 
to a contrarian profit while the linear coefficient should be negative given that the 
difference should be negative. This is exactly the case in 2009. Finally, in Chapter 4 in 
contrast to Chapter 5 behavioural factor is not statistically significant in 2009, the year 
where it is logical to expect some correction happening after a market overreaction in 
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2008. Consequently, I conclude that there is a bit of improvement of behavioural factor 
significance compared to Chapter 4. 
FF three factors model improved the contribution from rational factors as it is 
statistically significant in six out of eight years in the sample and positive in all the 
cases. Positive linear coefficient is in line with the logical assumption that the higher the 
difference in expected return between value and glamour stocks the higher the 
contrarian profit. In Chapter 4 rational factor was significant in two cases and in only one 
case was in line with the rational assumption behind it.  
Overall, the results under a new method give more clarity on the comparable 
contribution of the rational and behavioral factors for this strategy that in Chapter 4. At 
least one rational factor is significant in six out of eight years, while behavioral one is 
valid only in one. Again, it is interesting to note that behavioral factor is not valid in 
2004. 2004 was preceded by a year when the market was overreacting. 2003 can be 
assumed as the year when overreaction happened. In 2003 the market on average rose 
by 54% – the highest growth during the whole observed sample. Consequently, I could 
expect that behavioral factor should capture part of the overreaction correction in 2004 
as it captures it in 2009. Finally, the two rational factors are valid in 2009 the year with 
the highest R2. Behavioral factors are valid that year as well, but overall I still conclude 
the superiority of rational factors given the results for other years. 
As a result, I conclude that both tests have been improved under the new 
regression. R2 is small in all cases, but it is more than 50% in 2009 and it is higher on 
average than in Chapter 4. Moreover, in 2009 all three factors are valid. Addition of the 
rational factor – expected return under FF three factor model – slightly improved the 
contribution of rational factors to the explanation of contrarian profits for this strategy vs 
the results of Chapter 4. Now at least one rational factor is valid in six out of eight years 
while in all the years the sign of the linear coefficient is in line with the rational 
assumption behind it, which was not always the case in Chapter 4. The behavioural 
factor is valid only in 2009. In addition, behavioural factor failed to capture part of the 
overreaction correction which I expected in 2004 after a strong market growth in 2003.  
 
Chapter 5. Are contrarian returns mainly explained by the Fama French three-factor risk model? 
5.2. Ratio based strategies 202 
5.2.4. Cash flow to price, CF/P 
Both tests failed for this strategy in the previous Chapter with only very small 
evidence that the behavioural factor is more important than the rational one. R2 is small 
in all the cases (in the range of 3.5-28%) while the number of years with a statistically 
significant behavioural factor (nine) is higher than the number of years with a statistically 
significant rational one (three).  
In this part I will examine whether the new regression based on formula (5.5) is 
able to improve the test results and give more clarity regarding which type of factors 
(rational or behavioural) are more important in explanation of contrarian profits. 
For the years where contrarian profits are statistically positive the results are 
summarised in the table 5.2.4.1. 
Table 5.2.4.1. Distinguishing between rational and behavioural factors in explaining 
contrarian profit 
Part 1 
  Average 1991 1992 1993 1997 2000 2001 
 Value return 25.7% 39.2% 12.2% 52.9% 35.9% 23.8% 135.0% 
 Glamour return 8.7% 8.7% -2.6% 35.1% -23.2% 1.5% 47.3% 
 Contrarian profit 17.0% 30.4% 14.8% 17.7% 59.1% 22.3% 87.7% 
 
Number of 
stocks in 
value/glamour 
portfolios 
108 108 110 114 115 114 88 
 Value-Glamour regression results 
 a 18.8% 10.74% 26.51% 14.34% 18.14% 37.64% 21.77% 
 t-stat for a 3.2 2.139 4.457 3.527 2.894 4.316 4.575 
R
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
a1 6.9% 3.5% 3.7% 1.4% 7.1% 13.8% 9.3% 
t-stat for a1 1.75 1.25 1.04 0.44 1.48 3.18 2.73 
a2 0.3 0.6 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.2 -0.1 
t-stat for a2 1.90 3.03 0.57 1.82 0.58 2.31 -0.42 
B
e
h
a
v
io
ra
l b1 -73.5% 0.8 -2.9 1.2 1.4 -2.5 -0.5 
t-stat for b1 -0.57 0.83 -2.22 1.32 0.75 -2.50 -0.93 
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 R2 12.6% 11.98% 6.56% 4.01% 3.61% 18.44% 7.80% 
 
Part 2 
   2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2009 
 Value return  -20.3% 69.2% 22.5% 23.4% 20.2% 132.2% 
 Glamour return  -29.0% 44.8% 0.1% 12.4% 3.1% 52.4% 
 Contrarian profit  8.7% 24.4% 22.4% 11.0% 17.0% 79.8% 
 
Number of 
stocks in 
value/glamour 
portfolios 
 112 115 113 113 107 88 
 Value-Glamour regression results 
 a  4.96% 12.74% 20.65% 12.31% 14.43% 31.02% 
 t-stat for a  1.230 1.485 3.808 3.176 4.521 2.723 
R
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
a1  -4.2% 17.9% 12.7% 7.1% 3.4% 7.7% 
t-stat for a1  -1.69 3.77 3.61 2.56 1.06 1.61 
a2  0.3 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.1 1.0 
t-stat for a2  1.81 2.31 0.91 1.56 1.08 7.29 
B
e
h
a
v
io
ra
l b1  0.0 1.8 0.4 1.4 -1.9 -8.2 
t-stat for b1  0.02 1.21 0.59 1.49 -1.78 -5.68 
 R2  6.06% 19.76% 13.57% 9.59% 4.56% 45.75% 
Note: highlighted cells indicate statistically significant coefficients; average figures are over the years 
specified in the table. 
 
The tested regression: 
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘 = 𝑎 + 𝑎1(𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘 − 𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘 ) + 𝑎2∆𝐹𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘 + 𝑏1(𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑣𝑘 − 𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑔𝑘 ) + 𝑒𝑘   , 
where  
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘
  = the difference between a return of a k rated value stock over the period 
between t and t+1 and the return over the same period for a k rated glamour 
stock (the rank 1 for a value stock is the indication that the stock is the most 
undervalued one among value stocks; the same rank for the glamour stock 
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means that the stock is the most overvalued one among glamour stocks; value 
and glamour stocks are identified as at the end of March each year, 
𝑎  = constant, 
𝑎1  = linear coefficient for a rational factor related to dynamics of the fair price, 
𝑎2  = linear coefficient for a rational factor related to the expected dynamics of the 
stock price according to FF three factor model, 
𝑏1  = linear coefficient for the behavioural factor, 
𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘   = the change of the fair value for a particular value stock between a time t and 
t+1 scaled by the stock price at time t, 
𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘
  = the change of the fair value for a particular glamour stock between a time t 
and t+1 scaled by the stock price at time t, 
∆𝐹𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘
  = difference in expected returns according to FF model between a particular 
value and glamour stocks between a time t and t+1, 
𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑣𝑘  / 𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑔𝑘   = prior mispricing accumulation over the last five-year period for a particular 
value or glamour stock which is expressed in percentage terms, and 
𝑒𝑘   = residuals. 
There is a mixed picture in terms of the test of the overall significance of the 
regression compared to Chapter 4 results (see graph 5.2.4.2). On the one hand R2 is 
lower than in Chapter 4 in seven out of 12 years in the sample and it is lower on 
average. On the other hand, it is higher than 40% in 2009 (this was not the case in 
Chapter 4), which is considered to be significant. Moreover, two out of three factors are 
significant that year. 
Graph 5.2.4.2. R2 for the two regressions 
 
Note: R2 are presented only for those years where there is a statistically significant contrarian profit; old- 
regression used in Chapter 4; new – regression used in Chapter 5. 
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In addition, there is a notable improvement in terms of the significance of rational 
factors and deterioration of behavioural coefficients. 
In contrast to Chapter 4 (nine years with valid behavioural coefficients) only in 
three cases is the behavioural factor significant. However, in all the cases the value of 
linear coefficient for a behavioural factor is negative. This accords with the assumption 
that there should be a negative difference between value prior accumulated 
overreaction (in the best case it should be negative, meaning that the price performance 
should underperform the expected dynamics according to rational factors) and glamour 
prior accumulated overreaction (in best case it should be positive, meaning that the 
price performance should outperform the expected dynamics according to rational 
factors). Consequently, the logical assumption is that the more the difference between 
the value and glamour accumulated overreaction in the past the more significant should 
be the contribution from this factor to observed contrarian profits while the linear 
coefficient should be negative given that the difference should be negative. Finally, the 
behavioural factor is not valid in 2004 – the year when it looks logical to expect some 
correction of prior overreaction to happen and consequently behavioural factor to 
capture part of this.  
The FF three factor model improved the contribution from rational factors as it is 
statistically significant in four out of 12 years in the sample and positive in all other 
cases. A positive linear coefficient is in line with the logical assumption that the higher 
the difference in expected return between value and glamour stocks the higher the 
contrarian profit. Moreover, the rational factor related to the dynamics of fair value is 
statistically significant in five cases, while in Chapter 4 it was significant in only three. 
Overall, the results under a new method give a different picture to the one in 
Chapter 4. Now there are more years where at least one of the rational factors are valid 
(seven) vs the number of years where the behavioral factor is valid (three). However, in 
the only year where the regression overall can be considered as a significant tool to 
explain contrarian profit (2009) behavioral and FF factors are valid simultaneously, 
which does not give clarity regarding which one is the more important.  
As a result, I conclude that the first test has been improved under a new 
regression while the second test produces a different result. R2 is small in all cases like 
in Chapter 4, but it is more than 40% in 2009. Moreover, in 2009 two factors out of three 
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are valid. There is an opposite result to the one of Chapter 4 with the more years being 
the ones where at least of the rational factors are valid (seven years) vs the number of 
years where behavioural factors is valid (three). In addition, behavioural factor failed to 
capture some of the overreaction correction in 2004, the year after a strong positive 
overreaction of the market.  
 
5.2.5. Free cash flow to equity to price, FCFE/P 
This is one of the strategies for which both tests failed in Chapter 4 given the 
overall low R2 (in the range of 2.6-10.2%) and very few years where the behavioural or 
rational factors are valid. The linear coefficient for the rational factor is positive and 
statistically significant in two years. In one of these years it is the only statistically 
significant factor. There is also one year when the only statistically significant factor is 
the behavioural one related to value stocks. However, the linear coefficient is negative 
which contradicts with the rational assumption. 
In this part I will examine whether the new regression based on formula 5.5 is 
able to improve the test results and give more clarity regarding which type of factors 
(rational or behavioural) are more important in the explanation of contrarian profits. 
For the years where contrarian profits are statistically positive the results are 
summarised in the table 5.2.5.1. 
Table 5.2.5.1. Distinguishing between rational and behavioural factors in explaining 
contrarian profit 
 
 
Average 1990 1995 1996 1997 2000 2001 2002 
 Value return 24.6% 14.1% 41.9% 19.4% 57.9% 36.6% 19.7% -17.4% 
 Glamour 
return 
3.0% 2.9% 14.9% 11.3% 32.6% -9.1% 3.8% -35.4% 
 Contrarian 
profit 
21.6% 11.3% 27.0% 8.2% 25.3% 45.7% 15.9% 18.0% 
 Number of 
stocks in 
value/glamour 
portfolios 
 87 90 90 89 92 92 94 
 Value-Glamour regression results 
 a 18.6% 14.09% 25.89% 8.48% 24.80% 30.61% 11.14% 15.07% 
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 t-stat for a 3.19 2.44 5.15 2.04 3.70 3.76 1.56 3.67 
R
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
a1 1.2% 2.3% -0.7% -0.3% 2.0% 3.0% 1.3% 0.7% 
t-stat for a1 0.81 1.59 -0.43 -0.36 1.11 1.88 0.72 1.17 
a2 0.2 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.4 0.5 0.5 
t-stat for a2 1.30 -0.177 0.848 -0.619 0.212 3.799 1.857 3.193 
B
e
h
a
v
io
ra
l 
b1 0.6 1.1 1.6 0.1 2.5 -0.1 -1.1 0.1 
t-stat for b1 0.28 0.79 1.12 0.14 1.47 -0.09 -1.52 0.08 
 R2 8.5% 5.31% 3.33% 0.92% 5.16% 23.80% 7.74% 13.31% 
Note: highlighted cells indicate statistically significant coefficients; average figures are over the years 
specified in the table. 
The tested regression: 
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘 = 𝑎 + 𝑎1(𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘 − 𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘 ) + 𝑎2∆𝐹𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘 + 𝑏1(𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑣𝑘 − 𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑔𝑘 ) + 𝑒𝑘   , 
where  
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘
  = the difference between a return of a k rated value stock over the period 
between t and t+1 and the return over the same period for a k rated glamour 
stock (the rank 1 for a value stock is the indication that the stock is the most 
undervalued one among value stocks; the same rank for the glamour stock 
means that the stock is the most overvalued one among glamour stocks; value 
and glamour stocks are identified as at the end of March each year, 
𝑎  = constant, 
𝑎1  = linear coefficient for a rational factor related to dynamics of the fair price, 
𝑎2  = linear coefficient for a rational factor related to the expected dynamics of the 
stock price according to FF three factor model, 
𝑏1  = linear coefficient for the behavioural factor, 
𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘   = the change of the fair value for a particular value stock between a time t and 
t+1 scaled by the stock price at time t, 
𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘
  = the change of the fair value for a particular glamour stock between a time t 
and t+1 scaled by the stock price at time t, 
∆𝐹𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘
  = the difference in expected returns according to FF model between a particular 
value and glamour stocks between a time t and t+1, 
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𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑣𝑘  / 𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑔𝑘   = prior mispricing accumulation over the last five-year period for a particular 
value or glamour stock which is expressed in percentage terms, and 
𝑒𝑘   = residuals. 
There is a slight improvement in terms of overall significance of the regression 
compared to Chapter 4 (see graph 5.2.5.2). On average R2 is slightly higher than in 
Chapter 4. However, the constant is close to the actual value of contrarian profit in all 
the year and it is statistically significant in five out of seven years in the sample. Finally, 
R2 is still low in all the cases being below 40%. 
Graph 5.2.5.2. R2 for the two regressions 
Note: R2 are presented only for those years where there is a statistically significant contrarian profit; old- 
regression used in Chapter 4; new – regression used in Chapter 5. 
There are no notable improvements in terms of the significance of rational and 
behavioural coefficients. Moreover, there is a deterioration in terms of behavioural 
factor. 
The behavioural factor is not valid in all the years under revision. However, this is 
almost the same as in Chapter 4 where in only one year was the behavioural factor 
significant and linear coefficient sign was in line with the rational assumption.  
In the same way, as in Chapter 4 rational factors are significant in two cases. 
However, this time it is FF factor which is significant while fair price dynamics is not 
valid in all examined years.  
Overall, the second test results give slightly more clarity regarding the superiority 
of rational factors in explaining contrarian profit. However, it is still rather weak given the 
low R2 and low number of the years where at least one of the rational factors is 
statistically significant. 
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In the same way, as in Chapter 4 both tests failed. R2 is small in all cases. 
Despite a small improvement in the average figures I can still conclude that the 
regression failed to explain contrarian profits. There is a slight improvement in terms of 
relative validity of rational and behavioural factors. Under the new regression the 
rational factor constructed from, the FF expected return is valid in two years while 
behavioural one is not valid in any of the years. However, I cannot strongly rely on this 
given the small number of significant years for the rational factor and low R2 in all the 
cases.  
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5.3. Strategies based on valuation models 
 
5.3.1. Abnormal earnings growth, AEG 
In Chapter 4 the regression for this strategy failed to succeed in explaining of 
contrarian profits in any of the examined years given the overall low R2 (in the range 
0.5-24.4%). There was a weak evidence that behavioural factors are more important 
than a rational one due to the rational being not significant in all the years while 
behavioural ones are valid in some of them.  
In this part I will examine whether the new regression based on formula (5.5) is 
able to improve the test results and give more clarity regarding which type of factors 
(rational or behavioural) are more important in explanation of contrarian profits. 
For the years where contrarian profits are statistically positive the results are 
summarised in the table 5.3.1.1. 
 
 
Table 5.3.1.1. Distinguishing between rational and behavioural factors in explaining 
contrarian profit 
 
 
Average 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 
 Value return 50.2% 25.1% 79.1% 17.5% 105.1% 24.4% 
 Glamour return 19.2% -16.1% 40.1% 7.4% 51.8% 12.9% 
 Contrarian profit 31.0% 41.2% 38.9% 10.1% 53.3% 11.5% 
 
Number of stocks in 
value/glamour 
portfolios 
 88 99 108 67 105 
 Value-Glamour regression results 
 a 15.0% 13.59% 32.51% 8.60% 3.89% 16.23% 
 t-stat for a 2.67 1.62 5.49 3.11 0.23 2.90 
R
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
a1 0.5% 0.9% 0.2% 1.5% 0.0% -0.1% 
t-stat for a1 1.41 1.82 2.63 1.52 2.22 -1.12 
a2 47.4% 0.5 0.3 0.2 1.1 0.3 
t-stat for a2 3.57 4.37 3.97 1.83 5.65 2.03 
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B
e
h
a
v
io
ra
l b1 0.0 -0.1 -0.6 -1.7 0.7 1.8 
t-stat for b1 0.02 -0.06 -0.60 -1.94 0.29 2.41 
 R2 23.1% 28.02% 27.60% 12.88% 34.35% 12.47% 
Note: highlighted cells indicate statistically significant coefficients; average figures are over the years 
specified in the table. 
The tested regression: 
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘 = 𝑎 + 𝑎1(𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘 − 𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘 ) + 𝑎2∆𝐹𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘 + 𝑏1(𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑣𝑘 − 𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑔𝑘 ) + 𝑒𝑘   , 
where  
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘
  = the difference between a return of a k rated value stock over the period 
between t and t+1 and the return over the same period for a k rated glamour 
stock (the rank 1 for a value stock is the indication that the stock is the most 
undervalued one among value stocks; the same rank for the glamour stock 
means that the stock is the most overvalued one among glamour stocks; value 
and glamour stocks are identified as at the end of March each year, 
𝑎  = constant, 
𝑎1  = linear coefficient for a rational factor related to dynamics of the fair price, 
𝑎2  = linear coefficient for a rational factor related to the expected dynamics of the 
stock price according to FF three factor model, 
𝑏1  = linear coefficient for the behavioural factor, 
𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘   = the change of the fair value for a particular value stock between a time t and 
t+1 scaled by the stock price at time t, 
𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘
  = the change of the fair value for a particular glamour stock between a time t 
and t+1 scaled by the stock price at time t, 
∆𝐹𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘
  = difference in expected returns according to FF model between a particular 
value and glamour stocks between a time t and t+1, 
𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑣𝑘  / 𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑔𝑘   = prior mispricing accumulation over the last five-year period for a particular 
value or glamour stock which is expressed in percentage terms, and 
𝑒𝑘   = residuals. 
There is a significant improvement in terms of overall significance of the 
regression compared to Chapter 4 (see graph 5.3.1.2). On average R2 is almost twice 
as high than in Chapter 4. However, this was to a large extent achieved due to 2009 
where the new regression proved to be able to explain more than one third of contrarian 
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profit. In addition, both rational factors are valid that year while the constant is close to 
zero and is not significant.  
Graph 5.3.1.2. R2 for the two regressions 
Note: R2 are presented only for those years where there is a statistically significant contrarian profit; old- 
regression used in Chapter 4; new – regression used in Chapter 5. 
There is a notable improvement in terms of the significance of rational factors. 
However, there is a slight deterioration for behavioural one. 
The behavioural factor is valid only in one year out of five. Moreover, the sign of 
linear coefficient is positive, which contradicts with the rational assumption behind it. 
There should be a negative difference between value prior accumulated overreaction (in 
best case it should be negative, meaning that the price performance should 
underperform the expected dynamics according to rational factors) and glamour prior 
accumulated overreaction (in the best case it should be positive, meaning that the price 
performance should outperform the expected dynamics according to rational factors). 
Consequently, the logical assumption is that the more the difference between the value 
and glamour accumulated overreaction in the past the more significant should be the 
contribution from this behavioural  factor to  contrarian profits,  while the linear 
coefficient should be negative given that the difference should be negative. In Chapter 4 
for all glamour behavioural factors the sign of linear coefficient also contradicted with 
the rational assumption, but in the only case where value behavioural factor was valid 
its sign was in line with the rational assumption.  
In contrast to Chapter 4’s results (in all the years, rational factor was not valid) 
now in three out of five cases at least one of the rational factors are significant. 
Moreover, besides the FF expected return factor the factor related to the dynamics of 
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fair price is also valid in two cases. In all the cases, linear coefficients are in line with the 
rational assumption that the higher the difference in expected return between value and 
glamour stocks (according to FF returns or fair value dynamics) the higher the 
contrarian profit. 
The second test results are now more clear and contradicts with the results of 
Chapter 4 for this strategy. Rational factors are valid in three out of five years and have 
linear coefficients in line with the rational assumption. In contrast, the behavioral factor 
is valid only in one year and its linear coefficient is not in line with the rational 
assumption. Moreover, in 2009 – the year with the highest R2 – both rational factors are 
valid while the behavioral one is not. This contradicts with the assumption that in 2009 
the behavioral factor should capture part of the prior overreaction correction. 
There was a strong improvement of results for both tests compared to the results in 
Chapter 4. The average level of R2 is almost twice the size that in Chapter 4. Moreover, 
R2 in 2009 rose to 34% which is quite significant given the overall result for other 
strategies. Moreover, two rational factors are valid that year and constant is close to 
zero and is not significant. In contrast to Chapter 4 results rational factors here proved 
to be more important than behavioural one and I conclude this with more certainty than 
the opposite conclusion in Chapter 4. At least one of the rational factors is valid in three 
out of five years in the sample and in all these cases the linear coefficients are in line 
with the rational assumption behind them. Behavioural factor is valid only once, but the 
linear coefficient contradicts with the rational assumption behind it.  
 
5.3.2. Residual income model, RIM 
Both tests weakly succeeded for this strategy in Chapter 4. In one year, 2009, R2 
is close to 70%. Rational factor was not statistically significant that year while two 
behavioural ones were valid. 
In this part I will examine whether the new regression based on formula (5.5) is 
able to improve the test results and give more clarity regarding which type of factors 
(rational or behavioural) are more important in explanation of contrarian profits. 
For the years where contrarian profits are statistically positive the results are 
summarised in the table 5.3.2.1. 
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Table 5.3.2.1. Distinguishing between rational and behavioural factors in explaining 
contrarian profit 
 
 
Averag
e 
1992 1996 2000 2001 2003 2004 2006 2009 
 Value return 42.1% 25.3% 20.2% 30.6% 21.6% 72.4% 19.2% 15.9% 131.5% 
 
Glamour 
return 
12.8% 11.7% 6.9% -22.6% 6.3% 43.3% 2.7% 5.1% 48.6% 
 
Contrarian 
profit 
29.3% 13.6% 13.3% 53.2% 15.3% 29.0% 16.5% 10.8% 82.9% 
 
Number of 
stocks in 
value/glamour 
portfolios 
 54 62 87 91 99 104 100 80 
 Value-Glamour regression results 
 a 17% 12.47% 10.42% 15.55% 14.57% 22.16% 21.71% 6.58% 36.14% 
 t-stat for a 2.63 2.53 1.72 1.35 2.61 4.20 4.51 2.01 2.07 
R
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
a1 27% 80% -14% 3% 6% 33% 59% 33% 16% 
t-stat for a1 2.74 4.24 -0.87 0.74 0.90 5.16 6.45 3.49 1.83 
a2 0.3 -0.2 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.2 1.0 
t-stat for a2 2.28 -1.33 0.81 4.37 0.25 7.35 0.33 1.88 4.55 
B
e
h
a
v
io
ra
l b1 -0.9 -2.6 0.6 1.7 -0.3 -1.4 0.6 -0.9 -5.0 
t-stat for b1 -0.39 -1.63 0.61 1.09 -0.42 -1.19 1.17 -0.77 -1.97 
 R2 23.1% 28.97% 5.70% 20.94% 1.40% 48.79% 32.92% 20.15% 26.27% 
Note: highlighted cells indicate statistically significant coefficients; average figures are over the years 
specified in the table. 
The tested regression: 
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘 = 𝑎 + 𝑎1(𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘 − 𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘 ) + 𝑎2∆𝐹𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘 + 𝑏1(𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑣𝑘 − 𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑔𝑘 ) + 𝑒𝑘   , 
where  
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘
  = the difference between a return of a k rated value stock over the period 
between t and t+1 and the return over the same period for a k rated glamour 
stock (the rank 1 for a value stock is the indication that the stock is the most 
undervalued one among value stocks; the same rank for the glamour stock 
means that the stock is the most overvalued one among glamour stocks; value 
and glamour stocks are identified as at the end of March each year, 
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𝑎  = constant, 
𝑎1  = linear coefficient for a rational factor related to dynamics of the fair price, 
𝑎2  = linear coefficient for a rational factor related to the expected dynamics of the 
stock price according to FF three factor model, 
𝑏1  = linear coefficient for the behavioural factor, 
𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘   = the change of the fair value for a particular value stock between a time t and 
t+1 scaled by the stock price at time t, 
𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘
  = the change of the fair value for a particular glamour stock between a time t 
and t+1 scaled by the stock price at time t, 
∆𝐹𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘
  = difference in expected returns according to the FF model between a particular 
value and glamour stocks between a time t and t+1, 
𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑣𝑘  / 𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑔𝑘   = prior mispricing accumulation over the last five-year period for a particular 
value or glamour stock which is expressed in percentage terms, and 
𝑒𝑘   = residuals. 
There are no improvements in terms of overall significance of the regression 
compared to Chapter 4 (see graph 5.3.2.2). On average R2 is lower than in Chapter 4, 
but this is achieved due to 2009, when R2 for the regression in Chapter 4 was 
abnormally high. On the other hand, in 2003 the regression results improved with 
R2almost equal to 50% with both rational factors being statistically significant that year. 
There is a notable improvement in terms of the significance of rational factors 
and deterioration of results for the behavioural one.  
In contrast to Chapter 4 results the behavioural factor is not valid across all of the 
examined years. 
At least one of the rational factors are valid in six out of eight years in the sample, 
while in Chapter 4 it was only in half of the cases. In the same way, as in Chapter 4 all 
linear coefficients are positive which is in line with the rational assumption that the 
higher the difference in expected return between value and glamour stocks (according 
to FF returns or fair value dynamics) the higher the contrarian profit. 
Overall, in contrast to Chapter 4 results rational factors appeared to be more 
important for contrarian profits vs the behavioral one. Besides being valid in six years as 
stated above both of them are valid in 2003 – the only year where R2 is large (close to 
50%) while the behavioral factor is not valid that year.  
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Graph 5.3.2.2. R2 for the two regressions 
 
Note: R2are presented only for those years where there is a statistically significant contrarian profit; old- 
regression used in Chapter 4; new – regression used in Chapter 5. 
Results of both tests partially succeeded as was the case in Chapter 4. R2 is 
small in all cases, but it is close to 50% in 2003. Moreover, that year both rational 
factors are valid. In terms of the comparison with Chapter 4 results – on average R2 is 
smaller, but this is only due to 2009 where R2 was abnormally high (close to 70%) in 
Chapter 4. In contrast to Chapter 4 rational factors proved to be more important than the 
behavioural one. At least one of them is valid in six out of eight years and both of them 
are valid in 2003 – the year with the substantial R2. Behavioural factors are not valid in 
any of the years under review.  
 
5.3.3. Ohlson (γ=0, ω=0) model 
Both tests weakly succeeded for this strategy Chapter 4. Overall R2 was low (in 
the range 4.1-18.4%), but in 2009 it almost reached 50%. That year one of the 
behavioural factors was valid, while the rational one was not.  
In this part I will examine whether the new regression based on formula (5.5) is 
able to improve the test results and give more clarity regarding which type of factors 
(rational or behavioural) are more important in explaining  contrarian profits. 
For the years where contrarian profits are statistically positive the results are 
summarised in the table 5.3.3.1. 
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Table 5.3.3.1. Distinguishing between rational and behavioural factors in explaining 
contrarian profits 
Part 1 
  Average 1991 1992 2000 2001 2003 2004 
 Value return 40.5% 27.7% 26.7% 27.3% 18.4% 75.9% 20.7% 
 Glamour return 12.9% 14.3% 10.4% -23.0% 4.8% 37.6% 4.8% 
 Contrarian 
profit 
27.6% 13.4% 16.4% 50.2% 13.6% 38.3% 15.9% 
 Number of 
stocks in 
value/glamour 
portfolios 
 
56 55 88 92 100 105 
 Value-Glamour regression results 
 a 7.7% 3.42% 11.74% -1.66% 13.28% 19.14% 12.99% 
 t-stat for a 1.44 0.48 1.44 -0.16 2.65 2.56 2.81 
R
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
a1 0.2 1.0 -0.4 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 
t-stat for a1 0.93 2.85 -1.49 1.75 1.85 0.43 0.58 
a2 0.3 0.5 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.6 0.2 
t-stat for a2 2.45 1.82 0.06 5.39 0.72 6.51 0.90 
B
e
h
a
v
io
ra
l b1 -1.7 -1.8 0.1 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 1.1 
t-stat for b1 -0.75 -1.59 0.06 -0.52 -0.86 -0.39 1.49 
 R2 19.7% 26.26% 7.93% 30.99% 6.04% 32.20% 6.21% 
         
Part 2 
      2006 2009 2012 
 Value return     15.9% 131.9% 20.4% 
 Glamour return     7.8% 47.0% 12.5% 
 Contrarian 
profit 
    8.1% 84.9% 8.0% 
 Number of 
stocks in 
value/glamour 
portfolios 
    100 79 74 
 Value-Glamour regression results 
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 a     5.02% -3.39% 8.38% 
 t-stat for a     1.37 -0.22 2.03 
R
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
a1     0.1 -0.1 0.7 
t-stat for a1     0.41 -0.63 2.64 
a2     0.2 1.3 -0.4 
t-stat for a2     1.90 6.94 -2.18 
B
e
h
a
v
io
ra
l b1     -1.1 -11.8 0.6 
t-stat for b1     -0.82 -4.65 0.57 
 R2     5.44% 49.83% 12.21% 
Note: highlighted cells indicate statistically significant coefficients; average figures are over the years 
specified in the table. 
The tested regression: 
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘 = 𝑎 + 𝑎1(𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘 − 𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘 ) + 𝑎2∆𝐹𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘 + 𝑏1(𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑣𝑘 − 𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑔𝑘 ) + 𝑒𝑘   , 
where  
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘
  = the difference between a return of a k rated value stock over the period 
between t and t+1 and the return over the same period for a k rated glamour 
stock (the rank 1 for a value stock is the indication that the stock is the most 
undervalued one among value stocks; the same rank for the glamour stock 
means that the stock is the most overvalued one among glamour stocks; value 
and glamour stocks are identified as at the end of March each year, 
𝑎  = constant, 
𝑎1  = linear coefficient for a rational factor related to dynamics of the fair price, 
𝑎2  = linear coefficient for a rational factor related to the expected dynamics of the 
stock price according to FF three factor model, 
𝑏1  = linear coefficient for the behavioural factor, 
𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘   = the change of the fair value for a particular value stock between a time t and 
t+1 scaled by the stock price at time t, 
𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘
  = the change of the fair value for a particular glamour stock between a time t 
and t+1 scaled by the stock price at time t, 
∆𝐹𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘
  = difference in expected returns, according to the FF model between a 
particular value and glamour stocks between a time t and t+1, 
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𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑣𝑘  / 𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑔𝑘   = prior mispricing accumulation over the last five-year period for a particular 
value or glamour stock which is expressed in percentage terms, and 
𝑒𝑘   = residuals. 
There are almost the same results in terms of overall significance of the 
regression for this strategy vs Chapter 4 results (see graph 5.3.3.2). The average level 
of R2 is slightly higher, but this is achieved due to only two year 2000 and 2003. In the 
same way, as in Chapter 4 in 2009 R2is rather high (close to 50%). Additionally, that 
year constant was close to zero, while two out of three factors are statistically 
significant.  
Graph 5.3.3.2. R2 for the two regressions 
 
Note: R2are presented only for those years where there is a statistically significant contrarian profit; old- 
regression used in Chapter 4; new – regression used in Chapter 5. 
In addition, there is a notable improvement in terms of the significance of the 
rational factors and almost the same outcome for behavioural one.  
In the same way, as in Chapter 4 the behavioural factor is valid in 2009 (the year 
with the significant R2). The value of the linear coefficient for a behavioural factor is 
negative that year which is in line with the assumption that there should be a negative 
difference between the value portfolio’s prior accumulated overreaction (in best case it 
should be negative, meaning that the price performance should underperform the 
expected dynamics according to rational factors) and glamour portfolio’s prior 
accumulated overreaction (in best case it should be positive, meaning that the price 
performance should outperform the expected dynamics according to rational factors). 
Consequently, the logical assumption is that the more the difference between the value 
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and glamour accumulated overreaction in the past the more significant should be the 
contribution from this factor to  contrarian profits, while the linear coefficient should be 
negative given that the difference should be negative. In Chapter 4 behavioural factors 
for glamour stocks was valid in the other three years, but its linear coefficient 
contradicted with the rational assumption behind it.   
FF three factors model improved the contribution from rational factors as it is 
statistically significant in four out of nine years in the sample and positive in all cases 
except one (2012). The positive linear coefficient is in line with the logical assumption 
that the higher the difference in expected return between value and glamour stocks the 
higher the contrarian profit. In 2012 the linear coefficient for the FF factor is negative, 
which contradicts with the rational assumption. The rational factor related to the 
dynamics of fair value is statistically significant in two cases while in Chapter 4 it was 
significant in three. Again, the linear coefficient is positive, which is in line with the 
rational assumption behind it. 
Overall in contrast to Chapter 4 results, rational factors seem to be more 
important for explaining contrarian profits than behavioral ones. In 2009 the rational 
factor related to FF expected returns is valid together with the behavioral one. However, 
in all other years the behavioural factor is not significant while at least one of the rational 
factors are significant in some of them. Moreover, the behavioral factor is not valid in 
2004, which is assumed to be the year when the market should correct the prior positive 
overreaction.  
As a result, I conclude that the first test under a new regression has produced the 
same result as in Chapter 4 while the second test produces a different result from 
Chapter 4. R2 is small in all cases like in Chapter 4, but it is close to 50% in 2009. 
Moreover, in 2009 two factors out of three factors are valid. There is an opposite result 
to the one of Chapter 4 with more years being the ones where at least some of the 
rational factors are valid (five years) vs the number of years where behavioural factors 
is valid (one). In addition, the behavioural factor failed to capture some of the 
overreaction correction in 2004, the year after a strong positive overreaction of the 
market.  
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5.3.4. Ohlson (γ=0, ω=1) model 
Both tests weakly succeeded for this strategy in Chapter 4. In one year, 2009, 
R2is close to 40%. The rational factor was not statistically significant that year while two 
behavioural ones were. 
In this part I will examine whether the new regression based on formula (5.5) is 
able to improve the test results and give more clarity regarding which type of factors 
(rational or behavioural) are more important in the explanation of contrarian profits. 
For the years where contrarian profits are statistically positive the results are 
summarised in the table 5.3.4.1. 
Table 5.3.4.1. Distinguishing between rational and behavioural factors in explaining 
contrarian profit 
 
 
Average 2000 2001 2003 2004 2006 2009 2011 
 Value return 37.8% 29.8% 23.7% 59.9% 14.7% 15.1% 110.5% 11.0% 
 Glamour return 14.4% -25.6% -0.5% 46.9% 3.8% 7.3% 71.1% -2.5% 
 Contrarian profit 23.5% 55.5% 24.3% 13.1% 10.9% 7.8% 39.4% 13.5% 
 
Number of 
stocks in 
value/glamour 
portfolios 
 93 94 102 110 113 103 116 
 Value-Glamour regression results 
 a 13.5% 16.03% 26.12% 20.37% 13.63% 2.01% 2.56% 13.88% 
 t-stat for a 2.27 1.46 4.80 3.76 2.34 0.58 0.22 2.74 
R
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
a1 3.2% 5.2% 1.1% 4.9% 1.8% 8.1% 1.9% -0.6% 
t-stat for a1 2.12 2.26 0.66 5.58 1.77 1.84 3.32 -0.58 
a2 0.2 0.4 -0.3 0.3 0.1 0.4 1.0 -0.7 
t-stat for a2 2.16 3.45 -1.19 4.82 0.74 3.39 7.18 -3.28 
B
e
h
a
v
io
ra
l b1 -0.8 -0.3 -1.4 -0.1 1.0 -0.8 -5.9 1.8 
t-stat for b1 -0.38 -0.20 -1.70 -0.12 1.63 -0.69 -3.28 1.71 
 R2 19.6% 19.0% 4.8% 36.1% 6.1% 14.3% 46.6% 10.4% 
Note: highlighted cells indicate statistically significant coefficients; average figures are over the years 
specified in the table. 
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The tested regression: 
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘 = 𝑎 + 𝑎1(𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘 − 𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘 ) + 𝑎2∆𝐹𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘 + 𝑏1(𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑣𝑘 − 𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑔𝑘 ) + 𝑒𝑘   , 
where  
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘
  = the difference between a return of a k rated value stock over the period 
between t and t+1 and the return over the same period for a k rated glamour 
stock (the rank 1 for a value stock is the indication that the stock is the most 
undervalued one among value stocks; the same rank for the glamour stock 
means that the stock is the most overvalued one among glamour stocks; value 
and glamour stocks are identified as at the end of March each year, 
𝑎  = constant, 
𝑎1  = linear coefficient for a rational factor related to dynamics of the fair price, 
𝑎2  = linear coefficient for a rational factor related to the expected dynamics of the 
stock price according to FF three factor model, 
𝑏1  = linear coefficient for the behavioural factor, 
𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘   = the change of the fair value for a particular value stock between a time t and 
t+1 scaled by the stock price at time t, 
𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘
  = the change of the fair value for a particular glamour stock between a time t 
and t+1 scaled by the stock price at time t, 
∆𝐹𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘
  = difference in expected returns, according to FF model between a particular 
value and glamour stocks between a time t and t+1, 
𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑣𝑘  / 𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑔𝑘   = prior mispricing accumulation over the last five-year period for a particular 
value or glamour stock which is expressed in percentage terms, and 
𝑒𝑘   = residuals. 
Overall there is a slightly better R2 under a new regression compared to the one 
used in Chapter 4 (see graph 5.3.4.2). In four out of seven years R2 for the new 
regression is better, including 2009, where R2is now higher than 45%. In addition, there 
is a notable improvement of R2 in 2003, where no regression explains more than one 
third of the contrarian profit. In both cases (2003,2009) two rational factors are 
significant  and in 2009 behavioural factor is significant as well. Moreover, in 2009 
constant is close to zero and is not statistically significant.  
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Graph 5.3.4.2. R2 for the two regressions 
 
Note: R2 are presented only for those years where there is a statistically significant contrarian profit; old- 
regression used in Chapter 4; new – regression used in Chapter 5. 
There is a notable improvement in terms of the significance of rational factors 
and a small deterioration of results for the behavioural one. 
The behavioural factor is valid only in 2009 (the year with the highest R2), while in 
Chapter 4 at least one of the behavioural factors was significant in three years. 
However, the linear coefficient for the behavioural factor is in line with the rational 
assumption that there should be a negative difference between the value portfolio and 
prior accumulated overreaction (in best case it should be negative, meaning that the 
price performance should underperform the expected dynamics according to rational 
factors) and the glamour portfolio’s prior accumulated overreaction (in best case it 
should be positive, meaning that the price performance should outperform the expected 
dynamics according to rational factors).  
At least one of the rational factors are valid in five out of seven years in contrast 
to two years in Chapter 4. In all the cases except one (2011) the linear coefficients are 
positive. A positive linear coefficient is in line with the logical assumption that the higher 
the difference in expected return between value and glamour stocks the higher the 
contrarian profit. In 2011 the linear coefficient for FF factor is negative, which 
contradicts with the rational pricing assumption. The rational factor related to the 
dynamics of fair value is statistically significant in three cases while in Chapter 4 it was 
significant in two. Again, the linear coefficient is positive, which is in line with the rational 
assumption behind it. 
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Overall, in contrast to Chapter 4 results rational factors appeared to be more 
important for contrarian profits compared to behavioral ones. Besides being valid in five 
years as stated above both of them are valid in 2003 and 2009 – the years where R2 is 
large (close to 35% and 45% respectively)- while behavioral one is valid only in 2009.  
Results of both tests partially succeeded like it was in Chapter 4. R2 is small in all 
cases, but it is close to 45% in 2009 and to 35% in 2003. Moreover, in those years both 
rational factors are valid and in 2009 all three factors are valid, while the regression 
constant is close to zero and is not significant. In terms of comparison with Chapter 4 
results – on average R2 is higher and there are two years with relatively large R2 vs only 
one in Chapter 4. In contrast to Chapter 4 rational factors proved to be more important 
than behavioural one. At least one of the rational factors is valid in five out of seven 
years and both of them are valid in 2003 and 2009 the years with the a substantial R2. 
Behavioural factor is valid only once (2009). 
 
5.3.5. Discounted cash flow model 
This is quite unusual strategy according to Chapter 4 results. On one hand the 
first test weakly succeeded with R2 being high in 2009 (64%). On the other hand, none 
of the factors were significant that year, while in other cases only in two years one of the 
behavioural factors were significant.  
In this part I will examine whether the new regression based on formula (5.5) is 
able to improve the test results and give more clarity regarding which type of factors 
(rational or behavioural) are more important in the explanation of contrarian profits. 
For the years where contrarian profits are statistically positive the results are 
summarised in the Table 5.3.5.1. 
Table 5.3.5.1. Distinguishing between rational and behavioural factors in explaining 
contrarian profit 
 
 
Average 1992 1995 1997 2000 2001 2003 2009 2012 
 Value return 47.0% 23.0% 49.3% 58.6% 33.0% 20.8% 67.4% 101.9% 21.8% 
 
Glamour 
return 
21.0% 9.2% 18.2% 33.9% -18.1% 8.8% 36.4% 66.9% 12.7% 
 
Contrarian 
profit 
26.0% 13.9% 31.1% 24.7% 51.1% 12.0% 31.1% 34.9% 9.1% 
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Number of 
stocks in 
value/glamour 
portfolios 
 33 43 43 58 57 55 67 82 
 Value-Glamour regression results 
 a 12.4% 16.9% 27.7% 21.6% 17.2% 3.9% 12.7% -14.4% 13.9% 
 t-stat for a 1.93 2.85 4.12 2.62 1.62 0.69 1.99 -1.84 3.39 
R
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
a1 0.2% -0.3% 0.1% -0.2% 2.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.2% 0.0% 
t-stat for a1 0.85 -0.65 0.18 -0.23 1.78 0.02 3.07 2.72 -0.11 
a2 0.4 0.6 -0.4 -0.1 0.3 0.7 0.4 1.3 0.4 
t-stat for a2 3.27 2.63 -1.54 -0.56 3.11 2.99 4.59 12.69 2.25 
B
e
h
a
v
io
ra
l b1 -0.2 3.0 3.1 7.1 -4.2 -0.9 -4.1 -5.3 -0.6 
t-stat for b1 -0.46 1.17 1.32 3.46 -2.32 -1.11 -2.33 -3.17 -0.71 
 R2 30.3% 22.7% 10.2% 27.2% 29.3% 18.3% 44.8% 80.8% 9.1% 
Note: highlighted cells indicate statistically significant coefficients; average figures are over the years 
specified in the table. 
The tested regression: 
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘 = 𝑎 + 𝑎1(𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘 − 𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘 ) + 𝑎2∆𝐹𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘 + 𝑏1(𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑣𝑘 − 𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑔𝑘 ) + 𝑒𝑘   , 
where  
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘
  = the difference between a return of a k rated value stock over the period 
between t and t+1 and the return over the same period for a k rated glamour 
stock (the rank 1 for a value stock is the indication that the stock is the most 
undervalued one among value stocks; the same rank for the glamour stock 
means that the stock is the most overvalued one among glamour stocks; value 
and glamour stocks are identified as at the end of March each year, 
𝑎  = constant, 
𝑎1  = linear coefficient for a rational factor related to dynamics of the fair price, 
𝑎2  = linear coefficient for a rational factor related to the expected dynamics of the 
stock price according to the FF three factor model, 
𝑏1  = linear coefficient for the behavioural factor, 
𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘   = the change of the fair value for a particular value stock between a time t and 
t+1 scaled by the stock price at time t, 
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𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘
  = the change of the fair value for a particular glamour stock between a time t 
and t+1 scaled by the stock price at time t, 
∆𝐹𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘
  = difference in expected returns according to FF model between a particular 
value and glamour stocks between a time t and t+1, 
𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑣𝑘  / 𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑔𝑘   = prior mispricing accumulation over the last five-year period for a particular 
value or glamour stock which is expressed in percentage terms, and 
𝑒𝑘   = residuals. 
There is a notable improvement of the overall regression significance. In six out 
of eight years R2 for the new regression is significantly higher than for the one used in 
Chapter 4 (see graph 5.3.5.2). In the other two years, it is close to the figures observed 
in Chapter 4. Moreover, besides 2009, which is the year with a relatively high R2 in the 
previous Chapter, now R2 for 2003 is also relatively high at a level of above 40%. In 
contrast to Chapter 4 in both cases all three factors are significant, while constants are 
relatively small compared to actual contrarian profits and are not valid. Finally, average 
R2 is the highest one among examined strategies with the use of both Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5 regressions.  
Graph 5.3.5.2. R2 for the two regressions 
Note: R2are presented only for those years where there is a statistically significant contrarian profit; old- 
regression used in Chapter 4; new – regression used in Chapter 5. 
There is a notable improvement in terms of the significance of rational and 
behavioural factors. 
The behavioural factor is valid in half of the examined cases (four out of eight) 
while in Chapter 4 one of the behavioural factors were valid only in two cases. 
Moreover, in Chapter 4 behavioural factors were not significant in the only year with the 
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high R2 (2009), while now it is valid in both significant years (2003, 2009). Moreover, the 
linear coefficient for the behavioural factor in Chapter 4 was not in line with the rational 
assumption behind it. Now in three out of four cases the linear coefficient for the 
behavioural factor is negative which is in line with the rational assumption that there 
should be a negative difference between the value portfolio’s prior accumulated 
overreaction (in the best case it should be negative, meaning that the price performance 
should underperform the expected dynamics according to rational factors) and glamour 
prior accumulated overreaction (in the best case it should be positive, meaning that the 
price performance should outperform the expected dynamics according to rational 
factors). Only in one case (1997) it is positive.  
In Chapter 4 test there were no years where the rational factor was valid. Now in 
six out of eight years at least one of the rational factors are significant. This is due to the 
FF expected return factor as it is the one which is valid in all the six cases. The 
dynamics of fair price are only valid in 2003 and 2009 the years with the highest R2. 
Moreover, linear coefficients are positive in all cases which is in line with the rational 
assumption behind them - that the higher the difference in expected return between 
value and glamour stocks (according to FF returns or fair value dynamics) the higher 
the contrarian profit. 
In contrast to Chapter 4 now it is possible to make a conclusion regarding the 
relative importance of the rational and behavioral factors for explaining contrarian 
profits. In two years where the regression is able to explain a substantial part of the 
contrarian profit both rational factors are valid, while the behavioral factor is valid only in 
one of them. Moreover, there is higher number of years where at least one of the 
rational factors are valid (six) vs the number of years where behavioral factor is valid 
(four). Finally, all linear coefficients for rational factors are in line with the rational 
assumption behind them, while for behavioral factor it is true only in three out of four 
cases. 
Results of both tests partially succeeded, which is better result vs Chapter 4. R2 
is relatively high in two cases now (2003, 2009) with the figure being 45% and 81% 
respectively. In both of these cases constant is not significant while at least two out of 
three factors are valid. Moreover, the average level of R2 is the highest one if I take into 
consideration both Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 results. Consequently, I conclude that the 
suggested regression can be considered as a relatively efficient tool in explaining 
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results for this strategy. This is an improvement when compared to  Chapter 4’s results 
of this test for this strategy. Chapter 4 failed to provide any notable evidence for this 
test. With the new regression I conclude that rational factors are more important for 
contrarian profits explanations vs behavioural ones. Rational factors are valid in both 
significant years (2003, 2009) while the behavioural is valid only in one of them. 
Moreover, there is a higher number of years where at least one of the rational factors 
are valid (six) vs the number of years where behavioral factor is valid (four). Finally, all 
linear coefficients for rational factors are in line with the rational assumption behind 
them, while for the behavioral factors it is true only in three out of four cases.  
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5.4. Test on the overall sample 
The above analysis was done on the basis of the data when I take into 
consideration only those years where contrarian profit is statistically significant and 
positive. In this sub-section I will apply the common approach of testing using the whole 
sample without distinguishing between years with statistically significant and non-
significant contrarian profits. I will run regression 5.5 for all the data regarding matching  
value and   glamour stocks for all the 23 years in the analysis.  
Table 5.4.1. Distinguishing between rational and behavioural factors in explaining 
contrarian profit 
Part 1 Ratio based contrarian strategies 
 
 
P/E 
P/E (E-
expected 
EPS) B/P CF/P FCFE/P 
 Value return 18.0% 16.2% 19.2% 21.2% 20.0% 
 Glamour return 12.9% 15.0% 13.9% 9.2% 13.5% 
 Contrarian profit 5.1% 1.2% 5.3% 12.0% 6.5% 
 
Number of 
stocks in 
value/glamour 
portfolios 
118 118 107 116 94 
 Value-Glamour regression results 
 a 4,0% 2,6% -1,6% 8,9% 6,8% 
 t-stat for a 3,3 2,3 -1,2 7,5 5,4 
R
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
a1 
0,6% 10,9% 5,1% 2,1% 0,6% 
t-stat for a1 1,9 12,7 4,0 4,7 2,3 
a2 0,5 0,5 0,6 0,5 0,6 
t-stat for a2 16,6 16,6 21,0 17,3 18,4 
B
e
h
a
v
io
ra
l b1 
-0,1 -0,2 0,1 -0,3 -0,5 
t-stat for b1 
-0,3 -0,7 0,4 -1,6 -2,4 
 R2 9,3% 14,2% 16,1% 11,1% 14,0% 
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Part 2 Valuation models based contrarian strategies 
 
 
AEG RIM Ohlson (00) Ohlson (01) DCF 
 Value return 16.0% 17.9% 18.7% 16.6% 21.0% 
 Glamour return 13.4% 13.2% 13.4% 13.5% 10.2% 
 Contrarian profit 2.5% 4.7% 5.3% 3.0% 10.8% 
 
Number of 
stocks in 
value/glamour 
portfolios 
82 78 79 88 56 
 Value-Glamour regression results 
 a 1,5% 5,4% 0,6% 4,4% 7,4% 
 t-stat for a 1,2 3,8 0,4 3,5 5,7 
R
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
a1 0,0% 14,2% 12,5% 1,2% 0,1% 
t-stat for a1 2,6 7,6 3,1 7,3 4,2 
a2 0,6 0,6 0,7 0,5 0,6 
t-stat for a2 18,5 18,4 21,6 17,9 16,1 
B
e
h
a
v
io
ra
l 
b1 0,8 0,3 -0,4 0,3 -0,2 
t-stat for b1 3,2 0,9 -1,4 1,3 -0,8 
 R2 15,7% 20,3% 21,3% 16,1% 19,1% 
Note: the data regarding pairs of value/glamour stocks for all the years are taken into consideration; 
highlighted cells indicate statistically significant coefficients; 
The tested regression: 
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘 = 𝑎 + 𝑎1(𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘 − 𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘 ) + 𝑎2∆𝐹𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘 + 𝑏1(𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑣𝑘 − 𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑔𝑘 ) + 𝑒𝑘   , 
where  
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘
  = the difference between a return of a k rated value stock over the period 
between t and t+1 and the return over the same period for a k rated glamour 
stock (the rank 1 for a value stock is the indication that the stock is the most 
undervalued one among value stocks; the same rank for the glamour stock 
means that the stock is the most overvalued one among glamour stocks; value 
and glamour stocks are identified as at the end of March each year, 
𝑎  = constant, 
𝑎1  = linear coefficient for a rational factor related to dynamics of the fair price, 
𝑎2  = linear coefficient for a rational factor related to the expected dynamics of the 
stock price according to the FF three factor model, 
𝑏1  = linear coefficient for the behavioural factor, 
𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘   = the change of the fair value for a particular value stock between a time t and 
t+1 scaled by the stock price at time t, 
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𝐹𝑡+1
𝑔𝑘   = the change of the fair value for a particular glamour stock between a time t 
and t+1 scaled by the stock price at time t, 
∆𝐹𝐹𝑡+1
𝑣𝑘−𝑔𝑘
  = difference in expected returns according to FF model between a particular 
value and glamour stocks between a time t and t+1, 
𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑣𝑘  / 𝑀𝑡−5,𝑡
𝑔𝑘   = prior mispricing accumulation over the last five-year period for a particular 
value or glamour stock which is expressed in percentage terms, and 
𝑒𝑘   = residuals. 
The linear coefficient on the rational factor, associated with the difference in the 
dynamics of expected return, proxied for by the Fama and French three factor model 
estimated for both  value and glamour portfolios is statistically significant for all the ten 
examined strategies. In all the case it is positive, which means that the higher the 
difference between the expected returns over the testing period of a particular pair of 
value and glamour stocks the higher the contrarian profit. This is in line with a rational 
viewpoint  and also confirms the result of the analysis when only years with statistically 
significant positive contrarian profits are included in my tests.   
The linear coefficient on the rational factor, associated with the difference in the 
dynamics of fair values, for glamour/value stocks is statistically significant in nine out of 
ten examined strategies. In all the case it is positive, which means that the higher the 
difference between the change of fair price over the testing period of a particular pair of 
value and glamour stocks the higher the contrarian profit. This is in line with what could 
be expected from the rational point of view and in line with the result of the analysis 
when only years with statistically significant positive contrarian profits are taken into 
consideration.   
The linear coefficient on the behavioural factor, associated with the difference in 
the accumulated prior mispricing between a particular pair of matched value and 
glamour stocks,  is statistically significant in only two out of ten examined strategies. In 
one case (for contrarian strategy on the base of FCFE/P ratio) the linear coefficient is 
negative which affirms the rational assumption that there should be a negative 
difference between the value portfolio’s prior accumulated overreaction (in the ide; case 
it should be negative, meaning that the price performance should underperform the 
expected dynamics according to rational factors) and glamour prior accumulated 
overreaction (in the ideal case it should be positive, meaning that the price performance 
should outperform the expected dynamics according to rational factors). In the other 
cases (for contrarian strategy on the base of fair value in line with AEG valuation model) 
the linear coefficient is positive, which contradicts with the rational assumption. 
Chapter 5. Are contrarian returns mainly explained by the Fama French three-factor risk model? 
5.4. Test on the overall sample 232 
Overall results of the analysis using the full sample shows that rational factors 
are more important in explaining contrarian profits than the behavioural ones. In nine 
out of ten examined strategies linear coefficients for both rational factors are statistically 
significant and their signs are in line with the rational assumptions. For one strategy 
(based on P/E ratio) only the linear coefficient associated with the factor related to the 
Fama and French three factor model is statistically significant. On the other hand the 
linear coefficient on the behavioural factor is statistically significant only for two out of 
ten strategies with the sign on linear coefficient being in line with the rational 
assumption only in one case.  
In the same way as in Chapter 4 this overall conclusion is stronger when the 
analysis is done on the base of the whole sample rather than on the base of the sample 
of years where contrarian profit for a particular strategy is statistically significant and 
positive. In most of the strategies, there are no signs that behavioural factor has any 
significant contribution to the explanation of the contrarian profit with the approach when 
the whole years being in the sample for the analysis. On the other hand for most of the 
strategies some credit can be given to the behavioural factor as a result of the analysis 
with the approach when only years with statistically significant and positive contrarian 
profit are taken into consideration. Under this approach for eight out of ten strategies 
under review there is at least one year when behavioural factor is important in 
explaining contrarian profit.  
In some cases the dominance of rational factors is not that strong under the 
approach of the short sample vs the analysis under the whole sample. For example, the 
analysis on the base of the whole sample for DCF strategy show that both factors are 
statistically significant while behavioural factor is not. With the sample when only 
statistically significant years are taken into consideration the rational factor associated 
with the relative change in fair values for glamour and value stocks is statistically 
significant only in two out of eight years under review, while behavioural factor is 
statistically significant in half of the years.  
In the same way as in Chapter 4 this could be a sign of a misleading effect from 
the inclusion in the analysis years where contrarian profits exist mainly due to luck 
rather than due to ability of a particular strategy to efficiently distinguish between under 
and overvalued stocks.  
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5.5. Conclusion 
 
The test of the adjusted version of the regression used in Chapter 4 resulted in 
an opposite outcome to the one in Chapter 4. Rational factors are more important in 
explaining contrarian profits than behavioural one, which is mainly due to FF three 
factor model. However, the outcome of my analysis gives some credit to other factors 
than FF three factors model. This is different from the results of the proponents of FF 
three factor model who argue that FF three factor model can fully explain the contrarian 
profits for contrarian strategies in case the stocks are ranked only with the use of one 
criteria (Fama and French 1996 for US, Fama et al 2000 for US, Gregory et al 2001 for 
UK). My analysis shows that another rational factor – dynamics of a fair price - is also 
important (although in less cases that the FF three factor model). This relates to the 
result of Shiller (1981) that a fair price can be implied from a stock’s long term trend and 
extends his outcome as in my analysis fair price dynamics are based on a wide variety 
of methods. In addition, behavioural factor related to correction of prior accumulated 
mispricing in some cases also contributes to the explanation of the contrarian return. 
For example, for 2009 (the year when eight strategies have positive returns and most of 
the regressions have relatively high R2) the bevioral factor has statitstically significant 
linear coefficient in six out of eight cases, while the factor associated with the dynamics 
of fair price has statistically significant linear coefficient in four out of eight cases (see 
graph 5.4.2 for more details).  
Overall this outcome is in line with the outcome of Dissanaike and Lim (2010) test 
of whether FF three factor model can explain contrarian profit over one year for a broad 
range of contrarian strategies (based on ratios, past returns and valuation models) for 
the UK market and have found that it can explain only part of it. At the same time my 
result extends the results of Dissaniake and Lim (2010) in the several ways. Firstly, I 
show which other factors can be important in explaining contrarian profits (fair price 
dynamics and correction of accumulated prior mispricing). Secondly, I add more 
contrarian strategies in the analysis (DCF, AEG, FE/P, FCFE/P). Finally, I focus on the 
US market instead of UK one. 
The outcome of the analysis in Chapter 5  has more significance than the 
outcome of Chapter 4 (see Table 5.5.1).  
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The test of overall significance of the regression weakly succeeded in six out of 
ten strategies. Moreover, in one case (DCF) there are two years when R2 is above 40%, 
which is 25% of the revised years for this strategy. In addition, for 2009 R2 reached 
81%, which is the highest observed R2 for the old and new regressions. In Chapter 4 the 
first test weakly succeeded in only half of the cases and there was no test where two 
years had a relatively high R2 like for DCF in Chapter 5. 
The test of relative significance of behavioural and rational factors produced 
more certain outcome with an opposite outcome to the one of Chapter 4. In all the 
cases, rational factors proved to be relatively more important for explanation of 
contrarian profits. In Chapter 4 in seven cases behavioural factors proved to be better 
than rational one. In addition, in all the cases the level of conviction in the results of 
comparison is stronger for the new regression compared to the old one. Improvement of 
this test results is mainly due to the expected FF return factor, which is normally 
significant in more years than dynamics of the fair value (the second rational factor, 
which was used in both regressions). 
Table 5.5.1. Comparison of tests results of regressions used in Chapter 4 and Chapter 
5 
Strategy 
Test of regression significance 
Test of relative importance of rational 
and behavioural factors 
Old New Old New 
P/E Failed (10%) Failed (11%) Behavioural Rational 
P/E (E-expected 
EPS) 
Failed (22%) Failed (20%) 
Impossible to 
conclude 
Rational 
B/P 
Weakly succeeded 
once (11%) – in 
2009 R2=42% 
Succeeded once 
(16%) – in 2009 
R2=54% 
Rational Rational 
CF/P Failed (15%) 
Weakly succeeded 
once (13%) – in 
2009 R2=46% 
Behavioural Rational 
FCFE/P Failed (6%) Failed (9%) Rational Rational 
AEG Failed (12%) Failed (23%) Behavioural Rational 
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RIM 
Succeeded once 
(29%) – in 2009 
R2=69% 
Succeeded once 
(23%) – in 2003 
R2=49% 
Behavioural Rational 
Ohlson (00) 
Succeeded once 
(16%) – in 2009 
R2=49% 
Succeeded once 
(20%) – in 2009 
R2=50% 
Behavioural Rational 
Ohlson (01) 
Weakly succeeded 
once (18%) – in 
2009 R2=41% 
Weakly succeeded 
once (20%) – in 
2009 R2=45% 
Behavioural Rational 
DCF 
Succeeded once 
(19%) – in 2009 
R2=64% 
Succeeded/weakly 
succeeded twice 
(30%) – in 2009 
R2=81%, in 2003 
R2=45% (which 
are 25% cases – 
two out of eight 
years in the 
sample) 
Behavioural Rational 
Note: old- regression used in Chapter 4; new – regression used in Chapter 5; figures in () is average R2.  
Addition of the difference in expected returns between value and glamour stocks 
according to the FF three factors model improved the contribution of rational factors to 
the explanation of the contrarian profits. In three years when the average R2across the 
examined strategies is the highest (2000, 2003, 2009) this factor is significant in 100% 
or close to this figure cases (see graphs below). Overall during the years where at least 
half of the strategies had significant contrarian profits factor associated with the FF 
three factor model has a higher share (in terms of the number of strategies where this 
factor is significant divided by the overall number of strategies under review for a 
particular year) compared to the other two factors (fair value, and correction of prior 
mispricing) in four out of seven years, while factor associated with the dynamics of fair 
price is better than the other two factors only in two years and behavioural factor does 
not dominate in any of the years. 
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Graph 5.5.1. Share of the significance of the examined factors for the years where at 
least half of the strategies have significant contrarian profits 
Note: the years where at least five strategies have significant contrarian profits are taken into 
consideration. In each of this year for each of the factors I calculated the share of strategies with a 
particular factor being significant in the overall number of strategies in review for that year. FV- dynamics 
of fair value; FF – expected return according to FF three factor model; Miss – accumulated prior 
mispricing. 
Graph 5.5.2. Average R2across strategies for two examined approaches 
 
I think that to have more clear picture on the comparison of rational and 
behavioural factors there is a need for more analysis of the question whether FF three 
factors are actually risk factors.  
For example, let’s assume that over a five years period there was a flat dynamics 
of the market overall so Rm factor in the FF model did not matter much. Also lets 
assume that SML factor was not important as well. In this case we are left with the HML 
factor only. Let’s assume that there is only two stocks on the market: A and B. A has 
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each year and had a low B/P over all the period. B has been performing poorly with 
losses each year and had a high B/P throughout the period. Consequently, the HML 
factor for A versus B should be negative each year (return of B minus return of A). As a 
result B return should have a positive beta (positive exposure to risk) to HML factor 
given the losses each year, while A should have a negative beta (no risk at all) to HML 
factor. On the sixth year the reversal happened and valuation of B rebounded strongly 
while A contracted as investor re-allocated their portfolios from A to B. As a result in 
sixth year HML was positive and the betas for A and B which I get from prior five years 
managed to explain almost fully the difference in performance of B and A in sixth year, 
which is the contrarian profit for B/P strategy on a market with only two stocks. 
Now let’s look at the above described example from the point of view that over 
five years period investors were wrongly overoptimistic about A and wrongly 
overpessimistic about B. Consequently, the dynamics which was observed over this five 
years period was de facto a accumulation of mispricing for these two stocks (A 
becoming more and more glamourous; B becoming more and more value laden), which 
than corrected in sixth year.  As a result in this simple example I can say that the 
difference in betas to HML between A and B was not due to some fundamental 
difference in risks, but due to difference in accumulated mispricing. 
The intention to benefit in terms of explanatory power after making the 
behavioural factor more stock specific mainly failed as this factor continued to be valid 
mainly in 2009 – the year of the strongest prior mispricing correction – like it was in 
Chapter 4. The only notable exception is the test for DCF strategy. The behavioural 
factor is significant in two cases (2003, 2009) of a relatively high R2. Moreover it is 
significant in two other less significant cases (1997, 2000), but this time only in 2000 the 
linear coefficient is negative which is in line with the rational assumption behind this 
factor that there should be a negative difference between the value portfolio’s prior 
accumulated overreaction (in the best case it should be negative, meaning that the price 
performance should underperform the expected dynamics implied by rational pricing 
factors) and glamour portfolio’s prior accumulated overreaction (in best case it should 
be positive, meaning that the price performance should outperform the expected 
dynamics implied by rational pricing factors). 
Such an outcome can be due to more stock specific factors which are necessary 
to take into consideration. I included the individual prior mispricing accumulation, 
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assuming that it should affect the correction of this mispricing in the test period, but this 
seems to be not enough. Additional factors can be related to the speed with which this 
accumulated mispricing will be eliminated. Here there could be a wide range of factors 
which sometimes are hard to quantify. For example, there could be a start of turnaround 
story for rather poor performing companies which is visible only through some news 
related to its change of strategy, but which could trigger a case for a revised investment 
strategy by the market participants. In addition, there could be some relation to the size 
of prior mispricing during the time over which it was accumulated and the correction of 
mispricing. For example, if mispricing was mainly accumulated in the beginning of the 
prior period under review (one year in my tests) than it could be more likely to start 
being eliminated during the test period vs the case when mispricing was mainly 
accumulated near the end of the prior period under review. Further research can be 
done here to incorporate quantifiable proxies for investment strategy revisions during 
the testing period. For example, revisions of earnings expectations or the power of 
earnings surprises etc. 
The outcome of the analysis on the basis of the full sample is in line with the 
outcome on the basis of the sample of those years when contrarian profits are 
statistically significant. In nine or out ten examined strategies linear coefficients upon  
both rational factors are statistically significant, while for the behavioural factor this the 
case for only two strategies. Moreover, for the only strategy (based of P/E ratio) when 
the linear coefficient for the rational factor, associated with the difference in dynamics of 
fair values, between value and glamour portfolios is not statistically significant the linear 
coefficient for the behavioural factor is not statistically significant as well. Finally, in all 
the cases when linear coefficients on the rational factors are statistically significant their 
signs are in line with rational pricing, while for the behavioural factor this is the case only 
in one out of two cases with statistically significant linear coefficients. This means that 
the outcome of the analysis on the overall sample provides the evidence of even more 
strong dominance of the rational factors vs the behavioural one in explaining contrarian 
profits.  
In the same way as in Chapter 4 this could be a sign of a misleading effect from 
the inclusion in the analysis years where contrarian profits exist mainly due to luck 
rather than due to ability of a particular strategy to efficiently distinguish between under 
and overvalued stocks. 
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The results on the overall sample are closer to the results of Fama and French 
1996, Fama et al 2000 and Gregory et al 2001 in suggesting that the  contribution of 
behavioural factor in explaining stock price movements is rather small. However, my 
results show that other rational factor – dynamics of fair value- is also important in most 
of the cases, which can be considered as an extension of the results of the above 
mentioned authors.  
 
  
Chapter 6. Conclusion 
5.5. Conclusion 240 
Chapter 6. Conclusion 
6.1. The research questions 
The existence of contrarian profits is a well-documented finding across various 
equity markets around the world. A key question, which is the focus of this research, is - 
why do they exist? Potential answers are examined in a large number of research 
papers, and fall into two categories: rational (i.e. there is a difference in risks of glamour 
and value stocks) and behavioral (i.e. the market regularly overshoots, which leads to a 
mis-valuation of glamour/value stocks). However, a consensus has not been achieved 
so far. 
Amongst behavioral explanations the most important ones are naïve 
extrapolation of past dynamics of the companies’ fundamentals and errors in the 
analysts’ expectation, which are naively priced by the market. However, what is missing 
from the prior research of the behavioral explanation of contrarian profits is a direct test 
of the mispricing correction regarding sources of contrarian profit, where mispricing is 
estimated in relation to a particular fair price estimation method implied by a particular 
contrarian strategy. This analysis is undertaken here, and should be a valuable addition 
to the discussion given that an assumption of periodic correction of stock prices to some 
fair levels is central for behavioral explanations of contrarian profits. And this is what 
some of the researchers observe. For example, Shiller (1981) showed that prices 
fluctuate around fundamental fair value based on the discounted dividend stream. 
Consequently one research question I have analysed is: 
Are contrarian returns mainly explained by the behavioural factor (the correction of prior 
mispricing) rather than by rational reasons (the dynamics of stocks’ fair values)? 
Among rational reasons for contrarian profits the most important one is the 
potential difference in risks between glamour and value stocks, according to Fama and 
French three factors model. Consequently, I think that it is important to incorporate this 
factor in the analysis and test whether this is more or less important than the mispricing 
correction. As a result another research question I have analysed is: 
Are contrarian returns mainly explained by the Fama French three factor risk model 
rather than by the behavioural factor (the correction of prior mispricing)? 
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Also among rational reasons, given in the literature, which prevent portfolio 
managers from using contrarian strategies in the first place are transaction costs, which 
are considered to be an important obstacle for short term contrarian profits. I think that a 
more important obstacle could be failure of contrarian strategies to perform better than a 
passive strategy which is based on forming a portfolio from all stocks available in the 
sample without distinguishing between them according to any fundamental criteria. In 
the present world investors always have a cheaper option to use index funds or ETFs 
instead of actively managed portfolios. Consequently, in order to start using a particular 
contrarian strategy a portfolio manager should believe that it can compete well with this 
alternative. In terms of a research question, it is captured in the following way: 
Are contrarian returns not arbitraged away due to them being unattractive for investors 
relative to a passive investment strategy? 
Another question, which has been researched in the literature, is – which 
contrarian strategy is the best one? The key finding here is that CF/P approach is in 
many cases better than most of the other strategies or at least on par of some of them 
based on more sophisticated approach which incorporates valuation models. Despite 
this being a valuable insight for practical implementation of contrarian strategies by 
portfolio managers I think that this topic can be considered as the secondary one. There 
is little point in comparing various contrarian strategies if, in the event that they are not 
attractive to investors due to their inferiority to a passive strategy, or in the event that 
the key reason behind contrarian profits is difference in risks/other rational factors. 
6.2. The findings and further research: contrarian vs passive strategies 
I have started the analysis from the question regarding efficiency of contrarian 
strategies in comparison with a passive one given that it provides a back ground for the 
analysis of the other two questions. While analysing efficiency of each of the contrarian 
strategies I was able to find out the years when profits for a particular contrarian 
strategy are positive and statistically significant. These are the years when I can 
analyse the reason of contrarian profits existence as in other years the profits are either 
not statistically difference from zero or negative.  
The comparison of the contrarian strategies efficiency vs a passive strategy leads to the 
conclusion that an equally weighted portfolio of all constituents of S&P 500 over a 
particular testing period was superior to any of the tested contrarian strategies from 
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risk/return perspective. This outcome holds over one year, six months and three months 
testing periods.  
For a one year testing period in most cases contrarian strategies under review 
(based on past return, ratios and valuation models) were far worse than a passive 
strategy from a risk/return point of view. The Calmar ratio is in the range of -0.01 to 0.08 
for most of them, while passive strategy level is 0.19. The key problems being a smaller 
number of statistically significant positive returns and a smaller ratio of statistically 
significant positive returns divided by the number of statistically significant negative 
returns. The number of statistically significant positive returns varies from 5 to 12 vs. 19 
for a passive strategy. The ratio of the number of statistically significant positive returns 
and negative ones is 6.3 for a passive strategy, while for the examined strategies it 
varies from 0.9 to 4 for most of them. 
On the other hand, most of the strategies have on average a better return for 
statistically significant positive years. However, to a large extent this is due to a large 
difference in results between passive and active strategies in the two years 2000 and 
2009. In 2000 all of the active strategies have a negative return for a glamour portfolio 
and a positive return for a value portfolio. In 2009 all of the strategies have a positive 
return for value portfolio, which is substantially higher than return for the glamour one or 
for the return for a passive strategy. 
Overall most of the strategies not only performed worse than the passive one, but 
also do not have a statistically significant positive return over the 23 years according to 
the t-test, which is normally used in the literature. 
The only three strategies, which performed relatively well, are the CF/P, FCFE/P 
and DCF. These strategies have a statistically significant positive return across the 23 
years in the sample according to a t-test, with t-statistics being 2.5, 2.1 and 3.4 
respectively for CF/P, FCFE/P and DCF.  CF/P strategy has a smaller drawdown 
(43.7%) than a passive strategy, rather high number of statistically significant positive 
returns and relatively high ratio of positive returns vs losses. This helps it to perform 
almost as well as the passive strategy. FCFE/P has a substantially smaller drawdown 
(28.1%) than a passive strategy and a higher ratio of positive returns vs losses (7). DCF 
has a smaller number of statistically significant positive returns, but there are no 
statistically significant losses and the maximum drawdown is substantially smaller than 
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for the passive strategy (27.8% figure vs 52.7%). However, all of them failed to perform 
better than the passive strategy from a risk/return perspective. Calmar ratios are 0.18, 
0.08 and 0.19 respectively for CF/P, FCFE/P and DCF, which is smaller or on par with 
the 0.19 figure for a passive strategy.  
The above described results for one year testing period are confirmed by the 
tests for six and three months testing periods. Again, as in the one year period analysis 
most of the strategies not only performed worse than the passive one, but also do not 
have a statistically significant positive return over the whole period in the analysis 
according to the t-test, which is normally used in the literature. 
Again, the only exception, which performed relatively well, is the DCF, CF/P and 
FCFE/P strategies. All of them have a statistically significant positive return across the 
whole period for six months, with t-statistics of 3.8, 2.6 and 2.1 respectively, while for 
the three-month period only DCF and CF/P have the same characteristic. However, 
none of the strategies has a Calmar ratio, which could be considered as even close to 
the one for a passive strategy. For the six-month period Calmar ratios for the active 
strategies are 0.12, 0.11 and 0.01 respectively vs 0.19 for the passive strategy. For the 
three-month period Calmar ratios are 0.11, 0.14 and 0.06 for the active strategies 
respectively vs 0.17 for the passive one. 
The dominance of the passive strategy is also confirmed by the analysis on the 
basis of the full sample of periods. Cumulative return for the passive strategy ran 
forward from the end of March 1990 till end of March 2013 is better than for any of the 
contrarian strategies under review. This result is robust to the difference in the 
frequency of the portfolio rebalancing as it holds for 12, 6 and 3 months frequency.  
In the same way as in the previous analysis a passive strategy is better than 
contrarian one from risk/return perspective according to Calmar ratio. The only 
significant difference from the analysis on the basis of years where the contrarian profit 
is statistically significant is a raused ratio for DCF strategy (0.25 vs 0.20 for passive 
one). This is a result of inclusion into the sample the years where the strategy had 
positive returns, but which cannot be considered as statistically significant ones (which 
is driven more by luck rather than by the fundamental ability of the strategy to capture 
contrarian profits).  
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The fact that with these years in the sample for the analysis DCF started to look 
better that a passive strategy while this was not observed with the initial approach is a 
sign of a weakness of the approach when there is no separation of years on the base of 
the statistical significance of contrarian profits in each of them. Addition of the years 
where contrarian profits happened mostly due to luck factor (as there is no statistically 
significant difference between returns of glamour and value portfolios) resulted in the 
boost of results for DCF which was not due to some fundamental characteristics of the 
strategy. 
Moreover, comparison for six and three months rebalancing options shows that 
superiority of DCF strategy disappears when a shorter portfolio formation and test 
period is used.  
My results advance a non-risk based type of rational explanations of contrarian 
profits existence. One of the key factors in this category is trading costs (Lo and 
Coggins (2006)). Once an investor sees that contrarian profits for a particular strategy 
disappear when trading costs are taken into consideration he or she will not be inclined 
to use this contrarian strategy. In my view, it works the same way with the comparison 
to the passive strategy. Once an investor sees that a particular contrarian strategy fails 
to produce better results from risk return perspective than a passive strategy (even 
without taking into consideration trading costs) he or she is likely not to use this 
contrarian strategy. 
Further research of contrarian strategies efficiency in comparison to a passive 
strategy can include application of other risk/return coefficients, which should give a 
more complete picture given that some of the methods could result in the superiority of 
a particular contrarian strategy. 
In addition, there is a need to take into consideration the transaction costs, 
including those related to maintaining short positions in glamour stocks over a one year 
period. A revision of a portfolio once a year, three of six months should not add a lot to 
the transactions costs in terms of brokerage fees. However, maintaining a short position 
for such long period of time could be a costly exercise. 
It should be also valuable to know whether long only strategy, which focuses on 
value stocks selected with a particular approach (ratios, past returns, valuation models), 
is better than a passive strategy from risk return perspective. Sustainable superiority of 
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a particular value strategy can be also called as market anomaly. Consequently, the 
reasons behind such anomaly worth examining.   
6.3. The findings and further research: the correction to prior mis-pricing 
On the question related to the comparative importance of the behavioural explanation 
(mispricing correction) of contrarian profits vs the rational one (dynamics of stocks’ fair 
prices) I find that fair value revisions to new information is less important in explaining 
contrarian profits than behavioural aspects when the market in 2009 rebounded from 
the 2008 financial crisis. 
When one includes only 2009 as the test, which examines the ability of the 
regression to explain contrarian profit, partially succeeded only in that year, when the R2 
was close to or higher than 50% for RIM, Ohlson (0,0) and DCF and was in the range of 
40-45% for Ohlson (1,0) and B/P. These strategies represent five out of eight strategies 
which have a statistically significant contrarian profit in 2009.  
The result that behavioral factor is more important than a rational one that year 
looks logical given that in 2009 the market was rebounding from the oversold levels of 
the crisis in 2008 and consequently more focus should be put on the value stocks. 
However, glamour stocks also rebounded and consequently instead of a price decline to 
a fair value there was price growth given that in 2008 valuations of glamour portfolio 
stocks seem to be also depressed.  
The fact that the regression was able to explain the contrarian profits in only one 
year out of eight years with statistically significant contrarian profits (on average for the 
above-mentioned strategies) shows that there are some other factors which are missing 
from the regression which were important in the years when the markets were not 
recovering from as severe a turmoil as in 2008. Flight to quality, which normally happen 
during periods of turmoil on the market, is one of many irrational factors (in the sense 
that investors are driven by factors other than trying to buy undervalued stocks and sell 
overvalued ones to get alpha) which affect stock prices and result in the deviation of 
prices from fair levels. This factor is a top-down one and a rather strong one. 
Consequently, the assumption, underlying the behavioural factor in the regression, is 
that there is the same mispricing correction for all glamour stocks as a part of the fair 
value and the same mispricing correction for value stocks as a part of their fair value 
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can be more close to the reality than for those years when other irrational factors (more 
bottom-up ones) resulted in stock prices deviation from their fair values.  
The fact that the regression was not able to explain the contrarian profits in any 
year for the most efficient strategy P/CF with the largest number of years where 
contrarian profits were significant also could be an indication that there are other 
behavioural factors which regularly lead to the creation of mispricing and consequently 
to mispricing correction.  
The test of the relevant significance of the rational and behavioural factors on the 
overall sample of years has confirmed the superiority of the behavioural factors as well.  
In nine or out ten examined strategies at least one behavioural factor has a statistically 
significant linear coefficient, while for the rational factor this is the case for only five 
strategies. In the only regression when neither of the behavioural factors are statistically 
significant (for contrarian strategy based on the FCFE/P ratio) the linear coefficient for 
the rational factor is also not significant. 
With the whole sample in the analysis the conclusion is stronger than the 
conclusion on the base of the years where contrarian profit is statistically significant. 
Consequently, in the same way as in chapter 3 (with the improved result for DCF 
strategy when all years were taken into consideration) the approach with the whole 
sample in the analysis in chapter 4 has increased the strength on the conclusion 
regarding the overall superiority of behavioural factors vs the rational one. This could be 
a sign of the misleading effect after an inclusion in the analysis the years where 
contrarian profit happened mainly due to luck rather than the due to fundamental ability 
of a particular strategy to distinguish between under and overvalued companies. 
My results are related to and concord with the results of Lakonishoket al (1994), 
La Porta (1996) and Decho and Sloan (1997) who argue that there are errors in the 
future expectations priced in to  market prices about the relative worth of value and 
glamour stocks, either due to extrapolation of past results or due to mispricing 
embedded in analysts expectation which contain errors. My results extend their analysis 
as I show that the mispricing correction directly impacts upon  contrarian profits while 
the above mentioned authors did not do this, but rather indicate that there is  mispricing 
in  both value and glamour portfolios stocks at formation dates. 
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Further extension of research in this sphere can be done with the aim to 
incorporate the impact of other irrational factors such as the effects from flows into 
passive strategies (i.e. exchange traded funds), trading on the basis of technical 
indicators and other factors which affect stocks prices, but are not based on the analysis 
of their fundamentals. 
6.4. The findings and further research: the effect of Fama French 
adjustments 
On the final question related to incorporation on Fama-French three factor model into 
the analysis, I find that rational pricing factors are more important in explaining 
contrarian profits than behavioral aspects, which is mainly due to the significance of the 
Fama-French three factor model. This is different from the results of the Fama and 
French, who argue that FF three factor model can fully explain the contrarian profits for 
contrarian strategies, in cases where  the stocks are ranked only with the use of one 
criteria (Fama and French 1996 for US, Fama et al 2000 for US, Gregory et al 2001 for 
UK). My analysis shows that another rational factor – dynamics of a fair price - is also 
important (although in less cases that the FF three factor model). This relates to the 
result of Shiller (1981) that fair price sets a long term trend for a stock prices and 
extends his outcome as in my analysis fair price dynamics are based on a wide variety 
of methods. 
Again 2009 was the year when the test of overall significance of the regression 
succeeded in five out of ten strategies. In addition, regression for two strategies 
succeeded in 2003 year as well. Moreover, in one case (DCF) there are two years when 
R2 is above 40%, which is 25% of the revised years for this strategy. In addition, for 
2009 R2 reached 81%, which is the highest observed R2 for the old and new 
regressions.  
In all the cases, rational factors proved to be relatively more important for 
explaining contrarian profits. In addition, in all the cases the level of conviction in the 
results is stronger for the new regression compared to the old one. The improvement of 
this test results is mainly due to the expected FF return factor, which is normally 
significant in more years than dynamics of the fair value (the second rational factor, 
which was used in both regressions). 
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Addition of the difference in expected returns between value and glamour stocks 
according to FF three factors model improved the contribution of rational factors to the 
explanation of the contrarian profits. In three years when the average R2 across the 
examined strategies is the highest (2000, 2003, 2009) this factor is significant in 100%, 
or close to this figure, of cases. Overall during the years where at least half of the 
strategies had significant contrarian profits factor the  variation associated with the FF 
three factor model has a higher share (in terms of the number of strategies where this 
factor is significant divided by the overall number of strategies under review for a 
particular year) compared to the other two factors (fair value, and any correction of prior 
mispricing) in four out of seven years, while the factor associated with the dynamics of 
fair price is better than the other two factors only in two years and the behavioral factor 
does not dominate in any of the years. 
The intention to benefit in terms of explanatory power after making the behavioral 
factor more stock specific mainly failed as this factor continued to be significant mainly 
in 2009 – the year of the strongest prior mispricing correction. The only notable 
exception is the test for DCF strategy. The behavioral factor is significant in two cases 
(2003, 2009) of a relatively high R2. Moreover it is significant in two other less significant 
cases (1997, 2000), but only in 2000 the linear coefficient is negative which is in line 
with the rational assumption behind this factor that there should be a negative difference 
between the value portfolio’s prior accumulated overreaction (in the best case it should 
be negative, meaning that the price performance should underperform the expected 
dynamics according to rational factors) and glamour prior accumulated overreaction (in 
the best case it should be positive, meaning that the price performance should 
outperform the expected price dynamics implied by rational factors). 
Such an outcome can be due to more stock specific factors needing  to be taken 
into consideration. I included the individual prior mispricing accumulation, assuming that 
it should affect the correction of this mispricing in the testing period, but this seems to 
be not enough. Additional factors can be related to the speed with which this 
accumulated mispricing will be eliminated. Here there could be a wide range of factors 
which sometimes are hard to quantify. For example, there could be a start of turnaround 
story for rather poorly  performing companies which is visible only through some news 
related to its change of strategy, but which could trigger investment strategy revision by 
the market participants. In addition, there could be some relation to the size of prior 
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mispricing the time during which was mainly accumulated and the correction of 
mispricing. For example, if mispricing mainly accumulated in the beginning of the prior 
period under review (one year in my tests) then it could be more likely to start being 
eliminated during the test period vs the case when mispricing was mainly accumulated 
in the end of the prior period under review. Further research can be done here to 
incorporate quantifiable proxies for investment strategy revisions during the testing 
period. For example, revisions of earnings expectations or the power of earnings 
surprises, etc. 
The outcome of the analysis on the basis of the overall sample shows an even 
greater dominance of rational factors vs the behavioural ones. In nine or out the ten 
examined strategies linear coefficients for both rational factors are statistically 
significant, while for the behavioural factor this the case for only two strategies. 
Moreover, for the only strategy (based of P/E ratio) when the linear coefficient for the 
rational factor, associated with the difference in dynamics of fair values between value 
and glamour stocks, is not statistically significant the linear coefficient for the 
behavioural factor is not statistically significant as well. Finally, in all the cases when 
linear coefficients upon the rational factors are statistically significant their signs are in 
line with  rational pricing, while for the behavioural factor this is the case only in one out 
of two cases with statistically significant linear coefficients. This means that the outcome 
of the analysis on the overall sample provides evidence the stronger dominance of the 
rational factors vs the behavioural one in explaining contrarian profits. 
In the same way as in Chapter 4 this could be a sign of a misleading effect from 
the inclusion in the analysis years where contrarian profits exist mainly due to luck 
rather than due to ability of a particular strategy to efficiently distinguish between under 
and overvalued stocks. 
The results on the overall sample are more close to the results of Fama and 
French 1996, Fama et al 2000 and Gregory et al 2001 in suggesting the contribution of 
behavioural factors in explaining observed contrarian profits is rather small. However, 
my results show that other rational factor – dynamics of fair value- is also important in 
most of the cases, which can be considered as an extension of the results of the 
abovementioned authors.  
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Overall the analysis in Chapter 4 and 5 re-enforces the finding in  
Chapter 3 that there were no rational reasons for an investor to use any of the 
contrarian strategies over the examined period (1990-2012). This conclusion arises 
because the strategies were less efficient than the simple passive buy and hold strategy 
with annual revision of constituents in line with the constituents of S&P 500 index. The 
main result of the analysis in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 is that some of the rational 
factors (the dynamics of fair value and the FF three factor model) explain at least part of 
the contrarian profit return. Consequently, the profits from contrarian strategies can only 
partly be attributed to a mispricing correction. This means that if only this part is 
compared with the passive investment, the domination of the latter should be even 
larger. This can be also a topic for further extension of the current research. 
It is also important to mention that the method of annual or even quarterly 
revisions is not what is normally used in practice. In practice a portfolio manager 
monitors the situation daily and could take actions if a particular stock or stocks started 
to perform quite differently from the rest of the market. In my view this is an important 
limitation of my analysis presented here. Consequently, it is worth examining how 
portfolio revisions can be done in way which is closer to the real life situation in the 
portfolio management sphere.    
Finally, the analysis of all the research questions can be expanded in breadth 
and depth. Other equity market can be also added to the analysis, while the research 
can also include more stocks from a particular market.  
 
 
  
References 
5.5. Conclusion 251 
References 
1. Abarbanell, J., and Bernard, V. (1992). Tests of Analysts' 
Overreaction/Underreaction to Earnings Information as an Explanation for 
Anomalous Stock Price Behavior. The Journal of Finance, vol. 47, no. 3, pp. 
1181-1207. 
2. Abarbanell, J., and Bernard, V. (2000). Is the U.S. stock market myopic? Journal 
of Accounting Research, vol. 38, no. 2, pp. 221-243. 
3. Aikman, D., Galesic, M., Gigerenzer, G., Kapedia, S., Katsikopoulos, K., Kothiyal, 
A., Murphy, E., and Neumann, T. (2014). Taking Uncertainty Seriously: simplicity 
versus complexity in financial regulation. Financial Stability Paper No. 38, Bank 
of England. London, UK.  
4. Alexeev, V., Tapon, F.  (2013). Equity Portfolio Diversification: How Many Stocks 
are Enough? Evidence from Five Developed Markets. Published by the 
University of Tasmania. Discussion paper series N 2013-16 
5. Akerlof, G. (1970). The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics, August, pp. 488-500. 
6. Antoniou, A., Galariotis, E., and Spyrou, I. (2005). Contrarian Profits and the 
Overreaction Hypothesis: the case of the Athens Stock Exchange. European 
Financial Management, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 71-98. 
7. Antoniou, A., Galariotis, E.C., and Spyrou, S.I., (2006). Short-Term Contrarian 
Strategies in The London Stock Exchange: Are They Profitable? Which Factors 
Affect Them? Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, vol. 33, no. 5&6, 839-
867. 
8. Asness, C.S. (1997). The Interaction of Value and Momentum Strategies. 
Financial Analysts Journal, March/April, pp. 29-35 
9. Assoe, K., and Sy, O. (2003). Profitability of the Short-Run Contrarian Strategy in 
Canadian Stock Markets. Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences (Revue 
canadienne des sciences de l’administration), vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 311-319. 
10. Baker, M., Wurgler, J. (2006). Investor sentiment and the cross-section of stock 
returns. The Journal of Finance, vol. 61, no. 4, pp. 1645–1680. 
References 
5.5. Conclusion 252 
11. Bali, T., Demirtas, O., Hovakimian, A. (2010). Corporate Financing Activities and 
Contrarian Investment. Review of Finance, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 543–584. 
12. Barth, M.E., Cram, D., and Nelson, K. (2001). Accruals and the Prediction of 
Future Cash Flows. The Accounting Review, vol. 76, no. 1, pp. 27–58. 
13. Baruch, L., and Feng G. (2016). The End of Accounting and the path forward for 
Investors and Managers, Wiley, 288 p. 
14. Begley, J., and Feltham, J. (2002). The relation between market values, earnings 
forecasts, and reported earnings. Contemporary Accounting Research 19, pp. 1-
48.  
15. Bergstresser, D., and Philippon, T. (2006). CEO incentives and earnings 
management. Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 80, no. 3, pp. 511-529. 
16. Bhattacharya, U., Daouk, H., and Welker, M. (2003). The World Price of Earnings 
Opacity. The Accounting Review, vol. 78, no. 3, pp. 641-678. 
17. Bildik, R., and Guley, G. (2007). Profitability of Contrarian Strategies: Evidence 
from Istanbul Stock Exchange. The International Review of Finance, vol. 7, no. 1-
2, pp. 61-87. 
18. Black, A.J., and McMillan, D.G. (2005). Value and growth stocks and cyclical 
asymmetries. Journal of Asset Management, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 104–116. 
19. Bodie, Z., Kane, A., and Marcus, A. (2008). Investments, 7th Edition. New York, 
McGraw-Hill.  
20. Brouwer, I., Van Der Put, J., and Veld, C. (1997). Contrarian investment 
strategies in a European context. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, vol. 
24, no. 9-10, pp. 1353-1366. 
21. Cai, C. (1997). Glamour and value strategies on the Tokyo stock exchange. 
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, vol. 24, no. 9-10, pp. 1291-1310. 
22. Capstaff, J., Paudyal, K., and Rees, W. (1995). The Accuracy and Rationality of 
Earnings Forecasts by UK Analysts. Journal of Business Finance and 
Accounting, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 67-86. 
23. Chan, K. C. (1988). On the Contrarian Investment Strategy. Journal of Business, 
vol. 61, no. 2, pp. 147-163. 
References 
5.5. Conclusion 253 
24. Chan, L., and Lakonishok., J. (2004). Value and growth investing: review and 
update. Financial Analysts’ Journal, vol. 60, no. 1, pp. 71-86. 
25. Chan, L., Hamao, Y., and Lakonishok, J. (1991). Fundamentals and stock returns 
in Japan. Journal of Finance, vol. 46, no. 5, pp. 1739-1764. 
26. Chang, R.P., McLeavey, D.W., and Rhee, S.G. (1995). Short-Term Abnormal 
Returns of The Contrarian Strategy in The Japanese Stock Market. Journal of 
Business Finance & Accounting, vol. 27, no. 7, pp. 1035-1048. 
27. Chin, J. Y. F., Prevost, A. K., and Gottesman, A. A. (2002). Contrarian Investing 
in a Small Capitalisation Market: Evidence from New Zeland. The Financial 
Review, vol. 37, pp. 421-446. 
28. Choi, Y.-S., O'Hanlon, J. F., and Pope, P. F. (2006). Conservative Accounting 
and Linear Information Valuation Models. Contemporary Accounting Research, 
vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 73-101. 
29. Christy, G. (2009). Free-cash flow: Seeing through the accounting fog machine to 
find great stocks. John Wiley & Son, Hobekon, New Jersey, USA. 
30. Cohen, D.A., and Zarowin, P. (2010). Accrual-based and real earnings 
management activities around seasoned equity offerings. Journal of Accounting 
and Economics, vol. 50, no. 1, pp. 2-19. 
31. Conrad, J., and Kaul, G. (1993). The Returns to Long Term Winners and Losers, 
Bid-ask Biases or Biases in Computed Returns. Journal of Finance, vol. 48, no. 
3, pp. 39-63. 
32. Conrad, J., Gultekin, M.N., and Kaul, G. (1997). Profitability of Short-Term 
Contrarian Strategies: Implications for Market Efficiency. Journal of Business & 
Economic Statistics, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 379-386. 
33. Constantinou, D., Forbes, W., and Skerratt, L. (2003). Analyst underreaction in 
the United Kingdom. Financial Management, vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 93-106. 
34. Damodaran, A., (2001). Corporate Finance: Theory and Practice, Second 
Edition. John Wiley and Sons, New York. 
35. Damodaran, A. (2004). Applied Corporate Finance: A User's Manual. John Wiley 
and Sons Ltd, New York, United States. 
References 
5.5. Conclusion 254 
36. Daniel, K., and Titman, S. (1997). Evidence on the Characteristics of Cross 
Sectional Variation in Stock Returns. Journal of Finance, vol. 52, no. 1, pp. 1-33. 
37. Davis, J.L. (1994). The Cross-Section of Realized Stock Returns: The Pre-
COMPUSTAT Evidence. Journal of Finance, vol. 49, no. 5, pp. 1579-1593. 
38. De Long, B., Shleifer, A., Summers, L., and Waldmann, R. (1990). Noise trader 
risk in financial markets. Journal of Political Economy, vol. 98 no. 4, pp. 703-738. 
39. DeBondt, W., and Thaler, R. (1985). Does the stock market overreact? Journal of 
Finance, vol. 40, no. 3, pp. 793-805. 
40. DeBondt, W., and Thaler, R. (1990). Do security analysts overreact? American 
Economic Review, vol. 80, no. 2, pp. 52-57. 
41. Dechow, P., Hutton, A., and Sloan, R. (1999). An empirical assessment of the 
residual income valuation model. Journal of Accounting & Economics, vol. 26, 
no. 1-3, pp. 1-34. 
42. Dechow, P.M., and Sloan, R.G. (1997). Returns to contrarian investment 
strategies: Tests of naive expectations hypotheses. Journal of Financial 
Economics, vol. 43, no. 1, pp. 3-27. 
43. Dechow, P.M., Weili, G., and Schrand, C. (2010). Returns to contrarian 
investment strategies: Tests of naive expectations hypotheses. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, vol. 50, pp. 344-401. 
44. Demirakos, E., Strong, N., and Walker, M. (2004). What valuation models do 
analysts use? Accounting Horizons, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 221-240. 
45. Dimson, E., Nagel, S., and Quigley, G. (2003). Capturing the value premium in 
the UK. Financial Analysts Journal, vol. 59, no. 6, pp. 35-45. 
46. Dissanaike, G. (1997). Do stock market investors overreact? Journal of Business 
Finance and Accounting, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 27–50. 
47. Dissanaike, G., and Lim., K. (2010). The sophisticated and the simple: the 
profitability of contrarian trading strategies. European Financial Management, vol. 
16, no. 2, pp. 229-255.  
References 
5.5. Conclusion 255 
48. Doukas, J. A., Kim, C., and Pantzalis, C. (2004). Divergent opinions and the 
performance of value stocks, Financial Analysts Journal, vol. 60, no. 6, pp. 55-
64. 
49. Dreman, D. (2012). Contrarian Investment Strategies: The Psychological Edge. 
Free Press, 496 p. 
50. Dunis, C., and Miao, J. (2006). Volatility filters for asset management: An 
application to managed futures. Journal of Asset Management, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 
179-189. 
51. Edwards, E.O., and Bell, P.W. (1961). The Theory and Measurement of Business 
Income. Oakland, University of California Press. 
52. Eling, M., and Schuhmacher, F. (2007). Does the choice of performance 
measure influence the evaluation of hedge funds? Journal of Banking & Finance, 
vol. 31, no. 9, pp. 2632–2647. 
53. Elton, E., and Gruber, M. (1976). Valuation and asset selection under alternative 
investment opportunities. Journal of Finance, vol. 31, no. 2, pp. 525-539. 
54. Fama, E.F., and French, K.R. (1992). The Cross-Section of Expected Stock 
Returns, Journal of Finance, vol. 47, no. 2, pp. 427-465. 
55. Fama, E.F., and French, K.R. (1996). Multifactor explanations of asset pricing 
anomalies, Journal of Finance, vol. 51, no. 1, pp. 55-84. 
56. Fama, E.F., and French, K.R. (1998). Value versus Growth: The International 
Evidence. Journal of Finance, vol. 53, no. 6, pp. 1975–1999. 
57. Fama, E.F., and French, K.R. (2015). A five factor asset pricing model. Journal of 
Financial Economics, vol. 116, no. 1, pp. 1–22. 
58. Feltham, G., and Ohlson, J. (1995). Valuation and clean surplus accounting for 
operating and financial activities. Contemporary Accounting Research, vol. 11, 
no. 2, pp. 689-731.  
59. Fluck, Z., Malkiel, B.G., and Quandt, R.E. (1997). The Predictability of Stock 
Returns: A Cross-Sectional Simulation. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 
vol. 79, no. 2, pp. 176-183.  
References 
5.5. Conclusion 256 
60. Forner, C., and Marhuenda, J. (2003). Contrarian and Momentum Strategies in 
the Spanish Stock Market. European Financial Management, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 
67-88. 
61. Francis, J., Olsson, P., and Oswald, D. (2000). Comparing Accuracy and Explain 
ability of Dividend, Free Cash Flow and Abnormal Earnings Equity Valuation 
Models. Journal of Accounting Research, vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 45-70. 
62. Frankel, R., and Lee, C. (1998). Accounting valuation, market expectation, and 
cross-sectional stock returns. Journal of Accounting and Economics, vol. 25, no. 
3, pp. 283-319. 
63. Giamouridis, D., and Montagu, C. (2011). The Sophisticated and the Simple: The 
Profitability of Contrarian Strategies from a Portfolio Manager’s Perspective, 
European Financial Management, 2011. 
64. Gigerenzer, G and Todd, P (1999). Simple heuristics that make us smart, Oxford 
University Press, 416 p.  
65. Gigerenzer, G., and Selten, R. (2001). Bounded rationality: The adaptive toolbox. 
Cambridge / MA: MIT Press. 
66. Gordon, M., and Shapiro, E. (1956). Capital equipment analysis: the required 
rate of profit. Management Science, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 102-110. 
67. Graham, B., and Dodd, D (2009). Security Analysis: Sixth Edition. McGraw Hill, 
766 p. 
68. Gregory, A., Harris, R.D.F., and Michou, M. (2001). An Analysis of Contrarian 
investment strategies in the UK. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, vol. 
28, no. 9&10, pp. 1193-1228. 
69. Gregory, A., Harris, R.D.F., and Michou, M. (2003). Contrarian Investment and 
Macroeconomic Risk. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, vol. 30, no. 
1&2, pp. 215-253. 
70. Gregory, A., Tharyan, R., and Tonks, I. (2013). More than just contrarians: 
Insider trading glamour and value firms. European Financial Management, 
vol.19, no. 4, pp. 747-774.  
References 
5.5. Conclusion 257 
71. Healy, P.M., and Wahlen, J.M. (1999). A review of the earnings management 
literature and its implications for standard setting. Accounting Horizons, vol. 13, 
no. 4, pp. 365-383. 
72. Heidorn, T., Kaiser, D.G., and Roder, C. (2009). The Risk of Funds of Hedge 
Funds: An Empirical Analysis of the Maximum Drawdown. The Journal of Wealth 
Management, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 89-100. 
73. Hurley, W., and Johnson, L. (1994). A realistic dividend valuation model. 
Financial Analyst Journal, vol. 50, no. 4, pp. 50-54. 
74. Jamin, G. (2005). Investment Performance of Residual Income Valuation Models 
on The German Stock Market. Research Papers of the Institute for Business 
Management 
75. Jegadeesh, N., and Titman, S. (1993). Returns to Buying Winners and Selling 
Losers: Implications for Stock Market Efficiency. Journal of Finance, vol. 48, no. 
1, pp. 65-91. 
76. Johnston, K., and Cox, D.R. (1996). Tax Loss Selling and the Contrarian 
Investment Strategy. Journal of Economics and Finance, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 87-
94. 
77. Jorgensen, B., Lee, Y., and Yoo, Y. (2005). An Empirical Assessment of the 
valuation accuracy of the Abnormal Earnings Growth valuation model. URL: 
http://www.accountancy.smu.edu.sg/research/seminar/pdf/YongKeunYOO.pdf, 
accessed 25 May 2008. 
78. Kryzanowski, L., and Zhang, H. (1992). The Contrarian Investment Strategy 
Does Not Work in Canadian Markets. Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis, vol. 27, no. 3, pp. 383-395. 
79. La Porta, R. (1996). Expectations and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns. 
Journal of Finance, vol. 51, no. 5, pp. 1715-1742. 
80. Lakonishok, J., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. (1994). Contrarian Investment, 
Extrapolation and Risk. Journal of Finance, vol. 49, no 5, pp. 1541-1578. 
81. Lee, C., and Swaminathan, B. (1999). Valuing the Dow: A bottom up approach. 
Financial Analysts Journal, vol. 55, no. 5, pp. 4-23.  
References 
5.5. Conclusion 258 
82. Lee, C.M.C, Myers, J., and Swaminathan, B. (1999). What is the intrinsic value of 
the Dow? Journal of Finance, vol. 54, no. 5, pp. 1693–1741. 
83. Levis, M., and Liodakis, M. (2001). Contrarian Strategies and Investor 
Expectations: The U.K. Evidence. Financial Analysts Journal, vol. 57, no. 5, pp. 
43-56. 
84. Lo, A.W., and MacKinlay,A.C (1990). When are Contrarian Profits Due to Stock 
Market Overreaction?. The Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1990), pp. 
175-205. 
85. Lo, K., and Coggins, R. (2006). Effects of order flow imbalance on short-horizon 
contrarian strategies in the Australian equity market. Pacific-Basin Finance 
Journal, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 291-310. 
86. Maheshwari, S., Dhankar, R. (2017). Profitability of Volume-based Momentum 
and Contrarian Strategies in the Indian Stock Market. Global Business Review, 
vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 974-992. 
87. Mao, J. (1966). The Valuation of Growth Stocks: The Investment Opportunities 
Approach. Journal of Finance, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 95-102. 
88. McCrae, M., and Nilsson, H. (2001). The explanatory and predictive power of 
different specifications of the Ohlson (1995) valuation models. European 
Accounting Review, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 315-341. 
89. McFall Lamm, R. Jr. (2004). The Role of Long/Short Equity Hedge Funds in 
Investment Portfolios. URL: 
http://www.trendfollowing.com/whitepaper/long_short.pdf, accessed 20 August 
2008. 
90. McInish, T., Ding, D., Pyun, C., and Wongchoti, U. (2008). Short-horizon 
contrarian and momentum strategies in Asian markets: An integrated analysis. 
International Journal of Financial Analysis, vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 312-329. 
91. Miller, M., and Modigliani, F. (1961). Dividend policy, growth and the valuation of 
shares. Journal of Business, vol. 34, no. 4, pp. 411-433. 
92. Mun, J., Vasconellos, G., and Kish, R. (1999). Testing of the contrarian 
investment strategy: Evidence from French and German stock markets. 
International Review of Financial Analysis, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 215-234.  
References 
5.5. Conclusion 259 
93. Myers, J. (1999). Implementing residual income valuation with linear information 
dynamics. The Accounting Review, vol. 74, no.1, pp. 1-28. 
94. Novy-Marx, R. (2013). The other side of value: The gross profitability premium. 
Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 108, no.1, pp. 1-28. 
95. Ohlson, J. (1990). A synthesis of security valuation theory and the role of 
dividends, cash flows and earnings. Contemporary Accounting Research, vol. 6, 
no. 2, pp. 648-676. 
96. Ohlson, J. (1995). Earnings, book-values and dividends in equity. Contemporary 
Accounting Review, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 661-687. 
97. Ohlson, J., and Gao, Z. (2006). Earnings, earnings growth and value. 
Foundations and Trends in Accounting, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 1-70.  
98. Ohlson, J., and Juettner-Nauroth, B. (2005). Expected EPS and EPS Growth as 
determinants of value. Review of Accounting Studies, vol. 10, no. 2/3, pp. 349-
365. 
99. Peasnell, K.V. (1982). Some Formal Connections Between Economic Values and 
Yields and Accounting Numbers. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 
vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 361-381. 
100. Penman, S. (2013). Financial Statement analysis and security valuation, 
5th Edition. New York, MCGraw-Hill. 
101. Penman, S., and Sougiannis, T. (1998). A Comparison of Dividend, Cash 
Flow and Earnings Approaches for Equity Valuation. Contemporary Accounting 
Research, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 343-383. 
102. Penman, S.H. (2005). Discussion of “On accounting-based valuation 
formulae” and “Expected EPS and EPS growth as determinants of value”. 
Review of Accounting Studies, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 367-378. 
103. Piotroski, J., and So, E. (2012). Identifying Expectation Errors in 
Value/Glamour Strategies: A Fundamental Analysis. The Review of Financial 
Studies, vol. 25, no. 9, pp. 2841-2875 
104. Piotroski, J., (2000). Value Investing: The Use of Historical Financial 
Statement Information to Separate Winners From Losers. Journal of Accounting 
Research, vol. 38, pp.1-41.  
References 
5.5. Conclusion 260 
105. Romero, S. and Berenson, A. (2002). WorldCom Says It Hid Expenses, 
Inflating Cash Flow $3.8 Billion. New York Times, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/26/business/worldcom-says-it-hid-expenses-
inflating-cash-flow-3.8-billion.html 
106. Rollinger, T., and Hoffman, S. (2013). Sortino ratio: A better measure of 
risk. Futures Magazine. 
107. Shiller, R. (1981). Do Stock Prices Move Too Much to be Justified by 
Subsequent Changes in Dividends? American Economic Review, vol. 71, no. 3, 
pp. 421-436.  
108. Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. (1997). The Limits to Arbitrage. Journal of 
Finance, vol. 52, no. 1, pp. 35-55. 
109. Skerratt, L. (2000). Contrarian investment strategy using financial ratios. 
URL: http://lenskerratt.0catch.com/contrarian.pdf, accessed 16 November 2007. 
110. Sloan, R. (1996). Do stock prices fully reflect information in accruals and 
cash flows about future earnings. The Accounting Review, vol. 71, no. 3, pp. 289-
315. 
111. Sortino, F., and Forsey, H. (1996). On the use and misuse of downside 
risk. Journal of Portfolio Management, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 35-42. 
112. Sortino, F., and van de Meer, F. (1991). Downside risk. Journal of Portfolio 
Management, vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 27-31. 
113. Wu, Y., Li, Y. and Hamill, P. (2012). Do Low-Priced Stocks Drive Long-
Term Contrarian Performance on the London Stock Exchange? The Financial 
Review, vol. 47, no. 3, pp. 501 - 530. 
114. Xie, H. (2001). The mispricing of abnormal accruals. The Accounting 
Review, vol. 76, no. 3, pp. 357-373. 
115. Young, T. (1991). Calmar ratio: a smoother tool. Future Magazine, vol. 20, 
no. 1, pp. 40. 
116. Young, T.W. (1991). Calmar Ratio: A Smoother Tool. Futures Magazine, 
vol. 20, no. 1, p. 40.  
References 
5.5. Conclusion 261 
117. Zarowin, P. (1990). Size, Seasonality, and Stock Market Overreaction. 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 113-125. 
118. Zhang, G., (2000). Accounting information, capital investment decisions, 
and equity valuation: theory and empirical implications. Journal of Accounting 
Research, vol. 38, no. 2, pp. 271–295. 
119. Zou, L., and Chen, R. (2017). Earnings surprises, investor sentiments and 
contrarian strategies. International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, 
vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 133–143.  
 
 
